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ABSTRACT
This research situates the philosophy of existentialism in the history of rhetorical inquiry,
arguing that its focus on intersubjective communication creates both a rhetorical orientation to
the world and a unique method of public address called edification. The author addresses
misperceptions of existentialism, suggesting that its purported emphasis of alienation and
nothingness is misguided, and moves to an understanding of existentialism as concerned with the
meaning in life as opposed to the meaning of life. Works from the following existentialists are
analyzed and adapted in this research: Soren Kierkegaard, Miguel de Unamuno, Karl Jaspers,
Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The project begins with an
understanding of rhetoric as an existential world-view grounded in communication and
contingency—one that extends from the sophists of Ancient Greece to the existentialist
movement. It then draws connections between the rhetorical theorist, Kenneth Burke, and
existentialist criticism and literature. The author also demonstrates how existentialism helps
recover a sense of rhetorical agency in a postmodern world where agentic action is questioned. A
rhetorical model of communication, edification, is then theorized as speech directed to the
individuals within a public. Examples of edifying discourse are identified in the works of
Erasmus, Angelina Grimké Weld, and John Ruskin. This research aims to show how the concept
and interaction of communication are the dominant themes of existentialism, which provides a
rhetorical texture of an idea that is often considered the provenance of philosophy. The author
also suggests existentialism contributes new ideas about how to theorize rhetoric from both a
methodological and practical standpoint.
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INTRODUCTION
“The problems of speech and language are,
on the most fundamental level of analysis,
inextricably intertwined with the wider problem
of human existence. Speaking is an existential project
through which human existence in its manifold
concreteness comes to expression.”
Calvin O. Schrag, Experience and Being (159)
Burnished with the philosophical reduction, existence before essence, and conflated with
absurdity, despair, nihilism, and, nothingness, the academic reputation of existentialism often
fares little better than a Dostoevsky buffoon, inebriated and lacerated at the cuff, having been
defenestrated out of a local tavern for outstanding debts and outrageous conduct. The
existentialists themselves assailed one another and sought distance from the label, so critics of its
body of thought are seemingly invited to denunciate or dismiss it. This project tries to turn the
tables on this approach to existentialism, arguing that it finds a more profitable articulation by
shifting it to be examined as a rhetorical construct. Rather than a defunct philosophy that is seen
to endorse a fluid egotism of the self, existentialism can be seen an intellectual enterprise that
concentrates on the difficulties that face human beings who experience being by communicatingin-the-world. It posits the necessity of how we have to communicate with others, the problems
that ensue from this will-to-communication, and a unique method by which we can communicate
with others authentically. By teasing out the pervasive yet widely neglected interest in rhetoric in
the existentialist canon, I locate this body of thought squarely within the communication
discipline. In doing so, I suggest rhetorical inquiry benefits from enfolding existentialism in its
domain since the latter richly contributes to the former in a critical, historical, and methodological
manner. Adapting existentialism as such transforms what is thought to be an outdated philosophy
into an dynamic orientation, method and style of rhetoric.
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A rhetoric of existentialism begins by admitting the deficient features of human
communication. It emphasizes the possibilities of human relations rather than the perfection of a
sought-after determinism which would result in the finality of discourse. In short, existentialism is
comfortable with the problematicity of discourse—critical issues faced in life are never
completed, but extended so as to generate new questions to be engaged in the future. Examples of
this include Kierkegaard’s wish to make life more difficult in the face of utilitarianism and easy
faith; Miguel Unamuno’s favoring of an eternal restlessness to which human relations can be
bettered, but never resolved; Jean-Paul Sartre’s exposure of the subject in one’s naked
vulnerability before the other; Simone de Beauvoir’s description of the demanding tension
between people that existentialism provides; Karl Jaspers’ conception of truth as a communicative
process of inquiry rather than fixed assertions with a priori warrants; and Gabriel Marcel’s
emphasis on living with a permanent uneasiness. Despite the ostensible differences among such
thinkers under the heading, existentialism, it is this consistent model of communication that binds
it together and also answers its fiercest critics. In existentialism one finds an ontological
conception of rhetoric, one that focuses on not only how communication flourishes in the world
for human beings, but what implications that portends for individual existence.
This project seeks to rehabilitate existentialism by adapting a rhetorical framework in
which to conceive a better understanding of it. Existentialism needs not be looked upon as a
philosophy, but rather, in appropriating a Burkean vocabulary, an attitude, frame and/or
orientation that recognizes and emphasizes the multiplicity of symbolic action. As such, I engage
rhetorical inquiry and existentialism to generate a heuristic study that looks to answer a variety of
critical problems that beset the humanities. The questions and concerns explored in this study
include the marginalized status of existentialism in contemporary scholarship; the dismissal of
(sophistic) rhetoric after Plato; whether rhetorical inquiry is limited to the evaluation of suasory
2

discourse; the fraught categorization of Kenneth Burke; the possibility of rhetorical agency; and
the attempt to create a unique form of rhetorical discourse which departs from the Aristotelian
categories of deliberative, forensic, and epideictic address. Existentialism challenges and
confronts rhetorical inquiry in two distinct ways that become clear in the chapters to follow: first,
it articulates a rhetorical orientation to life itself, one that emphasizes the extreme contingency of
human situations and highlights the process of intersubjective communication as the only possible
avenue of negotiating such situations. Second, its method of communication does not follow the
civic discourse model of address. Existentialism offeres a rhetoric of edificiation, which proceeds
with neither propositional nor didactic claims to truth because, like postmodernism, it distrusts
epistemological certainty, teleological claims of policy, and operates from without a priori
assumptions or determinisms. Unlike postmodern and post-humanist philosophies, however,
existentialism attempts to recover and encourage a sense of human agency in the contemporary
world. I defend existentialism through a rhetorical vocabulary that accentuates how the rhetorical
subject is not isolated in his/her subjectivity so long as the possibility of communication exists.
Yet unlike a traditionalist account of rhetoric, agency is not assumed and the efficacy of a rhetoric
act is not judged by the criterion of historical success. Rather, humans face radically contingent
situations which are constrained by what Jean-Paul Sartre considers our facticity; human actors
negotiate their social environment with no guarantee that their communicative acts will translate
into successful action. Meaning and action are, ultimately, joint efforts corroborated by the
dramatism of intersubjective play. Within these limit situations, as Karl Jaspers refers to them,
existentialism seeks an authentic rhetoric that avoids inducing conformity with a mass,
acknowledges the impossibility of perfect communication, and distrusts ad populum reasoning.
Whereas Sartre writes that human beings are condemned to their freedom, a rhetoric of
existentialism, as I conceive it, suggests that human beings are condemned to rhetoric. This
3

condemnation, however, betokens an opportunity for awareness and the cultivation of improved
social interaction between subjects and action. Burke and Sartre share this insofar as identifying
the negative (though often misconstrued, I think, as nihilistic) function of human ontology. Burke,
for instance, writes that language-use is predicated on the negative; Sartre, meanwhile, writes how
“nature does not say yes or no…[only] thoughts say no” (“Existentialism and Humanism” 51).
Existentialism is comfortable with dealing with the flaws of the communication process, and
although criticized for despair and nihilism, existentialism, knowing that the eradication of
ambiguity is impossible (Beauvoir), locates a rhetorical subject who embraces the contingency of
relations, recognizes difference, and seeks to intensify the lived relation of being-with-others.
Where it remains inconsistent as a philosophy among its variegated thinkers, existentialism
possesses this frame of acceptance and orients itself to the other through communicative praxis. I
continually stress throughout this project that existentialism is not beholden to passivity or
cynicism but seeks an active, re-integrative relationship among humans accomplished through the
resources of a communicative rhetoric.
My project focuses on existentialism but is not designed as many such book-length
projects on the subject, which typically offer a chronological summary of the existentialists
beginning with Kierkegaard. As a dissertation on rhetoric, the chapters here are topical, and each
one adapts existentialism in a unique manner to address a problem or create a new rhetorical
frame. This method is limited in that it does not rehash for the reader a narrative of existentialism,
which, while entertaining reading, is often burdened or dominated by the controversial identities
and positions of its members from Kierkegaard on through Nietzsche and the German and French
existentialists. My aim is to revive this marginalized philosophy through the lens of rhetoric; my
hope is that the research and ideas generated in this study challenge some of the accepted beliefs
about both existentialism and rhetoric. Since most existentialists concentrate in great detail about
4

communication, I consider it belonging to the discipline of rhetoric, not philosophy. By adapting
this, however, rhetoric is changed anew.

5

CHAPTER ONE: EXISTENTIALISM AS A NEO-SOPHISTICAL
RHETORICAL ORIENTATION
“[E]xistentialism sends us back to the muck and mire
of the contingency of human existence;
like rhetoric, it earns its living there.”
-

Michael J. Hyde, “Existentialism” (246)

One of the few contemporary writers who has taken the legacy of existentialism seriously
is the recently passed Norman Mailer. A chapter of his 2006 book, The Big Empty, is entitled
“Existentialism—Does It Have a Future?” The mercurial novelist suggests that one of the
movements founders, Jean-Paul Sartre, “derailed” it by virtue of his professed atheism—
godlessness, it is averred, “deprived existentialism of more interesting explorations” (203-4).
Mailer voices this concern as early as 1959, expressing dismay over existentialism’s lack of a
clearly defined telos: “To be a real existentialist (Sartre admittedly to the contrary) one must be
religious; one must have one’s sense of ‘purpose’—whatever the purpose may be” (“The White
Negro” 214). Then as now, as his chapter title presages, Mailer hopes to rehabilitate existenz
philosophy. To do so, he recommends conceiving God anew—as divorced from the “gargantuan
oxymoron” that God is All-Good and All-Powerful: “If existentialism is to flourish (that is,
develop through a series of new philosophies building on earlier premises), it needs a God who is
no more confident of the end than we are [….] For the end is not written. If it is, there’s no place
for existentialism” (Big Empty 205-6). While the claim is accurate in capturing the basis of
existentialism’s understanding of life as unfolding without any a priori determinisms, it
implicates a correspondence to rhetorical inquiry ranging as far back as Isocrates, who said: “I
think it clear to all that it is not in our nature to know in advance what is going to happen”
(“Against the Sophists” 2). Neither God nor humans, that is, possess any assurances or
knowledge about the future. As such, existentialism should not seek to develop new
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metaphysical, philosophical, or spiritual doctrines, as Mailer suggests, but rather ground itself in
rhetorical theory. God can retain His perfection (or absence) in Truth, whatever that may be; the
interrogative purpose of existentialism Mailer attempts to clarify could more profitably be sought
by examining humans, with their propensity for symbolic action and rhetoric, as vehicles driving
toward an end that is not yet written and deprived of any a priori certainty. This underscores the
warrant sanctioning rhetorical inquiry and existentialism suits it notably well. It is not God who
is imperfect; it is the inter-human creation and exchange of meaning that is an ultimately fallible
enterprise. As Karl Jaspers writes, “Life, being essentially imperfect, and, as we know,
intolerable, is continually seeking to re-fashion the life-order under new forms” (Man in the
Modern Age 71). Rhetoric is the result of this imperfection of which Jaspers refers.
Existentialism might benefit, then, from a rhetorical framework in order to develop a more
effectual means by which to galvanize its corpus and sustain its viability.
My contention is that Mailer’s conception of an imperfect God is a misguided attempt to
reorient existentialism. To begin with, Sartre, while a professed atheist, considers existentialism
above all “a doctrine of action” concerned with the ensuing responsibility entailed in the freedom
of human interaction, not the positing this way or that of metaphysical truths or an excursus
“exhaust[ing] itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God” (“Existentialism and
Humanism” 46). Elsewhere Sartre acknowledges the Christian spirituality of Gabriel Marcel and
Karl Jaspers and the atheism of Martin Heidegger and Albert Camus as being compatible to
existentialism (to which can be added the Christian spirituality of Soren Kierkegaard, the
Judaism of Martin Buber, the agnosticism of Miguel de Unamuno, and the atheism of Simone de
Beauvoir) (27). In light of the spiritual diversity among its thinkers, I shall argue it is a rhetorical
orientation that binds them together—one that affords pious spirituality as much as free-thinking.
While Mailer’s recognition of the marginalization of existentialism is accurate, I engage it from a
7

different perspective in order to encourage a heuristic renewal. The discipline of rhetoric, no
stranger to marginalization since the time of Plato, offers an appropriate bedfellow to the
challenge: their mutual castigation aside, the major works of existentialism cultivate a rhetoric
that grounds communication as the ontological basis for human being. Exploring this
relationship confirms and expands upon Richard Weaver’s suggestion that rhetoric’s “topic
matter is existential”—“it must deal with the world, the thickness, stubbornness, and power of it”
(Language is Sermonic 216, 206). Rhetoric benefits from examining existentialism in such a
manner because the latter effectively articulates and revives a rhetorical worldview that captures
the perspective of the Greek Sophists, most of whose work is either not extant or severely
attenuated by a history of rhetoric inquiry grounded in Plato and Aristotle.
Existentialism inhabits the spatial absence of a genuine rhetorical orientation following
Plato’s sophistic critique of rhetoric—a lacuna Aristotle and many rhetoricians, who characterize
rhetoric as a technê of oral, written, and visual persuasion, have not adequately addressed. Since
sophistical rhetoric is interested in exploiting “the radical novelty of an ever unfolding present”
(Poulakos, Sophistical Rhetoric 190) and existentialism requires an investigation into the
“process and the choice of possible action” (Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age 159), a neosophistic model of rhetoric develops. In the argument that follows, rhetoric is first advanced as a
defining characteristic of the human life-world, not as a branch of epistemology interested in
mere persuasion. An examination of the sophistic movement incorporating existentialism is next
offered as a way to bridge the latter with rhetoric. I then tease out the attributes of existentialism
as an ontological rhetoric and demonstrate how the existentialist preoccupation with freedom
dovetails as a clearing for interrogating the creation and exchange of meaning. I conclude this
chapter by presenting the resistance to such an orientation that amounts to what I call the
Platonic Trap.
8

The Movement of Rhetoric
Enfolding existentialism within rhetorical inquiry must first delineate what is meant by
rhetoric as a discipline or study. Definitions of rhetoric abound, but scant attention is paid to how
a definition of rhetoric is formed. This chapter suggests rhetoric should be considered as a
defining condition rather than be tied down to a definable quality. I offer rhetorical inquiry as a
two-part movement that establishes itself ontologically and then transitions to a the creation or
evaluation of efficacious discourse. Rhetoric first proceeds by ontologically locating radically
contingent situations where beings create and struggle over meaning through the deployment and
exchange of symbols. It speaks to the pervasive tension of human relations inherent to beings
who necessarily rely on symbol-usage. As Schrag observes, “Rhetoric is the interaction of self
and other in dialogue and public encounter,” not limited to argument as a technique but
“encompass[ing] the aesthetical, ethical, and social practices of mankind” (“Rhetoric Situated”
170-173). While we find, for instance, twenty-four definitions of rhetoric on the American
Rhetoric website, it might be worthwhile to invert rhetoric such that it is not we, as humans, who
define rhetoric, but it is we, as humans, who are defined by rhetoric. Before clarifying a working
definition of rhetoric, there is a need to identify a rhetorical consciousness that permeates the
human life-word—recognizing, that is, Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.’s assertion, “To be human, then,
is to practice rhetoric” (“From Philosophy to Rhetoric” 58). Rhetoric is the intersection of an
ontological relationship between humans and communication in which the malleable properties
of language—when deployed, received, and returned—conceive a human life-world that
amounts to a rhetorical orientation. As Kenneth Burke writes, “Much of what has been attributed
to rhetoric in particular is more appropriately attributed to language in general” (“Dramatism
and Logology” 92). The two are not mutually exclusive, however, and should not be bifurcated
as such. While thinkers such as Burke and Schrag have distinguished between the ontological
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and epistemological functions of rhetoric, the transitional movement from one to the other should
be emphasized. Our very being, as humans, is rhetorically inscribed.
Only after having established rhetoric as an existential framework of intersubjective
meaning can it—or should it—be pursued as a technê of persuasive communication leading to
epistemological certainty or teleological change. My contention is that before assessing
rhetorical theory, analyzing communicative acts, or teaching rhetorical inquiry, one must furnish
a rhetorical world-view that addresses how and why humans rely on communication. Hans
Blumenberg illustrates this ontological component: “Rhetoric is an ‘art’ because it is an epitome
of difficulties with reality, and reality has been pre-understood, in our tradition, primarily as
‘nature’” (454). Rhetoric thus begins as an ontological perspective prior to any development of
its methods and practice. The significance of creating, delivering, and analyzing the situational
efficacy of discourse grows out of recognizing the communicative resources that govern the
human life-world. According to Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Persuasion is [only] possible because
men create meaning, because language itself is a motivating force, and because language may be
used both to modify man’s basic needs and to influence his symbolically created social and
cultural motives” (“Ontological Foundations” 104). It is both necessarily anthropomorphic and
intrinsically existentialist in scope because the communicative dynamic inherent to human life
creates the very means with which to examine existence. The existentialist Maurice MerleauPonty declares, for instance, “speech inaugurated a new world” and that we “must pay a price for
understanding language” (Prose of the World 42-3). “Rhetoric,” Burke likewise asserts in A
Rhetoric of Motives, “is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall” (23). Rhetoric initially
presents itself as the perforce recognition of this cost of admission to human existence, and, with
it, a confrontation with the gaps, imperfections, and messiness that the aptitude for symbolic
exchange augurs. Humans are rendered scattershot across Earth and start out with only the
10

faculty of communicative resources at our disposal to negotiate life with one another. Because
these resources are inherently limited and never teleologically completed between persons, this
represents, for Jaspers, “the perpetual insufficiency of communication,” and it requires a will to
have a genuine awareness of such difficulty (Philosophy 92). A consideration of rhetorical
address ensues only subsequent to addressing rhetoric as a fallible coefficient of the human lifeworld. Existentialism assists in articulating and clarifying rhetoric’s metaphysical condition.
As opposed to asserting a definable rhetoric as a quality of discourse, conceiving rhetoric
as a defining characteristic of human experience resituates how a rhetorical situation should be
considered. Considering the work of Lloyd Bitzer is instructive here: defining rhetorical activity
as a method of response, he writes that an exigence arises that invites utterance and the
conditions of a situation dictate how a rhetor creates and presents a discourse to a public. An
immediate audience is specified within the rhetorical situation, “consist[ing] only of those
persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change” (8).
Bitzer’s characterization of the rhetorical situation can be reduced, however, to an ontological
condition. While Bitzer narrows rhetoric down to where historical uncertainty is present,
existence itself, for all individuals, carries with it uncertainty and an exigence that demands
communicative acts to foster action. “The individual is a fact of existence,” writes Martin Buber,
“insofar as he steps into a living relation with other individuals” (Between Man and Man 202).
Humans always already respond to their experiences through the creation and exchange of
meaning, which is continually situated; therefore, the rhetorical situation must broaden to
encompass all communicative activity. Existentialism helps galvanize a rhetoric of the everyday,
then. It includes all intersubjective social actions. As Jaspers writes, “in existence I am always in
a particular situation [with others]” (Philosophy 183). Humans, he adds, are always “traversing
the possibilities of action in every direction in the historic world,” not just historically renowned
11

actors who instigate change when uncertainty arises (317). Rhetoric should not be restricted to
grand historical moments, as Bitzer would have it, for all existents are capable—necessarily so—
of communication and action. Since human existence is, in and of itself, provisional, uncertain,
and fraught with complications, rhetoric operates interpersonally as well as within publics and
between publics. Schrag confirms this by suggesting the following: “Communication, in its
variegated postures, is a performance within the topos of human affairs and dealings that
comprise our social world” (Communicative Praxis 22). He intimates that rhetoric cannot be
limited to only those situations which require argumentative discourse to move publics
teleologically. Rather, rhetoric presages the a priori condition of human intersubjectivity—that
is, the relationship between being and meaning for existents that leads to action. Robert L. Scott
also reverses the order of the inquiry mapped out by Bitzer: “[R]hetoric may be the art of
persuasion, that is, it may be seen from one angle as a practical capacity to find means to ends on
specific occasions; but it must also be seen more broadly as a human potentiality to understand
the human condition” (266). Seen here, Bitzer helps describe how rhetoric operates as public
address, yet he privileges the epistemological and historical functions of rhetoric rather than
exploring the ontological and existentialist foundations. The latter, however, should precede the
former in rhetorical inquiry. Doing so creates a more pointed significance: rhetoric is not just the
concern with the efficacy of discourse that addresses publics, but first and foremost a grounding
of how beings create meaning and initiate action in manifest tension. This framing is typically
ignored or merely tacit in its acceptance. Existentialism, though, continually stresses this
radically contingent rhetorical orientation to the world.
These two aspects of rhetoric are not forked prongs but a movement or transition from
the ontological to teleological. In her work on Buber, Jeanine Czubaroff recognizes an
existential-ontological orientation of “dialogical rhetoric” that contrasts the commonly held
12

pragmatic-epistemological view of “instrumental rhetoric,” which is concerned with persuasion.
While the latter is appropriated “to define situations, to resolve problems, [and] to achieve
specific goals,” the former is invoked “to acknowledge and respond to the address of the other in
the light of her own experienced truth” (174). Czubaroff presents dialogical and instrumental
rhetorics as competing forms of discourse, yet her descriptions of dialogical rhetoric, apart from
the above definition, betokens an a priori conditional aspect of rhetoric. They should not be
paired side by side but expressed as a movement: rhetoric as ontological grounding → rhetoric as
suasory discourse toward a telos. As Buber writes, “for in actuality speech does not abide in man
[sic], but man takes his stand in speech and talks from there” (I and Thou 49). Before creating or
examining discourse that a being addresses to other beings, it is vital to first address the function
of discourse as a singularly human orientation between beings themselves. Czubaroff captures
this by suggesting that by “grasp[ing] the existential implication is to move to an ontological
rhetoric” and that “within Buber’s philosophy of dialogue, not only is each human being
involved in a two-fold ontological movement, each individual finds her or himself in a concrete,
particular biographical-historical situation—bound to a particular time, place, and society” (171).
The emphasis sought here, though, is to recognize and privilege the transition. The ontological
prism of rhetoric sanctions its later role as a technê.
The Sophistical Orientation of Rhetoric
This ontological and existentialist grounding of rhetoric, which locates the deployment
and exchange of symbols, communication, as a defining characteristic of human existence,
subtly courses through the history of rhetorical theory. Its genesis hearkens back to the sophists,
whose work responds not only to the rise of the middle-class in the democratic formation of
Ancient Greece, but the evolution from a theocentric worldview, where gods dictate human
causality, to an anthropomorphic worldview, where action is dependent upon re-action(s) to the
13

exchange of discourse. Unlike philosophers of the time such as Plato, the sophists, according to
W.K.C. Guthrie, “were rather teachers, lecturers and public speakers whose aim was to influence
their own age rather then to be read by posterity” (53). While they are often characterized by
their purported mercenary status as teachers-for-hire—a not illegitimate concern—the sophists
can also be held up as encouraging oratory in the democratic formation of Greek city-states and
articulating the ontological grounding of communication. This latter contribution is often
overlooked and underscores the vital first step in conceiving rhetoric as a discipline. Considered
here, rhetoric begins as a foundation of the terms of human existence: endowed with
communicative resources, existents create, exchange, and re-act to one another through imperfect
media. This is a current that courses through sophistic rhetoric—not the rhetorical notion of
contingency that refers only to the influence of a particular speech act in a given situation but a
view of language and communication as the defining characteristic of human existence. While
this conception of contingency could be considered radical, for the sophists—and for the holistic
view of rhetoric posited here—it is fundamental. As Jacqueline de Romilly writes, “[The
sophists] were the first to try to think of the world and life purely in terms of human beings”
(238). The extant works of the sophists cohere to advance that we, as humans, are who we are
and do the things that we do because of how and what we speak (through the exchange of
symbols, the tension of meaning, and the movement toward action).
Tethering the sophists by this rhetorical orientation of contingency helps examine them
together in a consistent framework—the works of Protagoras, Gorgias, and Thrasymachus, in
particular. Edward Schiappa warns against such a method insofar as sophists “ought to be
examined as individuals” because “a specific sophistic view proper of rhetoric cannot yet be
identified with confidence” (12, 198). In his debate with John Poulakos, who codifies a sophistic
technê of rhetoric, Schiappa allows that “a more favorable verdict is possible” if the sophistic
14

“argument is amended and viewed as an effort toward an existentialist, neosophistic theory of
rhetoric” (76). Poulakos hints at but does not emphasize the ontological basis of the sophists’
rhetorical orientation. While he thinks the objective of a rhetorician is to “resolve [our]
existential dilemma[s]” (“Toward a Sophistic Definition” 43), Poulakos ultimately reduces
sophistic rhetoric to a communicative strategy that is concerned with the opportune moment, the
playfulness of discourse, and moving publics toward that which is possible (Sophistical Rhetoric
192). Poulakos, that is, finds the rhetorical practice of the sophists as ontological, not the ideas
they generated about the function(s) and significance of communication. Schiappa, by contrast,
disagrees with any conception of a totalizing technê of sophistic rhetoric. In his individual study
of Protagoras, Schiappa finds him to have “conceptualized the scope and function of logos in a
way that, in retrospect, can be identified as an incipient philosophy of rhetoric” (198). While
accepting Schiappa’s concern about galvanizing the respective technê of the sophists, Protagoras
shares this incipient philosophy of rhetoric with Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and the anonymous
author of the Dissoi Logoi. Sophists should be evaluated not by the development and
organization of rhetorical treatises but rather their rhetorical worldview, a marked distinction
from rhetoric based in the Aristotelian tradition. Galvanizing a sophistic worldview of rhetoric
does not constitute, as Schiappa critiques Poulakos, a “historical reconstruction” of “selective
interpretation” (70-81), either; by privileging the ontological dynamic of communication, it
enlists rhetoric as the primary means with which to negotiate the contingencies of human
existence. Like the existentialists, sophists expose the fragile and imperfect resources humans are
equipped with to deal with the contingencies of experience.
There are no extant writings or passages from Protagoras, only fragments and ideas
attributed to him. Two in particular stand out as providing the existentialist conception of a
rhetorical worldview sought here. In Against the Schoolmasters, Sextus quotes Protagoras as
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follows: “Of all things the measure is man, of things that are that they are, and of things that are
not that they are not” (Older Sophists 18). Another version of the passage is found in Hermias’
Pagan Philosophers Defended: “Man is the standard and judge of things, and whatever comes
before the sense is a thing, but that which does not is not among the forms of being” (Older
Sophists 10). Plato treated this statement with derision, having Socrates comment in the
Theaetetus, “I found the beginning of his treatise surprising—the fact that he [Protagoras] didn’t
begin his Truth by saying that the measure of all things is a pig, or a baboon, or some other
creature that has perception” (161c). Plato betrays his misinterpretation, however, by begging the
question: Protagoras never purports to advance a Truth in his statement. Protagoras merely
emphasizes the primary significance of how humans are responsible beings who always create
their own meaning (together) and are accountable to evaluate, judge, and respond to it
themselves. While Truth underscores the investigative quest of philosophy and theology into the
meaning of life, the rhetorical orientation advanced by Protagoras concerns itself with the
meaning in life. Protagoras distrusts inquiry that resides outside the human scope of the forms of
being; as a teacher of rhetoric, he is interested in assessing the things that are in a human purview
and the transformation of the things that are into the things that could be from a practical, or
pragmatic, standpoint. As Poulakos describes sophistic rhetoric, it is “the desire to be other, the
wish to move from the sphere of actuality to that of possibility” (“Toward a Sophistic
Definition” 46). Poulakos captures here the rhetorical orientation of the sophists, not their
organizational technê. This worldview is reinforced by the other quote attributed to Protagoras
(via Sextus): “Concerning the gods I am unable to say whether they exist or what they are like,
for there are many things that hinder me” (Older Sophists 10). The focus is not to prove that the
gods do not exist, but to extricate humans from relying on the divine realm to foster and
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complete action. The burden is re-turned to humans. Thus rhetoric both instigates action and
signals the awesome responsibility thrust upon human beings.
Human inquiry begins with the examination of how we, as existents, are beholden and
defined by the communicative process in which we create and exchange meaning so as to
actualize our motives. As Thrasymachus is quoted in The Constitution from Dionysius of
Halicarnassus,
since our fortune has reserved us for this later time, in which we submit to <the
government of> our city <by others> but <bear> its misfortunes ourselves, and of
these the greatest are the work neither of gods nor of chance but of the
administration [of persons], one really has to speak. (Older Sophists 90)
Elsewhere Thrasymachus declares “that the gods take no notice of human affairs” (93), which
emphasizes the recognition of how humans are responsible for their action. Thrasymachus is not
adducing a formal treatise on atheism so much as bestowing accountability on humans—as
divorced from the whims of the gods. The anonymous sophistic author of the Dissoi Logoi also
intimates as much: “all forms of speech have for their subject matter everything that <exists>”
(Older Sophists 292). While the sophists are known primarily as teachers and speakers for hire in
the public sphere, they also establish a lasting rhetorical orientation where humans understand
themselves by first divorcing casual action from the provenance of the gods and restoring
responsibility, via language and speech, to humans.
Many different theories about the nature and practice of rhetoric have ensued since, but
this undercurrent of a rhetorical orientation of experience, based on the ontological premises of
communication, can be detected elsewhere. For Isocrates, speaking in the “Antidosis”, the
deployment of language and symbols are what distinguish humans from other organisms. As a
result, rhetoric is a gift and hope that communication affords humans-as-existents:
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For in our other faculties, as I said earlier, we do not differ from other living
beings, and in fact we are inferior to many in speed, strength, and other resources.
But since we have the ability to persuade one another and make clear to ourselves
what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we have come
together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts. Speech is responsible for
nearly all our inventions [….] If one must summarize the power of discourse, we
will discover that nothing done prudently occurs without speech, that speech is
the leader of all thoughts and actions. (Isocrates 254-7)
Just as communicative speech—or symbolic action, in the words of Kenneth Burke—eliminates
the superhuman relationship with the gods, it also distinguishes humans from other living
organisms of nature. Rhetoric thus situates humans on an island where we have only others with
which to communicate in order to figure out what it is we are going to do and how it is we are
going to do it. It both defines who we are, as symbol-using animals, and describes what we do, as
motivated persons who must negotiate our experiences with others.
There is a two-fold function in this ontology of rhetoric. One, humans are imminently
responsible as a result of our reliance on communicating through symbols, a demonstrably
imperfect enterprise. While persons may be held accountable to a god or gods in relation to
eternal judgment, humans have free discrimination to exercise practical judgment (krisis) in the
here and now. Though our agency is eminently problematized by the insufficiency and messiness
of the discursive deployment of symbols, it manages to create a breach between humans and the
gods. Likewise, we, as humans, are differentiated from other living organisms. This latter theme
is taken up by Cicero when referring, in his early work, De Inventione, to our “excellent
endowment”: “indeed, it appears to me, that it is on this particular that men, who in many points
are weaker and lower than the beasts, are especially superior to them, namely, in being able to
18

speak” (1.4). While Cicero considers speech as that which distinguishes humans from nature, he
still cannot unhinge human reliance on the divine realm. In his treatise, The Nature of the Gods,
Cicero declares humans must answer the following “important” question:
are the gods inactive and idle, absenting themselves totally from the supervision
and government of the universe, or is the opposite true, that they created and
established all things from the beginning, and that they continue to control the
world and keep it in motion eternally? Unless a judgment is made between these
views, we must inevitably labor under grievous misapprehension, in ignorance of
the supreme issues. It is conceivable that, if reverence for the gods is removed,
trust and the social bond between men and the uniquely pre-eminent virtue of
justice will disappear. (1.2-4)
A rhetoric of existentialism, by contrast, makes its stand where Cicero does not go far enough.
While he distinguishes humans from animals by virtue of speech, which demonstrates our
humanness, it is imperative to illustrate how, by relying on communication, speech renders
humans imperfectly human—that is, marks our distinction from godlike ability. Cicero bifurcates
the question of the gods: by demanding a judgment between the gods as absent and the gods as
deterministic purveyors of human action, he neglects the possibility of both human responsibility
and divine judgment. For rhetoric to be established and sustained as a significant form of
inquiry, a corollary must be added that highlights the significance of the freedom that the gods
afford, namely, that rhetoric signals our governance of existence in the here and now whereas the
gods judge and govern the hereafter.
St. Augustine pursues this line of thought by mapping out a disconnect between humans
and God. As Burke points out, Augustine’s work merits rhetorical study “because he so clearly
points up the relation (or disrelation!) between secular words and the theological Word”
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(Rhetoric of Religion 50). In doing so, Augustine breaks through the false dilemma created by
Cicero. While asserting “God is unspeakable” and “nothing can be spoken in a way worthy of
God,” Augustine maintains how God “has sanctioned the homage of the human voice” (On
Christian Teaching [De Doctrina Christiana] 11). Language, communication and rhetoric
comprise our ontological gifts as humans but also that which demarcates a perfect God from
human imperfection. We have recourse to rhetoric precisely because we are not gods (or angels)
ourselves. Whether or not a being believes in a divine Being, meaning in life remains both
corroborated and substantiated through communicative exchange. For believers, God judges us
accordingly; not so for freethinkers, but in either case, rhetoric is necessary for humans-asexistents. As Augustine writes, “Words have gained an altogether dominant role among humans
in signifying the ideas conceived by the mind that a person wants to reveal” (31). Rhetoric can be
seen as a privilege not only sanctioned but foisted upon human beings. Rhetoric is what we
possess to evaluate what-is and how that what-is can become something else.
To haggle with or protest against rhetoric is an adamant refusal to willingly acknowledge
how humans, as social creatures, interact with one another by creating and sharing meaning to
bring about action. Plato’s refutations of rhetoric and then, later, his crafting of a true rhetoric is
ultimately an exercise in cognitive dissonance—an evasion from recognizing the radical
contingency that ensues from the responsibility rhetoric entails. Augustine, meanwhile, is
comfortable allowing Truth to exist outside of language—beyond language—and that we process
what purports to be true through a linguistic prism: “even the divinely given signs contained in
the holy scriptures have been communicated to us by the human beings who wrote them” (31).
This signals a breach between language and Truth. Weaver echoes Augustine here by stating
“until we are in possession of a more complete metaphysics and epistemology,” rhetoric and the
human relationship with language must be interrogated, never assumed (Language is Sermonic
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223). To extend Weaver’s assertion, metaphysical claims are never complete because we use
language to communicate them; Augustine recognized this and advocated, in the fourth book of
De Doctrina Christiana, that rhetoric be employed, much like scripture, as a testament to the
Truth. Plato thought rhetoric should be the pure transmission of truth from soul to soul. The
difference is subtle yet significant: Augustine positions rhetoric as, at best, a testament to God
and Truth; Plato attempts to furnish rhetoric as the transmission of Truth understood by the gods
themselves. To fully grasp this distinction is to position rhetoric as, first, a reflection upon which
the conditions of human existence are revealed. The imperfection of communication—the fact
that humans necessarily have to communicate, not transmute, to one another—problematizes
rhetoric as such, yet this problematization is productive in the sense that rhetoric enables a proper
analysis of motives and can map out strategies for finding better means in which to foster action.
This revelatory function of rhetoric, however, exposes the paucity of assertive metaphysical or
scientific claims of Truth.
Existentialism as Signaling the Death of God and the Gift of Rhetoric
Existentialism helps satisfy rhetoric’s initial step as a discipline, providing a rhetorical
worldview that is often neglected in the epistemological constructions that seek to define
rhetoric. Rhetoric is necessary only if we, as humans, are imperfect beings who must engage in a
struggle over the creation and interpretation of meaning as a gateway to action. Both
existentialism and rhetoric demand an ontological worldview based on the tensional properties of
communication; each unrepentantly discloses a certain fallibility and tenuousness about the
experience of humans-as-existents. According to Jaspers, “Since communication in existence is a
process, not something complete, its reality is a sense of being deficient” (Philosophy 66).
Rhetoric begins with the recognition of this deficiency, how humans rely on the imperfect
exchange of symbols as the means with which to act. The deficiency of communication can
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never be completely mastered or expunged, yet it can be negotiated with a more productive
facility. Thus rhetoric as form, seen as efficacious or instrumental discourse, follows rhetoric as
the primary function of the meaning for human-as-existents in life. Rhetoric’s long history as a
deleterious concept extends beyond its purported basis in falsity and probability and stems, as
will be addressed in the discussion of Plato below, from its revelation of the insufficient
remainder of how we must live with one another. Rhetoric helps divorce us from what Nietzsche
refers to as being “chained by the Socratic love of knowledge and the delusion of being able
thereby able to heal the eternal wound of existence” (The Birth of Tragedy 109). Yet in doing so,
rhetoric starts as a recognition of the possibilities afforded to beings in how they interact.
Examining rhetoric as the ontological foundation of communication at once both activates and
problematizes agency. As Merleau-Ponty writes, communication “invoke[s] our membership in a
common world” where “speech must bring meaning into existence” (141). Rhetoric exists as the
resulting tension imbued through our communicative resources.
Tracing this progression of rhetoric from the ontological to the teleological liberates
rhetoric from its subordinate role in Western thought, which, as Robert Hariman observes,
“begins in the zone of the philosophically unacceptable, as an asylum” (47). Developing a
rhetoric of existentialism shifts the burden of explanation to Platonic ontology where
philosophical and theological worldviews must account for the meaning created in life.
“Unfortunately,” as Poulakos points out, “too many rhetoricians through the ages lacked the
sophistical gumption to ‘stand by their story,’ and sold out to the mythology of ‘True rhetoric’”
(“Sophistical Rhetoric” 100). Existentialism, however, resituates the incipient rhetorical
perspective established by the sophists. To privilege rhetoric as a discipline of inquiry,
existentialism clears a space for which rhetoric is needed—nay, required. This space, or clearing,
begins by divorcing God from human affairs beginning with a question of accountability: how
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are humans responsible for their actions? Whereas the philosophy/theology nexus inquires into
whether we, as humans, are responsible, existentialism and rhetoric assume responsibility as a
warrant that underscores how persons and publics possess motives and act from the fluid
exchange of discourse.
The death of God is the starting point of existentialism—for both spiritual-believers and
free-thinkers alike. It also establishes rhetoric as the fundamental resource allotted to humans in
order to take up the mantel of responsibility for their actions. God’s symbolic death does not kill
God, then, but activates an accountability of our communicative exchanges with one another.
Thus: “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him,” exclaims Friedrich Nietzsche’s
madman, adding, for emphasis or perhaps effrontery, “There has never been a greater deed” (The
Gay Science 181). Now it takes, admittedly, a perverse sort of glee to confidently announce the
slaying of the divine Himself and then deem it an act that surpasses all others, but Nietzsche is
not just lolling about in the bosom of his usual blasphemous self-satisfaction here. Despite what
he declares, neither Nietzsche nor his madman, nor anyone else for that matter, killed God. God,
for His part, as Henry Miller writes in his novel, Tropic of Capricorn, “can only become more
and more God”—never any less (185). If God is God, His existence is not, and could never be,
threatened by the paltry speech-act of a mortal. I intentionally refer to Nietzsche’s declaration as
paltry because it reveals the imperfection of all speech or symbolic action. Communication is by
no means a futile exercise, but it remains, as John Durham Peters writes, a struggle that marks
“an index of our fallenness” wherein through communication with others we “find our way back
to God” (72). Recognizing this imperfection amounts to answering why Nietzsche’s madman
considers God’s death a greater deed than anything hitherto. The death of God is not God’s death
but ours—what is killed is our ability, as humans, to communicate with the divine, or divinely
communicate in a perfect setting with perfect understanding with one another. Our covenant with
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God is not eliminated, but re-framed. Nietzsche’s declaration amounts to an awareness that
clears the space for an opportunity to recognize and actualize the human condition as a
rhetorically-inscribed enterprise. It unleashes the fetters of a rhetorical consciousness that cannot,
as Plato would have it in the Phaedrus, please the gods themselves through communicative
discourse. For Plato, rhetoric should be approached as “a laborious effort a sensible man will
make out not in order to speak and act among human beings, but so as to be able to speak and act
in a way that pleases the gods as much as possible” (272d-e). Yet humans, equipped with only
the imperfect faculties of language at their disposal, lack the technical wherewithal to reach such
a firmament. God, as a corollary to Nietzsche’s claim, thus loses the power to negotiate the
domain of terrestrial meaning. It would be—it would have to be, both figuratively and literally—
beneath Him. Our covenant with God is broken insofar as we cannot interact with God or have
any precise knowledge of Him.
In contradistinction to abolishing or diminishing the wonder of the divine, Nietzsche
elevates its significance by divorcing faith from the yoke of paganism whereat God, or a
collection of gods, exercises control over causal action in terrestrial affairs. This awesome
responsibility, which manifests itself as a burden, falls squarely on human shoulders and can
only be negotiated through rhetoric—the continual creation and projection of the tensional
dynamic of meaning in life. The conception of religion, according to Ernesto Grassi, as the
human “endeavor to construct a ‘holy and intact’ cosmos” that “springs from the experience of
the threat to man being consumed by chaos and thus from the necessity of holding the terrible in
check by giving reality a fixed meaning,” is no longer tenable (Philosophy as Rhetoric 102).
Religion is by no means banished, but its authority, Grassi adds, cannot be “recognized as the
possibility for binding humanly defined existence to final, universal, holy reality in order to
provide man’s uncertain, short-lived constructions with security and permanence” (103). By
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qualifying religion as such, the possibility of faith remains. It is activated and enacted by, as
Viktor Frankl suggests, divine grace: “Grace, however, dwells in the suprahuman dimension and,
therefore, appears on the human plane only as a projection” (Psychotherapy and Existentialism
29). Soren Kierkegaard, a devout believer whose work Karl Jaspers conflates with Nietzsche’s in
Reason and Existenz, admits as much by posing a similar conception of faith: “If, namely, the
god does not exist, then of course it is impossible to demonstrate it. But if he does exist, then it is
foolishness to want to demonstrate it” (Philosophical Fragments 39). While Kierkegaard has
faith, he admits his standing as “only a poor existing human being who neither eternally nor
divinely nor theocentrically is able to observe the eternal but must be content with the existing”
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript 212). Thus the death of God as a rhetorical act by no means
delegitamizes faith but expresses itself as a challenge to the rhetorical being of beings: can
humans acknowledge the imperfection of their communicative resources and, if so, will they
accept the responsibility that ensues from such an imperfection?
From this perspective of a uniquely human confrontation with meaning, Nietzsche does
not so much speak against God as for God in demanding a measure of accountability in Creation
of the activities of social beings in their being. Issued forth by a god of an ungodly personage,
this directive pitches us into the untamed sea of the radical contingency of experience where only
the tenuous buoyancy of rhetoric keeps us afloat, not the philosopher’s advocacy of a totalizing
logical equation solved by an Abstract Ideal of the Good or a theologian’s encouragement of
finding solace in divine intervention. As Richard Wolin states, "The secularized ontology of
existentialism does away with the perfection of the creator, thus separating Being-in-the-world
from the (albeit delusory) security of its former ground" (129). So it is not the philosopher who
wishes to elevate to godliness or those for whom certainty is provided by a God who assumes the
airs of a philosopher that we look to for help in negotiating what amounts to the oceanic tide of
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contingency that confronts existence. It is the rhetorician. The death of God turns us away from
the philosopher/theologian nexus of asking and finding out the meaning of life and subjects us to
the tensional dynamic of meaning in life—how it, meaning, is created; how it is understood; how
it is misunderstood; and how it brings about cooperation and division among persons within and
across communities in their concrete historicality. Although writing in regard to the postmodern
devaluation of the philosophical subject, Schrag captures this post-Nietzschean fall-out by
announcing: “Philosophy dies so that rhetoric can be born” (“Rhetoric Situated” 166).
Would that He exist, God governs Creation by dispensing eternal judgment (always His
meaning), not practical judgment (krisis), which is always, as individual existents, ours. Whether
God’s judgment is allocated through love or condemnation is and can only be the prerogative of
God, yet the practical judgment that ensues from the manifold rhetorical situations that arise in
existence re-installs and re-inscribes the pervasive tissue of human contingency. Simone de
Beauvoir intimates as much in The Ethics of Ambiguity, asserting that humans are “abandoned
on the earth” because their acts are definitive, absolute engagements: a human being qua human
being “bears the responsibility for a world, which is not the world of a strange power, but of
himself [sic], where his defeats are inscribed, and his victories as well. A God can pardon,
efface, and compensate. But if God does not exist, man’s faults are inexpiable” (16). Nietzsche’s
eulogy—that the killing of God is a great deed—is a commemoration because it restores to God
what is God’s—the Creation and judgmental meaning of life—and re-turns human beings to their
rightful ownership and responsibility over the creation of meaning in life. As Albert Camus
writes, “When the throne of God is overturned, the rebel realizes that it is now his own
responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity that he sought in vain with his own condition,
and in this way to justify the fall of God” (The Rebel 25). The rebel, for Camus, is not an
atheistic political revolutionary, but a person “determined on laying claim to a human situation in
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which all the answers are human” (21). This responsibleness for meaning, a crisis of krisis that
manifests itself as a singularly human confrontation with being, is not a possessive deed upon
whose claim we can mortgage the future with assurance; it suggests a thrownness where beings
are suspended in a tensional flux of struggle. It is not an ownership of meaning, then, but a lease,
our existence as existents, that inheres a rhetorical texture of consciousness wherein connectivity
with other consciousnesses is sought through a dispersion of meaning that can never, as a
projection to and between others, deliver a finality of equipoise.
Meaning—how it is created, exchanged, and reacted to—never affects a teleological
resolution of purification but remains firmly within the tensional dynamic of its own process.
The will to meaning, Frankl points out, consists of individual existents “encountering other
beings and reaching out for meanings to fulfill” in an “ineradicable” tension between being and
meaning (Psychotherapy 8-10). If there is, somehow, a meaning of life that can be known, it
might be expressed as a negotiation of this tensional dynamic of meaning through the gift of
rhetoric, a gift that can only be accepted by acknowledging God’s death in governing
intersubjective human relations. Rather than killing God through declaring His death,
Nietzsche’s pronouncement matures the relationship humans can have with God, and, most
significantly for the rhetorician, between, to, and with others. In her dialogue “Pyrrhus and
Cineas,” Beauvoir writes of God, “He is; one can say nothing more. The perfection of his being
leaves no place for man” (Philosophical Writings 102). But to accept the gift of rhetoric, humans
have to accept God’s perfection—just as long as God’s perfection remains perfect in the divine,
not human, realm. Beauvoir, then, is misguided insofar as the perfection of God leaves
everything to humans precisely because it renders us imperfect. What is this imperfection? I call
it the gift of rhetoric. What distinguishes this gift from others is the supreme difficulty in
accepting it: for Hyde, rhetoric must be accepted in that “we are called upon to face our
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possibilities with anticipation, to assume the responsibility of affirming our freedom through
resolute choice, and thus to become consciously/willingly/personally (i.e., authentically)
involved in the re-creation of a meaningful existence” (“Call” 378). Acknowledging the death of
God inaugurates the gift of rhetoric and activates a thrownness into the complications of
symbolic exchange.
Freedom as Being Condemned to Rhetoric
The gift of rhetoric is a consequence of the freedom from the loss of God’s power to
coerce and dictate human action. Human responsibility is restored through a careful examination
of how communication motivates persons and publics to incite action. Erich Fromm emphasizes
the importance of understanding freedom as a function of existence whereby freedom is not
understood as a freedom-to but a freedom-from—“namely, freedom from the instinctual
determination of [human] actions” (31). As with rhetoric, Fromm considers freedom an
“ambiguous gift” (32). It begins with the human choice to pursue action, complicated, as it is, by
the opportunities of communication. While Fromm is not an existentialist, by stressing freedomfrom as opposed to freedom-to, he captures the orientation where existentialist conceptions of
freedom begin. While existentialists decline to address rhetoric specifically in their discussions
of freedom, they evince a rhetorical condition of existence. Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance,
considers the death of God as a clearing for freedom and, by extending Nietzsche’s
announcement, suggests, as humans, “We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean
when I say that man is condemned to be free” (“Existentialism and Humanism” 32). Sartre’s
discussion of freedom is not political but ontological. Freedom is not an objective thing that is
possessed or suppressed but a condition that humans, as existents, confront as a challenge.
The complications and reservations that have ensued in rhetorical scholarship about
Sartre’s articulation and deployment of freedom will be addressed in a later chapter, but it is vital
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to establish here that Sartrean freedom is not a teleological gift of liberation where, once
delivered into freedom, a grand unity can or will commence. As with Fromm, freedom is an
expressive consideration of the condition of existence. Humans, Sartre continually insists, are
condemned to freedom. In Being and Nothingness, he writes how an individual’s freedom is not
an essential property of the self but a texture of dynamic presence[-ing] that throws the self
“perpetually in[to] question” (566). Above all, freedom, for Sartre, augurs a “plenitude of
contingency at the heart of which is itself contingency” (653). The benefit of this condemnation
of freedom is the possibility, for the self, of a choice in a given situation—the self’s engagement
in communicating and acting with others in the plenitude of contingency that saturates existence.
It allows for judgment and action, the concomitant ingredients for rhetoric. In The Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle writes: “The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and
that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end [….] for no one deliberates but about
what is future and capable of being otherwise” (6.2). For rhetoric, then, freedom flourishes only
insofar as it is recognized as a function of responsibility. According to Weaver, “Unless we
accept some philosophical interpretation, such as the proposition that freedom consists only in
the discharge of responsibility, there seems no possibility of a correlation between the use of the
word and circumstantial reality” (The Ethics of Rhetoric 228). While Weaver is somewhat casual
in his articulation, he touches upon what needs to be more acutely focused: humans-as-existents
are free but, as a result, are ultimately responsible for their actions. We act because we choose,
and we choose insofar that we engage in communication with others to decide whither and what
to choose. Choice is itself a fundamental ingredient necessary for rhetorical action. As Farrell
writes, “The first aim of rhetoric is thus to reflect upon its own inventional regions of choice, in
light of the fluctuating potentials of human nature” (“The Tradition of Rhetoric” 175). This
ability to choose is, however, continually complicated, problematized, and threatened: “By the
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sole fact that our choice is absolute, it is fragile; that is, by positing our freedom by means of it,
we posit by the same stroke the perpetual possibility that the choice may be a ‘here and now’
which has been made-past in the interests of a ‘beyond’ which I shall be” (Being and
Nothingness 598). Sartre expresses freedom as the recognition of the absolute contingency of
existence through which a recovery of choice and the (re-)enactment of agency can make itself
manifest. There is, then, a rhetorical scope to the conception of how choice confers the freedom
of action in the work of Sartre. Finding the free-will/determinism debate a red herring for
philosophers, Sartre poses the concept of action as the first condition of freedom (559). Given
this privileging of contingency, choice and action in his conceptual sketch of freedom, it is
curious that Sartre neglected rhetoric as the fundamental theme of his development of
existentialism.
While curious, this lack should come as no surprise. No explicit mention of rhetoric in
Sartre’s extensive corpus of work speaks to the power of Plato’s ghost, whose reduction of
rhetoric to mere flattery haunts both philosophical and rhetorical inquiry. Galvanizing the work
of Sartre and other existentialists to a more coherent, heuristic understanding would require an
organization of the themes of existentialism by means of a rhetorical scope rather than the
construction of a consistent philosophical system. Concerned with the ontological intersections
of discourse, agency, and action in the fundamental contingency of life, existentialists were
preoccupied with concepts of rhetoric, they just weren’t aware of it and therefore did not speak
of it. The existentialists’ lack of familiarity with rhetoric is by no means exclusive to Sartre,
either, and should by no means intimidate rhetorical inquiry, which I believe it has. As Hyde, one
of the few rhetorical scholars who engages existentialism, indicates in his essay, “Existentialism
as the Basis for the Theory and Practice of Rhetoric,” “Despite its rather uneducated view of the
art of rhetoric, existentialism reveals itself to be a major source of legitimation for the art” (246).
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Perhaps the closest any existentialist came toward considering rhetoric as the warrant that
underscores existenz philosophy is found in the conclusion of Miguel de Unamuno’s Tragic
Sense of Life. Reflecting on the wandering discursivity of his text, Unamuno anticipates “all this
commentary of mine [to be accused as] nothing but rhetoric” and whose “divagations will
provoke [others] to exclaim, ‘Rhetoric, rhetoric, rhetoric! [by those who] would appear to think
that virtue is the fruit of knowledge, or rational study, and that even mathematics helps us to be
better men” (286, 292). Unamuno, perhaps by accident, acutely encapsulates the affinity of what
both existentialism and rhetorical theory admit to not being able to accomplish in
contradistinction to philosophy and theology: “[a] catalogu[-ing] [of] the universe, so that it may
be handed back to God in order” (308). Where the latter fields of inquiry concern themselves
with providing ultimate descriptions so as to deliver a teleological unity of the meaning of
existence, the former enjoins inquiry to grapple with the creation and struggle over the vortex of
meaning inscribed in existence. As Ernesto Grassi writes, “The problems of rhetoric hereby
apply not merely to a special sphere of human existence but to every human activity and method
of action” (Rhetoric as Philosophy 50). This conception of rhetorical inquiry, Grassi adds, takes
on an “existential significance.” Whereas theology searches for inscriptions of God’s meaning in
existence and philosophy, beginning with Plato,1 attempts to elevate communicative meaning to
approach a divine sphere of understanding, the existentialist and the rhetorician look to
interrogate the saturation of meaning created and struggled over in the forum of existence (that
God, would that He exist, provides).
By conflating existentialism and rhetoric and accepting Sartre’s condemnation of
freedom as a singular human potentiality to negotiate the meaning that is created and struggled
over in existence, re-positioning Sartre’s articulation of freedom might make it more palatable
for rhetorical scholars who express discomfiture with the term.2 I put forward that, as beings
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confronted with a radical sense of contingency and equipped with only symbolic action to
negotiate experience, humans are condemned to rhetoric. Condemning ourselves to rhetoric is
but the first step to better recognize and more profitably actualize the contingency of our human,
all-too-human situations. Doing so rejects a retreat into either a carapace of idealized abstractions
or a neat utilitarian calculus; it privileges an interrogation of the creation and location of meaning
inherent to the challenge of communication. God is dead for humans-as-existents, yet we
continue to sin before godliness with humility through the imperfection of our communicative
resources. Sin, in fact, expresses the challenge of communication itself, that is, encountering
others in the deployment of language and the texture of meaning that is both invented and
received. Conceived existentially, rhetorically situated beings can freely accept either God or the
absence of God but must focus, significantly, on the intersubjective processes by which humansas-existents communicate so as to foster action.
Condemning ourselves to rhetoric does not condemn rhetoric as such. The existentialist
articulation of freedom liberates rhetoric and enables humans to sin before others, not only God,
with humility. As Beauvoir writes, “For a freedom wills itself genuinely only by willing itself as
an indefinite movement through the freedom of others” (Ethics 90). Moreover, “to be free is not
to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open
future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my
own freedom” (91). This freedom, which necessitates projecting the self toward others with
humility, can only be commiserated through a communicative rhetoric that acknowledges the a
priori impossibility of a perfected unity of understanding. Meaning is created through
communication, not transmission. Peters captures this distinction by offering a description of the
impregnable but ultimately impossible coefficient of discursive collaboration: “This means, at
best, communication is a dance of differences, not a junction of spirits”; it is “subject to the
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interruptions of contingency”; and it is “the name for those practices that compensate for the fact
that we can never be each other” (65, 167, 268). Peters, however, does not accept condemning
ourselves to rhetoric. He attempts to extradite the failure of communication by advocating the
pressing of the flesh as recompense for the disruptions and gaps that inevitably arise in the
communication exchange. While the diagnostics of Peters help more accurately describe the
attributes of communicative exchange, his proposal is an evasion from the tensional flux of
discourse whereas a rhetorically grounded, existentialist understanding of freedom evinces a
thrownness into the dynamic struggle of meaning. As Grassi writes, humans are “always
[rhetorically] situated and must meet claims made upon [them] in the ‘here’ and ‘now’”
(“Remarks” 128). It is thus not through the pressing of the flesh that humans are redeemed but
rather by the grounding of rhetoric as an interrogation of how we negotiate this freedom of
contingency.
Freedom can be expressed as the interactive tension that arises between beings and
meaning in existence. As Sartre writes, it “ought not to be envisaged as a metaphysical
endowment of human ‘nature’” (What Is Literature? 264), but be recognized as the opportunity
to adapt to the contingencies of life. Freedom as such is necessarily rhetorical in scope because it
requires consciousness to operationalize the communicative resources that humans possess in the
manifold circumstances that existence affords for each individual in his or her relation with
others. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes of consciousness as “really only a net of
communication between human beings; it is only as such that it had to develop; a solitary human
being who lived like a beast of prey would not have needed it” (298). A rhetorical consciousness,
or the ability to be conscious of the freedom that rhetoric entails in existence, also carries the
burden of imperfect communication, which suggests that meaning must be always be created,
negotiated, and struggled over. That is, it can never be completed, purified, or transmuted—not
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even by a sense or understanding of Truth. Three assumptions are made in asserting this: first,
God, who may very well have created the grounds and/or possibility of human existence, does
not actively govern or influence the social realm of beings; second, we as humans lack the
communicative resources of angels, who can perfectly communicate; and third, we as humans do
not possess the ability to telekinetically create social meaning. By making these assumptions, I
do not here deny the possibility or reality of Truth—be it of the philosophical, scientific or
theological variety. They comprise the warrant of an argument that suggests Truth qua Truth
cannot be accessed or ascertained by the deployment of language, communication, which is,
from the start, a wholly imperfect enterprise.
Truth as a Function of Communication
Truth, in order to be Truth, would necessarily have to divorce itself from language. It
could not be dragged down by the complications and messiness of not just language itself, but
the fallible media with which it is communicated. Truth is Truth or it is not Truth. Despite
human efforts, language affords no prehensile ability to corral Truth. In his essay, “On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” Nietzsche recognizes truth as, at best—or most efficaciously—the
recognition of a “form of tautology” (1173). The question of Truth and its resulting distinction
from language, however, retains the possibility of Truth. Just as St. Augustine was comfortable
with the division between words and things, formulating a faith in truth based on belief,
Kierkegaard addresses this by expressing his own personal religious Christian Truth yet
admitting the sheer incapacity of communicating it to others: “one person can communicate
[Truth] to another, but, please note, not in such a way that the other believes it; whereas, if he
communicates it in the form of faith, he does his very best to prevent the other from adopting it
directly” (Philosophical Fragments 103). Truth, then, maintains itself as eternal Truth, but only
through manifestation, not communication. Elsewhere Kierkegaard writes: “for in the world of
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time God and I cannot talk with each other, we have no language in common” (Fear and
Trembling 35). We are, as human beings, endowed with the faculties of language,
communication, and rhetoric. None of these refute Truth but interrogating them as such admits to
lacking the proper resources with which to define, see, and share Truth epistemologically.
Despite Plato’s sincere desire, humans cannot communicate through a transmission of Truth
from soul to soul. Communication, as the Jaspers quote above demonstrates, signals a certain
deficiency from its reliance on language; as such, it inhibits methods of inquiry that purport to
claim or discover Truth. But precisely owing to this imperfection we, as humans, have
freedom—and because we have freedom, we have rhetoric. “In this sense, freedom might appear
to be a curse; it is a curse,” writes Sartre. “But it is also the sole source of human greatness”
(264). Sartre ushers in a worldview, an orientation, of freedom, but what he and other
existentialists fail to offer was a means by which this freedom could be negotiated.
Existentialism thus satisfies the initial ontological grounding of rhetoric, but does not emphasize
the necessary transition that compensates this negotiation, which amounts to an explicit
instrumental rhetoric.
Existentialism has fallen into disrepute because its thinkers establish an ontologicallysituated worldview unique to philosophical-system building yet do not consistently or effectively
provide any profitable methods to traverse it. On the one hand, existentialism is distrusted for its
radical conception of the contingency of existence and its potential for descending into complete
relativism; on the other, some harbor suspicions because of its loose interpretation of
subjectivity. The historically brief rise and fall of existentialism is not altogether different than
the treatment of rhetoric as a discipline over the past 2,500 years. The same qualifying concerns
plague both and must be addressed in a more satisfactory manner. Their alliance, while natural,
more significantly should be seen as complimentary. It must be. In a world where Truth itself
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exists or does not exist in a non-discursive space apart from symbolic exchange, rhetorical
inquiry is itself the most constructive means with which to negotiate the ontologically-inscribed
situation that existentialism propounds. Rhetoric and existentialism gainfully engage one another
in that the latter assists the former in responding to the charges of relativism evinced by
philosophy beginning with Plato. Rhetoric buttresses existentialism by providing a practical
frame from which to adapt in such an ontological worldview.
The Platonic Trap
To once more emphasize the qualification above, the condemnation to rhetoric espoused
here is not, as Plato would have it, a condemnation of rhetoric. It is a perspective that observes
the tissue of human relations as beholden to the offices of rhetoric. Through rhetoric we, as
human existents, find a more supple appreciation for, and a more enhanced ability of, how to
assume our responsibilities as the creators and interrogators of meaning in life. Conversely, the
Platonic Trap is characterized by a recourse to abstract idealism and an evasion from not only the
contingent circumstances that confound human experience, but the inherent problematization of
the necessary communicative efforts that ensue between beings. When deployed, language is
always directional—even in situations where discourse is offered in order to re-confirm
something. Yet the Platonic Trap is the complete and utter denial of the complications which the
process of communication augurs.
In his dialogues, Plato maieutically works through his mentor, Socrates, having the latter
reject any breach between the transmission of content between souls. Content here is taken as
what purports to be the truth: “Won’t someone who is to speak well and nobly,” Socrates asks in
the Phaedrus, “have to have in mind the truth about the subject he is going to discuss?” (259e).
Later Socrates advises that when composing a speech, “First, you must know the truth
concerning everything you are speaking or writing about [….] Second, you must understand the
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nature of the soul” (277b). Such question-and-answer play rigs the game by presuming that Truth
is a quality that existents can possess and then confer onto other existents. As discussed above in
the Nietzschean corollary, Truth, if Truth, simply exists (is or is not); Truth cannot be acquired
through language as such, let alone delivered on a platter. Plato’s efforts to capture and
transmute Truth3 thus amount to an evasion from our complicated, problematized, and ultimately
fallible human-ness. The imperfection implied here is by no means tragic, though, for rhetoric
provides the means with which to negotiate such conditions—notice, however, that rhetoric does
not purport to teleologically solve such conditions.
Plato’s preoccupation with the transmission of content between souls is also instrumental
in setting the trap. Socrates describes what rhetoricians do without their consent, then enfolds his
description neatly with what he, the Platonic Socrates, suggests. Consider the logical flow of the
Phaedrus:
Clearly, therefore, Thrasymachus and anyone else who teaches the art of rhetoric
seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to
understand what it is [….] But those who now write Arts of Rhetoric—we were
just discussing them—are cunning people: they hide the fact that they know very
well everything about the soul [….] Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct
the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul
there are. (271a-d)
By privileging the soul, Plato creates a dualism wherein rhetoric is not a complicated process of
persons communicating to one another but a pure distillation of meaning. Yet emphasizing the
exploration of the soul, of oneself or that of others, should be distinct from rhetorical inquiry.
There exists an inherent disruptive quality of how the deployment of language affects the
interaction of beings with one another. As Michel Meyer writes, “Communication,
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transcendental or not, reflects the differences between human beings who have to live together.
Rhetoric is a mode of expression of those differences, even if argumentation is meant to resolve
them by generating some consensus” (Rhetoric, Language, and Reason 5). Plato refuses to accept
this and presumes the role of the soul for rhetoricians so as to insert his own definition. Rhetoric
does not, or should not, deal with direct communication between souls; the exchange of
discourse always already signals a disruption. Burke speaks to this in writing how humans
inhabit “bodies that learn [and use] language” and must negotiate the subsequent problematicity
thereof. Plato’s suggestion that rhetoricians should put on an air of denial regarding the soul is
disingenuous and reflects the wont to privilege a purified encounter of transmission. As opposed
to rhetoric, philosophy, for Plato, becomes the exchange of “blessed and spectacular vision[s]”
where philosophers see “in pure light because we were pure ourselves, not buried in this thing
we are carrying around now, which we call a body, locked in it like an oyster in a shell”
(Phaedrus 250b-c). Rhetoric does not purport to have such a luxury, but deals with the thick
muck of experience itself. Existentially grounded, rhetoric proposes no evasion. Nietzsche
recognizes this and subsequently confronts Plato in The Twilight of the Idols, asserting, “Plato is
a coward in the face of reality—consequently he flees into the ideal” (88). While Nietzsche’s
language is ostensibly charged, his Platonic reversal offers a profitable means by which
rhetorical inquiry can avoid fleeing from the stubborn complications of communication.
Rather than resorting to an abstract idealism that looks to advance efficacious discourse
toward the Good, rhetoric—as both theory and practice—legitimates itself by recognizing that, at
best, communication is the movement toward that which is possible. The Good can only ever be
determined or evaluated as such after action—it is a reflective and post-rhetorical undertaking.
Rhetoric pitches itself forward as a projection device between beings in their being; it is ethical
not because a set of a priori values are adhered to or adopted in advance, but insofar as action is
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always ever possible in a particular situation. The Platonic high-ground flourishes as fear and
injects the post-rhetorical conception of an ideal state before the creation and exchange of
communication, and the re-action to it, takes place. Grounded in discovering and delivering
Truth between souls, Plato attempts to envelop rhetoric into philosophy. This offering
necessarily condemns rhetorical inquiry. Understanding the conditions of rhetoric provides a
hope with which to combat such weighted die. As Schrag writes in The Resources of Rationality,
rhetoric “privileges neither epistemic objects nor interiorized subjects. It is a responsive activity,
attending to the incursion of that which is other” (142). Plato’s work is inviting, however, in that
it activates a safety mechanism proposing to ensure an idealized finality of purpose. Rhetoric,
meanwhile, squares itself with only that which is possible.
In shifting away from Plato, it is vital for rhetorical inquiry to move beyond the
Aristotelian conception of rhetoric in two distinct ways. First, rhetoric is not—it cannot be—as
Aristotle asserts at the beginning of his treatise On Rhetoric, the counterpart (antistrophos) to
dialectic (1.1.1). Second, rhetorical inquiry is done a disservice when relegated to merely a
search for the available means of persuasion in any given situation (1.2.1). Robert Pirsig
addresses the first charge in his popular best-seller, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,
“outraged that rhetoric had been brought down to the level of dialectic” (471). To ruminate on
this really is enough to induce, as Pirsig himself experienced, madness. Why? Simply because
rhetoric is damned from the start when it is located as a counterpart to a process, dialectical
logic, that defines itself as aimed at Truth and the Platonic ideal of the Good. To Meyer, even
this sympathetic view of rhetoric, which ranges from Aristotle to Chaim Perelman, “limits” its
proper place as an art and a method of inquiry that defines our existence as socially interactive
beings (Rhetoric, Language and Reason 63-9). Seen here, rhetoric consists of the vast spectrum
of communicative resources humans possess and deploy ranging from dialectic or formal logic
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on the one hand to flattery on the other. Plato is correct by suggesting that rhetoric, if unchecked,
could degenerate into a meretricious display of currying favor (Gorgias); this, rhetoricians should
readily admit, is always a potential outcome of any discursive exchange. However, Plato’s
philosopher-king, embodying the noumenal space of the Good and True, also resides on the
rhetorical spectrum. In fact, there is no guaranteeing that what purports to be a dialectical
endeavor is not itself a form of flattery attempting to disguise its own motives through an overly
confident, yet no less machinating, rigor. Dialectic operates, to a degree, as obeisance to a
systematic method. As Weaver writes, “Dialectic is abstract reasoning upon the basis of
propositions [whereas] rhetoric is the relation of terms of these to the existential world”
(Language is Sermonic 162). A perhaps unintended consequence of Aristotle’s theory of
rhetoric-as-counterpart-to-dialectic, then, is that it legitimizes the Platonic charge of rhetoric-asflattery.
More accurately, dialectic can be seen as but one form of rhetorical arrangement among
others. Weaver suggests that dialectic marks the opening foray of rhetorical discourse—“its first
process [is] a dialectic establishing terms which have to do with policy” (The Ethics of Rhetoric
17). Aristotle intimates this as well in his articulation of logos in the Rhetoric,4 but his opening
line unknowingly but necessarily diminishes the significance of his treatise and thereby
attenuates rhetoric as mode of inquiry. Dialectic should rather be subordinated to a function of
rhetoric—one function among many. The two are not co-equal peers, and should not be treated
as such. The privileging of dialectic has been responsible for not only the denigration of rhetoric
in Western thought but also the sheer proliferation of philosophical systems. As Weaver writes,
“A complete reliance upon dialectic becomes possible only if one accepts something like this
Socratic theodicy [from Plato]” (Language is Sermonic 183). On the other hand, rhetoric, for
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Weaver, “must deal with the world, the thickness, stubbornness, and power of it [….] Rhetoric
has a relationship to the world which logic does not have” (208).
Still, Weaver himself is not immune to lapsing into theodicy. In The Ethics of Rhetoric,
he remains tethered to Platonic idealism. “It is impossible to talk about rhetoric as effective
expression,” he writes, “without having as a term giving intelligibility to the whole discourse, the
Good” (23). He adds: “So rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better
versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect
can apprehend and only the soul have affection for” (25). Weaver here walks into the Platonic
trap by privileging terms such as the Good, advocating the advocacy of perfection, the ideal, and
the soul. While he attempts to draw distinctions between rhetoric and dialectic, ultimately,
Weaver endeavors to transform rhetoric into something it is not. Rhetoric finds its start as the
owning-up to our fallen state as beings engaged in a problematized exchange of meaning through
the process of communication with other beings. Humans-as-existents have recourse to rhetoric
precisely because we cannot attain the Good, the perfect, or the ideal through a pure transmission
of meaning between souls. The Platonic trap Weaver falls into is by no means uncommon,
however; Poulakos insightfully laments that “too many rhetoricians through the ages lacked the
sophistical gumption to ‘stand by their story,’ and sold out to the mythology of ‘True Rhetoric’”
(“Sophistical Rhetoric as a Critique of Culture” 100). Driving a wedge between rhetoric and
dialectic, as in Aristotle and Weaver, is, in the last, not enough. Rhetoric must initially be sought
and understood as an orientation that ontologically locates humans as negotiating the plenitude
of contingency that existence affords with but the inherently fallible enterprise of symbolic
action. Before rhetoric can be activated as efficacious discourse, it requires a recognition of its
own limits—limits, that is, which reflect back on the imperfection that defines humans-as-
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existents. Otherwise, rhetorical inquiry is attenuated for it will continually be pitted against those
methods of inquiry that purport to corral Truth.
The second qualification of Aristotle concerns how he considers rhetoric a technê, or art,
of persuasion, then organizes his treatise as a scientific endeavor with structured classifications.
Interestingly enough, Aristotle himself warns against this, asserting, “In so far as someone tries
to make dialectic or rhetoric not just mental faculties but sciences, he unwittingly obscured their
nature by the change, reconstructing them as forms of knowledge of certain underlying facts,
rather than only of speech” (1.4.6). Yet Aristotle betrays such a stance by continually
objectifying rhetoric into categories. Rhetorical inquiry is better served, though, when its
untamed texture engage the flotsam of contingency. Just as existentialism began as a philosophy
that dissipates philosophical systems, so, too, is there the need for a rhetoric that distrusts a
systematic approach to rhetoric. That existentialism—whose roots can be traced to Kierkegaard’s
critique of Hegel’s formal use of dialectic—resists analytical and systematic philosophy lends
itself to a natural alliance with rhetorical inquiry and a rhetorical orientation. Existentialism
contests Plato’s devastating critique and upgrades Aristotle’s encouraging yet limited view of
rhetoric. A neo-sophistical orientation of rhetoric, dormant for some time but activated by
existentialism, begins redressing the damaged reputation rhetoric has undergone for quite some
time—instead of falling into the trap, it moves it beyond the Good into that which is possible.
Endnotes
1

As Richard Rorty writes in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, “The trouble with Platonic notions is not that they
are ‘wrong’ but that there is no way to ‘naturalize’ them or otherwise connect them to the rest of inquiry, or culture,
or life” (311).
2

See Raymie McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric,” and Joshua Gunn, “Review Essay.” Drawing from the work of Michel
Foucault, McKerrow bases the praxis of his development of a critical rhetoric as a critique of freedom; Gunn
reduces Sartrean freedom to the equation that subjectivity equals truth and as “the last gasp of humanism.” Both
studies are addressed more fully in Chapter 3.
3

In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates recommends: “It is the truth, and our minds, we should be testing” (348a).
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4

“Rhetoric is partly dialectic, and resembles it as we said at the outset; for neither of them is identifiable with
knowledge of any specific subject, but they are distinct abilities of supplying words” (Aristotle 1.2.7).
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CHAPTER TWO: EXISTENTIALISM AS EQUIPMENT FOR LIVING:
A NEW UNENDING CONVERSATION FOR KENNETH BURKE
“According to [Burke],
our very existence is rhetorical.”
-

William Rueckert, “Rereading Kenneth Burke” (250)
“[Burke] has written an existential rhetoric,
an ultimate rhetoric which explains why some
men decide beyond or without pure reason.”
-

Craig Smith, “The Medieval Subjugation and
The Existential Elevation of Rhetoric” (166)

In a 1985 symposium, Bernard L. Brock recounts an anecdote that features a discussion
about Kenneth Burke where one of the participants, Robert L. Scott, asks, “What philosophy
does Burke’s rhetorical system reflect?” Brock remembers no satisfactory answer being
proposed except the suggestion that Burke’s rhetorical theory “was so flexible that it could
reflect any philosophy” (“Dramatism” 18). Brock was inspired by the question to come up with
the concept of paradox as the consistent theme coursing through Burke’s work on rhetoric. I
would respond to the question in two ways: first, it is terribly misguided to suggest Burke creates
a rhetorical system; any thoroughgoing study of Burke’s long career reveals a distrust of
theoretical system-building and a focus on envisaging perspectives through the use of language,
expressed in Burkean terms as symbolic action. Southwell points out, for instance, how “Burke’s
conception of language means that philosophy as it has been conceived is impossible” (35).5 In
response to the provocative nature of Scott’s question, I offer existentialism as a working
rejoinder. It is the one philosophy prepared to deal and match Burke’s ontological interest in
communicative interaction. Two passages from disparate members of the existentialist canon
illustrate the connection with Burke. First, as Albert Camus contends, “Any philosophical system
is, in the last analysis, a theory of language. Every inquiry about being calls into question the
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power of words” (Lyrical and Criticial Essays 232). Burke, I think, would whole-heartily agree.
Walker Percy, meanwhile, considers existentialism to focus on the ontology of language to get
beyond behaviorism and scientific empiricism. Existentialism, he writes, “is the discovery of the
symbolic transformation as the unique and universal human response” (The Message in the
Bottle 280). Much of Burke’s written oeuvre reflects the basic tenets of existentialism that have
been mapped out in this project: an ontological perspective of rhetoric that considers the
exchange of our communicative resources as that which activates all human social-interaction; a
skepticism of teleological ends or any finality of discourse in favor of analyzing the
transformative yet transient moments of cooperation; an acknowledgment of the agency of
individual expression but an emphasis of the struggle of communicative meaning; and a negation
of the belief that humans are secure in their rationality. In short, Burke shares with existentialism
an orientation, not a system, predicated on the notion that we, as humans, are fallible beings who
rely on an imperfect medium of interaction, communication, which thus renders our existences
tenuous yet pregnant with meaning. While existentialism has, in the past, been labeled
pessimistic, I hope to demonstrate that it more properly can be evaluated as possessing the poetic
humanism of Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical worldview.
All of this is not offered to say, definitively, that Kenneth Burke was an existentialist. He
would have most assuredly declined the offer and resisted the label. But so, for that matter, did
the existentialists themselves. Almost every existentialist announced, at one point or another, that
he or she was not an existentialist—including Jean-Paul Sartre himself. Part of the problem with
existentialism’s cold reception in academia is its ties to identity: so-and-so is, or is not, an
existentialist. This project tries to move beyond such associations in hopes of reaching a better
understanding of existentialism by teasing it out as a heuristic. What ties the variegated themes
explored by existentialists together is not a systematic philosophy, but a perspective that
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emphasizes the dramatistic situations that saturate human existence and, like Burke, attempts to
equip persons with a thoroughgoing understanding of the significance of language,
communication, and motives to deal with all forms of social interaction. Burke and the
existentialists were both primarily concerned in how to explore life without resorting to the
determinisms of rationalism and theology. As Karl Jaspers writes, “Existence-philosophy cannot
discover any solution, but can only become real in the multiplicity of thought proceeding from
extant origins in the communication from one to another” (Man in the Modern Age 176). First
and foremost, Burke and existentialism agree that we, as humans, are not God; and since we
cannot be like God or angelic creatures that communicate perfectly, we are imperfect selves who
rely on a flawed process of socialization which is consummated by the deployment and reception
of language. As such, we are rendered vulnerable with, as Burke writes in the peroration to his
1935 book, Permanence and Change, “no place for purely human boasts of grandeur, or for
forgetting that men build their cultures by huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of
an abyss” (272). In this chapter I aim to demonstrate that Burke’s vast theoretical contributions
to rhetoric possess an existentialist warrant that has been overlooked and pivot to show how
Burke’s critical understanding of aesthetics help us better categorize the literary works of
existentialism. Ultimately, my goal is to enjoin the ideas of each to precipitate a scholarly
conversation between two perspectives that share much in common with one another.
It is worth admitting, up front, the fundamental difference between the two, which I take
as a difference of terminology. Whereas Burke creates a grammar as well as new strategies in his
explicit discussion of rhetoric, most writers in the existentialist movement, though interested in
discussing language and communication, lack a vocabulary with which to negotiate their spheres
of influence. Both, however, carry a similar perspective—namely, that each considers language
to function as an ontological rhetoric and that human social interaction plays out dramatistically
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(for Burke) or tensionally (for existentialists such as Beauvoir and Frankl, each of whom employ
the word). Though Burke dismisses existentialism as a passing fad isolated within the resistance
to the Nazi occupation of France and provides a rather harsh, if not misguided, critique of
Kierkegaard in The Rhetoric of Motives,6 Burke’s writings reflect an existentialist view of
communication. From his first critical work, Counter-Statement, to his later essays that comprise
Language as Symbolic Action, Burke emphasizes the committed, purposeful aspect of language
and how it breathes life into our existence. As he writes in Permanence and Change, humans “do
not communicate by a neutral vocabulary” since all “language is an implement of action, a
device which takes its shape by the cooperative patterns of the group that uses it” (162, 173).
This is precisely the stance of all major existentialist thinkers from Kierkegaard to Beauvoir, all
of whom grant a fundamental primacy to the act of communication. Taken together,
existentialism, as Campbell writes, reflects a Burkean orientation insofar as it “will not permit
the slightest separation between man and language” (“Rhetorical Implications” 156-61). Since
Burke’s most central idea is grounded in the implications for human symbolic action, it would
seem both appropriate and apt to consider existentialism, which Sartre considered above all a
philosophy of action.
The following sections do not merely explore the similarities between Kenneth Burke and
existentialism. It suggests that Burke’s theories about rhetoric reflect an existentialist sensibility
and then employs Burke’s critical methods to “size things up properly,” as he recommends in
The Philosophy of Literary Form. The first section deals with Burke’s rhetorical theories,
suggesting that the precepts of existentialism underscore them and serve as its warrant.
Specifically, the Burkean parlor is examined as a representative anecdote of existentialism. I then
draw a link between Burke’s rhetorical theory of identification and Sartre’s understanding of
human consciousness; this connection underscores the method behind how each thinker
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interpreted the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism. The next section employs Burke’s methods for
literary criticism, wherein he views aesthetics as rhetorical tools, as a way to more carefully
locate the dramatistic elements that enfold in existential literature. The existentialist drive for
authenticity, I conclude, is reflected in the meta-communication of its literary works of art.
Specifically, existentialist literature is seen to present radically contingent situations that demand
one’s ability to negotiate the meaning in life as opposed to discovering first or final causes that
may deliver a meaning of, or for, life. Like Burke, the existentialist author attempts to finds ways
to avoid degenerating into pure identification, which Sartre calls bad faith.
Abandoned in the Burkean Parlor: KB’s Existentialist Warrant
Burkean scholars such as Wess (“Pentadic Terms”) and Brock (“Kenneth Burke’s
Philosophy of Rhetoric”) find within his works a collapse of the traditional dividing line between
ontology and epistemology. In a Burkean frame, knowledge is dictated by the drama of human
relations fortified by symbolic action. Language, for Burke, can never be transformed into a pure
domain of objective facts. As such, knowledge takes on a secondary role to dramatism, which,
Burke writes, is concerned with the problems of action and form rather than methods employed
to isolate kernels of knowledge (LSA 367, RR 38-39). Knowledge, or the process of knowing, is
seen as a function of our ability to symbolic interact with one another, which renders
epistemology as inextricably tied to ontological considerations. As Wess writes, Burke moves
away from positing any final epistemological program, preferring, instead, the open-endedness
of drama whereby knowledge “is not [expressed by] an individual in permanent possession of a
knowledge fixed once and for all, but, rather, in symbol-users equipped to converse today better
than yesterday and maybe even better tomorrow” (“Pentadic Terms” 168). Existentialism rebels
against epistemology in a similar way by enfolding it as, or into, an ontological understanding of
communication.
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This rebellion begins specifically with Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegelian system
building, a distrust that can be traced all the way back to Plato, who elevated reason as the
hallmark of human greatness. The faculty of reason had been celebrated as “the distinguishing
mark of man,” according to Miguel de Unamuno, but for existentialism, he writes, all reason, all
knowledge, becomes a social product that owes its origin to language (Tragic Sense of Life 25).
Privileging language by accepting its rich ambiguities, Unamuno considers any “purely rational
philosophy” to have been constructed from “an inhuman language—that is to say, one inapt for
the needs of life” (144). His thoroughgoing critique of the myth of pure language and pure
knowledge resembles Burke’s own criticism of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian calculus of a
neutral vocabulary, which Burke describes as “a patient labor of hate” (PC 191). Just as
existentialists such as Unamuno, above, and Jaspers, who considered all truth and reason to be a
function of communication (Reason and Existenz), Burke likewise reduces knowledge to the
exchange of our verbal resources. Burke is explicit about this in The Rhetoric of Religion,
distinguishing his method of dramatism and logology as ontological compared with “scientism,”
which is epistemological. In drawing these distinctions, however, Burke is apt to point out that
we be “reminded that each ends by implicating the other” (39). For this reason, it is better to say
Burke and existentialism collapse the epistemeological/ontological breach rather than necessarily
privileging the latter over the former. Both Burke and the existentialists could be seen, from this
vantage point, as forerunners to postmodernism or the rhetorical turn in the humanities, which is
said to have heralded the destruction of Enlightenment thought and its preoccupation with
discovering objective knowledge.7
Burke’s idea of symbolic action is the central theme that binds his corpus together
because it suggests that all language use, manifested as communication, functions ontologically.
The reason I take the liberty to suggest symbolic action as essential to Burke is because his other
49

main concepts—dramatism, identification, and logology (among others)—are implications that
draw from the belief that we are the symbol-using animal or, as he later put it, bodies that learn
language. All verbal acts, as Burke writes in The Philosophy of Literary Form, are to be
considered as instances of symbolic action (8). Grounding Burkology, as Stanley Edgar Hyman
calls it, in symbolic action is, admittedly, a thesis that could be (strenuously) contested. The
justification here is that symbolic action functions as not merely a theory but an orientation to the
world itself—one that locates Burke firmly in the existentialist camp. As Bertelsen points out,
“The realm of symbolic action, then, is the realm of social existence [….] Thus, all of our talk
embodies a statement about existence—an ontological statement” (233). Recognizing symbolic
action as fundamental to Burke’s project provides a window into how he viewed the world. After
all, Burke’s ingenious ideas do not play out in a theoretical vacuum. By teasing out the
implications of symbolic action and all that Burke shares in its wake, an existentialist warrant
surfaces that suggests we, as humans, are abandoned on earth with only our communicative
resources available to negotiate existence. Burke’s entire career was spent investigating what I
have dubbed the central tenet of existentialism: exploring the meaning in life as opposed to the
meaning of life.
Declaring that humans are abandoned does not necessarily entail an affirmation or
negation of God or religion, either. Burke stresses over and over that this is not even within his
critical abilities. In the introduction to The Rhetoric of Religion, for instance, he writes: “It is not
within the competence of our project to decide the question [of God] either theistically or
atheistically, or even agnostically” (2). Later he would declare, as a demonstration of logology,
“Linguistically, God can be nothing but a term” (LSA 456). And in an interview conducted in the
early 1980s, Burke adds: “You can’t have religious doctrine unless somebody tells it to you.
Theology is a function of language” (On Human Nature 380). This is precisely the stand
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Kierkegaard, a devout Christian, and Sartre, a committed atheist, made. Asking the question,
whether God exists or does not exist, is beyond the communicative resources humans are
equipped with. Belief itself occupies a spatial realm that transcends the faculty of discourse. As a
result, communicative interaction arises as the most significant aspect to our existence and
should be the locus of human inquiry. Human abandonment, for existentialism as well as Burke,
is but the point of departure for beginning critical explorations. An illustration of this is worked
out in Burke’s Permanence and Change:
I do not see why the universe should accommodate itself to a man-made medium
of communication [….] Perhaps because we have come to think of ourselves as
listening to the universe, as waiting to see what it will prove to us, we have
psychotically made the corresponding readjustment of assuming that the universe
itself will abide by our rules of discussion and give us its revelations in a cogent
manner. (99)
This sentiment reflects existentialism such that, as Jaspers writes, communication is considered
“the universal condition of man’s being” (Reason and Existenz 79). It is, that is to say, all we
have—or all we can be sure of. The world does not find us; rather, we carve out our projects of
discovery through symbolic action. This view, however, provides little comfort. Privileging
symbolic action necessitates a view of human life awash in abandonment warded off from pure
logical or religious truth. Positing communication as the fundamental, perhaps only recognizable
certainty in existence lacks any secure ground since it is a wholly slippery enterprise. Burke’s
theory on man as the symbol-using animal finds its fullest expression with not only the statement
that we create and use symbols but, more importantly, we necessarily misuse symbols. That we
coerce or disagree with one another allows for life to unfold as primarily dramatistic rather than
scientifically knowable or theologically determined.
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In the section of The Rhetoric of Motives where Burke establishes identification, “The
Range of Rhetoric,” there is a fruitful display of this existentialist worldview. Our understanding
of rhetoric, writes Burke, “lead[s] us through the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the
flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard.” He concludes the section by asserting that
“[r]hetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall” (23). The necessary corollary or
unspoken warrant to Burke’s view of the fall of Babel, or, as he would work out in The Rhetoric
of Religion, man’s fall expressed through original sin in the story of Adam and Eve (172-272), is
the inauguration of a world where humans are abandoned but have need of one another through
communication. We are abandoned in the world except for the properties and possibilities of
symbolic action. This condition of abandonment is the site where Burke and existentialism
compliment one another. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “We are in the world, mingled with it,
compromised with it,” and communication is our “way of being” through this world (Sense and
Non-Sense 147, 93). Burke recognizes the significance of rhetoric in a human life-world
governed by contingency rather than reason, but his writings critically dwell on the effects or
implications of such a state of affairs. Existentialism, on the other hand, works from the inside
out; its major thinkers continually describe the individual’s supreme difficulty in negotiating a
world with no a priori legitimization. They lack a facility with rhetoric which would otherwise
provide more rich explorations of how to negotiate one’s existence with others. Both, however,
share a frame of acceptance that acknowledges the possibility of an extra-human dimension but
focuses more introspectively on human-interaction. “We start out,” Camus confirms, “from an
acceptance of the world” (The Myth of Sisyphus 64). Thompson and Palmeri clarify this
Burkean frame in a comparable way: “Acceptance,” they write, “means dealing with the drama
of human action as it is but allows one the freedom to ‘thunder against’ it” (277). A frame of
acceptance, as Burke describes in the opening to Attitudes Toward History, entails
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abandonment—one accepts the world as it works from within rather than determined from
without.
Abandonment, in this sense, should not be seen as a terrifying encounter with
nothingness or pure relativity. It merely expresses that while we cannot be sure of any truth that
can deliver a final meaning of life or an objective set of determined values, we can profitably
concentrate on analyzing and devising the means of our all-too-human encounters through a
focus on communication. Existentialism would indeed be a thoroughly pessimistic enterprise if it
left us standing alone without any recourse to deal with such a state of affairs. Camus, in
particular, addresses these charges of pessimism, suggesting that such a philosophy would be one
of “discouragement” whereas existentialism explores the problem of civilization thus: “to know
whether man, without the help of eternal or rationalistic thought, can unaided create his own
values” (Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 57-58). From this vantage point, existentialism does
not merely throw up its hands in nihilistic resignation; it paints a poetic view of life that
galvanizes our ability to communicate in order to recognize that values and actions are
thoroughly creative in scope and open to chance, flux, and purposeful commitment. “We
believe,” Camus adds, “that the truth of this age can be found only by living through the drama
of it” (59). Recognizing our collective abandonment is merely a point of departure upon which
one can begin to more profitably negotiate the symbolic activities of an all-too-human life-world.
To take it a step further, Burke’s unending conversation presented in The Philosophy of
Literary Form serves as a representative anecdote8 of the existentialist notion of abandonment. A
representative anecdote, according to Burke in The Grammar of Motives, stems from the human
need to create “vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality” (59). He adds that it is
reductive in scope that can be understood in terms of drama “in the realm of action, as against
scientific reduction to sheer motion” (61). Here an opportunity arises to stand Burke on his head.
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His relaying of an unending conversation in a parlor captures the communicative texture of
existentialism and reveals Burke’s existential warrant more clearly. In writing this little sketch,
Burke, of course, is not attempting to define existentialism but make an account for the source of
his dramatistic view of human relations. Its retelling betrays the existentialist implications that
underscore Burke’s work, however. Dramatism, he begins, starts with “the ‘unending
conversation’ that is going on at the point in history when we are born” (110). Burke then invites
the reader to imagine herself entering a parlor, arriving in the middle of a heated discussion in
which the participants neither pause nor inform the newcomer about what the discussion entails.
After listening for awhile, you, the reader, decide to “put in your oar” and start participating in
the discussion. The vicissitudes of the Burkean parlor are such that one person may argue against
you while another may defend you while someone else may take a completely different approach
altogether. “However,” Burke concludes, “the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late,
you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress” (111).
While this certainly serves as an accurate description of the drama of human relations, it also
encapsulates existentialism better than any pithy statement, essay or story I know of.
Notice that Burke provides no epistemological grounding that explains why you, the
reader, should show up at just such a parlor; who the other persons that inhabit the parlor are, or
why they are there; and there are no descriptions of, or explanations for, the parlor itself. All we
find is an ontological manifestation of communication between persons who spontaneously come
and go. All sense of time and truth exists outside the parlor. The participants of the discussion
are equipped with no resources to negotiate the parlor except for focusing their consciousnesses
on what is being said and trying to find ways to engage the arguments at hand in order to interact
with one another. Like existentialism, Burke draws attention to the discussion at hand.
Communicative acts are granted a primacy above the questions of how the parlor came to be and
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who the participants of the discussion are. As mentioned above, it rounds out a frame of
acceptance to the natural world. Burke points out, a few pages later, that “[w]hatever may be the
character of existence in the physical realm, this realm functions but as scenic background when
considered from the standpoint of the human realm” (115). The objective of this representative
anecdote is to bring the discursiveness of the parlor into sharper focus because the process of
symbolic action is the only dominant, pervasive aspect of existence we can be sure of.
Whereas a scientist or theologian might encounter Burke’s parlor and then attempt to
discern why it was there and what the meaning behind it was, someone with an existentialist
orientation would accept the terms of the parlor and, as the reader is instructed, gauge where the
discussion is flowing and put in an oar. In Sartre’s lecture, “Existentialism and Humanism,” he
asserts that “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines
himself afterwards,” adding, “Man simply is” (28). In Burke’s parlor, you, the reader, are
summoned to the parlor without any a priori cause reason: you show up and are disciplined to
recognize the flurry of symbolic activity going on around you, and are thus compelled to join in.
Imagine, however, someone demonstrating what I might call Sartrean bad faith in the Burkean
parlor—perhaps a person with either a scientistic or theologically-deterministic orientation.
Pretend, for a moment, this person is in fact able to imagine themselves, as Burke instructs,
entering a parlor. In keeping with Burke’s anecdote, that person first recognizes her own
tardiness. Next, she realizes that a discussion, well-advanced already, is continuing without her.
These two factors of the situation immediately arouse feelings of inadequacy, shame, and
vulnerability. At this point, you can either accept the parlor for its dynamic, or rebel against it.
Recall that a Burkean, or, in my reading, an existentialist, sizes things up and decides to put in an
oar, reveling in the odd contingency of fate that should locate oneself in such surroundings. But
would everybody? I think not. The person of bad faith, whom I hypothesized above, would halt
55

the discussion immediately and demand to know whence the parlor came. The discussion would
not be permitted to continue unless a satisfactory account of the parlor’s origins and make-up
had been formulated. If no factual reasoning for the parlor could be assessed or divined, the
newcomer would not permit the previous discussion, or a new, spontaneous one, to ensue.
Heavens, no. The person of bad faith would demand an inquiry and instruct the other participants
to never again impulsively converse until the parlor’s constitution was ascertained. Rather than
enjoy the meanings that multiply within the parlor, this newcomer would want the participants to
discover the meaning of the parlor.
Besides the question of how the parlor came to be and as to its fundamental essence, the
person of bad faith then begins to think, Wait, just who, exactly, are these others who were
conversing without me before I arrived? And what were they discussing? The wheels are turning.
The prior discussion has little chance of continuing because the person of bad faith cannot accept
the dramatistic situation she faces because it is endowed with a sense of absolute contingency.
For her, the parlor, the participants of the discussion, and herself, must be justified—whether
rationally through a logical explanation or determined through a divine source which created the
parlor and governs it by extra-human abilities. This person would then move to demand a full
account of when the discussion began, who discussed what, and what the reasons for the
discussion were. How, she might ask, can we begin to catalogue the parlor and ourselves? Even
if the other participants of the discussion are perturbed by the newcomer’s thirst for explanation,
they would not be able to resume the discussion since the protests have completely interrupted
the flow of dialogue. Some might agree with the person of bad faith, realizing that no discussion
can continue until the surrounding environment is accurately assessed. Others might have ideas
upon how the parlor was founded—attributing it to a God, a Spaghetti Monster, evolution,
astrophysics—and attempt to convince their fellows to join his or her side. Yet another group of
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participants might take time to construct arguments that refute the importance of understanding
the parlor and plead for a return to the prior spontaneity of the discussions before the
newcomer’s arrival. It is a dialogical universe come to life in an enfolding drama, which is
great…Right?
Well, in one sense, this is certainly in keeping with Burke’s parlor such that discussion
continues unabated and new conversations arise. It can be said that the newcomer I have in mind
is merely putting in an oar until her time is up and that, eventually, she departs with, as Burke
imagines, the discussion “still vigorously in progress.” Perhaps so; it’s only natural that the
newcomer will, at some point, not be so new anymore. The problem is that her bad faith has
infected the dramatistic texture of the parlor forever more. Since she will never accept the pure
contingency of the predicament of people coming and going, having only communicative
equipment at their disposal, the newcomer of scientistic or theologically-determined bad faith
will decisively alter the parlor dynamic. The participants will only have communicative
resources to investigate the parlor’s origins, whereabouts, and composition, but such inquiries
will prohibit the free flow of unending conversations to progress spontaneously. The
communicative texture of the parlor will be focused on explanatory knowledge: the
ascertainment of facts. Once sides are drawn, newcomers will have to choose sides upon
entering. That is to say, instead of how Burke envisions it, where the participants do not halt the
conversation when a newcomer arrives, the new dynamic dictates that the epistemological
camps, be they of a religious or scientific bent, will immediately focus on the newcomer and
attempt to recruit her to their side.
Just maybe, though, this was always the case in the parlor. It would certainly be keeping
with Burke’s work on identification. Besides, he is never clear since he recounts the parlor
dynamic in only one paragraph. Suffice it to say, though, Burke’s dramatistic orientation
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compels a newcomer to not pick sides but to recognize the Human Barnyard in the parlor for
what it is: a continual exchange of symbolic activity. Furthermore, Burke does not want the
participants to pause so as to inform the newcomer as to what is going on. The discussion,
remember, is “heated.” Burke advises that you, the reader, assess the situation “until you decide
that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar” (my emphasis 110).
The point here is that Burke’s ideal candidate for the parlor is an existentialist. Only someone
with an existentialist orientation would feel comfortable within the parlor without assessing
exactly whence it came. Why? Because only existentialism provides a way to deal with such
vulnerability. One grants the situation as an absurd, unjustifiable moment of chance. The self is
abandoned with others, but symbolic action provides an opportunity to negotiate the parlor
together. Existentialism thus proceeds two-fold: first, as a frame of acceptance that recognizes
the abandonment of the self with others; second, it galvanizes communication as a way to
negotiate that very experience.
Burke does not say so, but most persons, finding themselves thrown into the parlor,
would not wait patiently until they felt comfortable putting in their oar. They would, as with our
hypothetical newcomer described above, demand answers and facts to justify why they were
thrown into a random parlor among a motley crew of dialogical participants. The existentialist or
Burkean dramatist, however, recognizes that she is abandoned in a parlor with others, armed
with only the resources of communication at her disposal. She accepts the parlor for what it is
and does not demand to know the essence of the parlor. Instead, the Burkean or existentialist
grows aware of the situatedness of herself in the parlor, and starts from there.
It is worth acknowledging that the above analysis does not preclude a person of faith or a
scientist from adopting the existential frame of acceptance in the Burkean parlor. Take Soren
Kierkegaard, for example—a man of immense spiritual faith. How might he respond would that
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the plucky Dane be thrown into a Burkean parlor? Limping slightly owing to the imbalance of
his body’s political economy, which was lampooned in Copenhagen editorial cartoons through
the nineteenth century, let us imagine young Soren walking in. Fond of cigars, he lights one and
follows the conversation for a time. While listening in and enjoying a long ash, he suddenly
begins to feel an immense spiritual weight on his shoulders; as he waits for the right moment to
put his oar in, he concludes that there is a divine force that exists outside the parlor to whom he
is eternally indebted. Soren knows this to be true because he himself can feel it. As such, he
knows it. However, Soren recognizes that while he possesses this spiritual truth there is no way
of impressing it upon the other parlor members. Communication, he thinks to himself, is the only
binding faculty within this parlor. Like St. Augustine before him, Soren can admit the breach
between a world full of symbolic action and an extra-human one. Soren firmly believes in his
divinely inspired, guiding force outside the parlor, but he also acknowledges the impossibility of
confirming it to others from inside the parlor. Though he holds this extra-parlor force close to his
breast, he dare not demand others accept it.
In fact, while ruminating about these things, he notices one participant of the discussion
trying to force others to accept a certain position which he, the participant, believes in. The
participant’s tone grows forceful and his person becomes agitated. Why, he cries out, can’t every
one of you in this parlor accept the truth and validity of what I’m saying? Ah, sighs Soren, who
decides this is where he shall put his oar in. The Danish newcomer, not afraid to offend,
addresses the increasingly impatient participant with amused condescension: We cannot accept
the truth and validity of what you’re saying, good sir, because of the fact you are, indeed, saying
it. We but hold our truths subjectively, which thereby inhibits any chance of you perfectly
communicating your truths to us in this here parlor. And no amount of people here who agree
with you, should they choose to do so, can confirm your truth. You may logically prove
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whatever you like systematically, but you are, alas, using language, which prohibits the
communication of truth itself. Whether it is true is quite besides the point, I’m afraid. I, for
instance, know and love my God, who created this parlor and placed me here, but never can any
of you know this as I know it. It is beyond the resources of this room, unfortunately. A toast,
then, is in order: Let our conversations never end in ossified form; may we continue on
outspoken and in flux—assured of what we think, but deficient in what we know.
And so it goes with the Burkean parlor, on and on. At least one can hope, for the greatest
threat to it is in the human potential for identification, whose perversion of communion is a
disease which results in war (RM 34). The next section uses existentialism as a way to examine
the problems inherent to our need to identify with one another.
Consciousness, Communication, and Identification
In terms of rhetorical theory proper, Burke is best known for conceptualizing
identification as the instrumental term of rhetoric over the Aristotelian model of persuasion.
Identification has been used as an applied tool for rhetorical criticism, but rarely have scholars
explored the philosophical orientation that underscores its conception. Examining it more closely
reveals that foregathering behind the term is a thoroughly existential orientation as to how the
self interacts with others. Burke makes this link explicit, stating, “The persuasive identifications
of Rhetoric, in being so directly designed for use, involve us in a special problem of
consciousness” (RM 36). Existentialism underscores Burke’s ideas here because he demonstrates
both the isolation of individuals and the need to communicate: consciousness and
intersubjectivity rely on one another continually, and this ebb and flow necessitates the human
need of rhetorical identification. Bertelson’s work is helpful in pointing out that the corollary to
Burke’s drive to division is that persons and existence itself is naturally divisive: “In essence,
division is the natural state of human existence” (233). As such, we are, as persons, compelled or
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drawn to symbolically interact with one another. According to Burke, this is inevitable.
“Identification is compensatory to division,” he writes. “If men were wholly and truly of one
substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence” (RM 22). The existentialist
position on consciousness is a subtle but definitive corollary to what Burke is trying to say.
“[C]onsciousness,” as Merleau-Ponty points out, “is itself the living connection between myself
and me and myself and others” (Sense and Non-Sense 95). Division can be expressed as a world
inhabited by singular consciousnesses, yet insofar as these singular consciousnesses possess the
ability to communicate, they necessarily transcend themselves toward one another through
symbolic action. That consciousnesses symbolically interact, they necessarily identify with one
another. It is a logical domino effect of the consequences of being: if singular consciousness,
then communication with other consciousnesses; when or where there exists communication,
then identification necessarily follows.
Identification is not merely a theoretical term Burke came up with but a natural extension
of an existentialist worldview that privileges the need, or will, to communicate. Such a world
grounded in communication, primarily divided but seeking unification, is thus, as Jaspers writes,
“a continually insecure and endangered reality which must always re-establish itself, limit and
expand itself, test itself, and push on [….] It exists therefore in the tension of detours, errors,
somersaults, and recorveries” (Reason and Existenz 79). Similarly, Burke discusses the human
predicament as having
at is command a keen and adventurous equipment for attaining the wherewithal to
bring about a state of security, peace, relaxation, comfort, the benign sluggishness
of satiety and warmth—yet this very equipment for attaining the state of worldy
Nirvana is the soul of turbulence and struggle. (PLF 255)
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Identification and division are seen as continually in flux. Such a state of affairs fortifies Burkean
identification and can be reduced to a window into singular consciousness to align itself with
Sartre’s work. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre maps out the two-fold aspect of consciousness:
being-for-itself (pour-soi) and being-in-itself (en-soi). The latter, according to Sartre, occurs
when a consciousness or person attempts to erase its being; it is grounded in the wish to become
God and not have to deal with consciousness as such. An existent could otherwise lose herself
through identification by religious or political fiat or affiliation and thus not have to technically
choose one’s own being. In the last, being-in-itself is the conscious or unconscious attempt to
negate or reduce consciousness to the Burkean understanding of sheer motion. That is, it denies
both the significance and possibilities of symbolic action, whereas being-for-itself, according to
Sartre, is conscious decision to make choices. As Bell explains Sartre’s ontology of
consciousness, “A human being exists as an uneasy tension between the two regions of being:
the for-itself and the in-itself” (28). If consciousness is a coin, being-in-itself is one side—let us
say heads—and being-for-itself is the other—let us say tails.
It is possible here to adapt these tensional modes of consciousness to Burke’s
understanding of rhetoric. First, it is important to note that he does not privilege identification in
order to expunge Aristotle’s emphasis on persuasion, which Burke considers “administrative”
rhetoric. Rather, they operate together just like a coin: while the latter “centers in the speaker’s
explicit designs with regard to the confronting of an audience [….] there are also ways in which
we spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously persuade ourselves” (LSA 302). Since
identification is a necessary corollary to our communicative equipment, there is also “implicit” in
symbolic action the drive toward perfection, which Burke would later discuss in terms of
entelechy (LSA 17; see also RR 246, 300). Being-in-itself reflects this necessary drive for
perfection which is grounded in our ability to symbolically interact; and if one reaches perfection
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by either becoming God or gaining divine faculties, then one does not have to choose. One can
just be—in itself. Erasing the ability to have a consciousness of oneself and the ability to
negotiate experience individually represents the dangerous problematic inherent to the
application of identification. While identification marks a necessary outcome of symbolic action,
it is important, especially in a democracy, to not have persons degenerate into pure
identification—or, for that matter, a complete being-in-itself, whose ultimate manifestation,
according to Sartre, is bad faith. For Burke, identification can be reduced to the level of
substance: one person may become, or think they are becoming, consubstantial—of the same
substance—as or with another, “[y]et at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of
motives” (RM 21). In this sense, identification is both necessary and dangerous. A person may
be convinced to yield one’s autonomy into a person, cause, idea or god to which they can flee
being as such and exercise, as Sartre would say, bad faith. The menace implicated here finds its
fullest expression in considering the case of anti-Semitism, of particular interest to both of these
thinkers.
This correlation between identification and being or bad faith plays out less abstract and
more concrete in their critically applied works. For Burke, it is his famous essay, “The Rhetoric
of Hitler’s ‘Battle,’” published in the late 1930s but included in the 1941 compilation, The
Philosophy of Literary Form. Sartre’s book, Anti-Semite and Jew, was originally published in
1946. The affinity between the two is obvious in its subject matter, but it reflects a common
methodological perspective which is grounded in a similar critical worldview. Their terminology
differs, however. Whereas Sartre explores anti-Semitism as a function of bad faith and a feeling
inimical to French (and European) political/social life, Burke adapts his book review to consider
Hitler as a medicine man and a warning call for America such that “we may know, with greater
accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine
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in America” (PLF 191). Since identification, according to Burke, is grounded in the
consubstantial wish to “confront the implications of division” (RM 22), singling out the Jew was,
has been, and is a way in which to fortify substance among a majority in a culture, nation or
continent in which Jews or the minority. Both Burke and Sartre treat anti-Semitism in terms of
identification rather than religious terms. Specifically, Burke considers Hitler to provide a
secular analogue to theological doctrine, whereby “[m]en who can unite on nothing else can
unite on the basis of a foe shared by all” (PLF 193), while Sartre suggests the anti-Semite finds
comfort in the position because he can lose himself by becoming a “man of the crowd” (AntiSemite 22). The implications for both is that anti-Semitism does not proceed with an aversion to
Jewish theology, but stems from the mere fact that, in every country excepting Israel, Jews are a
minority and anti-Semitism serves as the best way to foment solidarity. It proceeds as a function
of achieving a purified, totalizing substance, to which the Jew is necessarily excluded.
For Burke, Hitler’s ingenious rhetorical trick was to label the Jews as a scapegoat in order
to provide “a noneconomic explanation of economic phenomena” (201). The devastated
economic landscape following World War I was so debilitating that the German people were left
“ripe for a Hitler” (207). He employed anti-Semitism, according to Burke, to provide a
“curative” function that “hand[ed] over one’s ills to a scapegoat.” By doing so, Hitler moved
toward a “purification by dissociation” (202). Anti-Semitism can be explained, then, as an
outcome of a nation mired in economic depression whereby the “yearning for unity is so great
that people are always willing to meet you halfway” (205). Once this power manifests itself,
Burke adds, “[t]he efficiency of Hitlerism is the efficiency of the one voice, implemented
throughout a total organization” (213). It thus requires complete or pure identification, which
itself, as Burke writes in The Rhetoric of Motives, is a “perversion of communion” (22). When
Burke wrote his book review, however, he had not completely developed his theory of
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identification, which would not appear until 1950. While his work on Hitler is widely celebrated
as a feat of rhetorical criticism par excellence, it focuses perhaps too much on the economic
factors behind the drive for anti-Semitism. This Marxist reading should by no means should be
discounted, but Burke overlooks some of the more pervasive aspects of his theory of
identification which would deal with why people were so amenable not just to Hitler but to an
anti-Semitic orientation writ large. If we take Burke’s later writings of identification, it would
seem to be a given that persons, because of their symbolic make-up, are always ripe for a Hitler.
Sartre fills in this gap. His interest is in the “personality of the anti-Semite” (33). Reading
Anti-Semite and Jew, one is struck by how Sartre critically negotiates his topic with a Burkean
cast—the Burke, that is, from the pages of The Rhetoric of Motives. Sartre’s longer work delves
into anti-Semitism as it appears in France and Europe as a whole and does not limit it to Hitler’s
rhetorical effects. Like Burke, though, he suggests anti-Semitism does not stem from a religious
difference but is predicated on the ability of a majority to be able to call a Jew “one whom other
men consider a Jew” (Anti-Semite 69). That is, Jews can be isolated in contrast to a group that is
consubstantial with itself. Sartre then explores what goes into such a decision-making process on
an individual level:
The anti-Semite has no illusions about what he is. He considers himself an
average man, modestly average, basically mediocre. There is no example of an
anti-Semite’s claiming superiority over the Jews [….] The phrase, “I hate the
Jews,” is one that is uttered in chorus; in pronouncing it, one attaches himself to a
tradition and to a community—the tradition and community of the mediocre. (22)
For Sartre, anti-Semitism represents bad faith—inauthenticity. One arrives at anti-Semitism in
order to be a man of the crowd; this entails an escape from all liberty and all responsibility.
People are drawn to anti-Semitism, Sartre is suggesting, not merely because of economic
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phenomena but because of a more basic need which Burke later articulates as the inevitability of
identification. Since anti-Semitism “favors laziness of mind” (43), it fulfills the wish to flee
being, to negate the possibilities of choice in existence. At bottom, Sartre considers the antiSemite as a person who is afraid, one who fears the human condition (and is in bad faith): “The
anti-Semite is a man [sic] who wishes to be pitiless stone, a furious torrent, a devastating
thunderbolt—anything except a man” (54). In short, Sartre is comparing the individual move to
anti-Semitism as a rejection of symbolic action whereby the anti-Semite can attempt to live by
the properties of sheer motion. The very act of using language necessitates an attempt to suture
the primal divisions of the existence inherent to consciousness itself.
For existentialism as well as Burke, it is vital to recognize that such a perfect harmony
can never be achieved. Would that it could, one may be sure of an underlying pattern of
destruction in its wake—the destruction of all human meaning, to begin with. This is not to
suggest any residue of identification within symbolic acts necessarily augurs a holocaust. Burke
insists on the inevitability of identification within symbolic action. Once it moves toward
totalization, though, we find its perverse tendencies. For Burke and Sartre, the act of individually
recognizing this condition is the best way to combat a community of persons from degenerating
into pure identification, for this totalizing effect need not be limited to anti-Semitism, either.
“The Jew only serves” the anti-Semite as a “pretext,” writes Sartre; elsewhere this bad faith
manifests itself as a prejudiced aversion to “the Negro or the man of yellow skin” (54). In any
such instance, it keeps with the Burkean notion of identification and the problems inherit to
symbolic action. Neither Burke nor Sartre moralize about what to do; they merely draw our
attention to the properties of identification so what we may aware ourselves as to where we are
and what the available choices are in a particular situation. Maximizing one’s awareness of a
particular situation can be seen, then, as the key to authenticity: it does not necessarily translate
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to making the correct choices, but it ensures avoiding subordinating one’s choices to pure
identification or consubstantiality.
A Burkean Analysis of Existentialist Literature
I recounted Burke’s parlor above as a representative anecdote that captures the themes
and theoretical grounding of existentialism. In this section, I seek to capitalize on Burke’s
method of literary analysis in his essay, “Literature as Equipment for Living,” in which he
suggests that literature should be organized “with reference to strategies” in “active categories”
(PLF 303). Specifically, I want to consider existentialist literature as representative anecdotes of
a particular orientation or worldview, the point of which is to create a vocabulary that reflects,
selects and deflects reality (GM 59). It functions as rhetorically-endowed communicative acts by
the author, and its subject matter is about communication in general. As Kaelin writes,
existentialist literature “begins with a complex gesture on the part of the author [who is] inviting
an audience to consider the nature of the universe” (131). Yet by and large, the terms often
associated with existential literature include absurdity, alienation, despair, and nihilism. This has
to do in part with the gloomy subject matter, or situations, that arise in such books, and a great
deal with the unsavory characters that inhabit them. Existential dread dominates our
understanding of existentialism, and this is not only unfortunate, but terribly flawed. It is as if the
decision to pick up and leaf through any novel by Franz Kafka, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes
From the Underground, Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea, Albert Camus’ The Stranger, or Samuel
Beckett’s play, Waiting For Godot, is not just an exercise in leisurely entertainment, but a
statement about how one is feeling—and that feeling might be summed up, in the popular
imagination, as lonely and without hope. Viewed through a Burkean lens, however, one may
consider existentialist literature as communicative acts that provoke the ontological difficulties
with which persons face in negotiating their social experiences.
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Besides, how can existentialist literature be considered as an isolated act of solipsistic
consciousness if Burke’s lessons about how literature operates as a rhetorical act of
communication are taken seriously? Authorial invention and the act of reading, which initiates an
intersubjective communicative process, would seem to preclude such a foreboding landscape. As
early as 1931, with the publication of his first critical work, Counter-Statement, Burke declares
“all competent art is a means of communication, however vague the artist’s conception of his
audience may be” (73). For Burke, any linguistic act “is to be considered as ‘symbolic action’”;
furthermore, a symbolic act functions as “the dancing of an attitude” (The Philosophy of Literary
Form 8-9). Fiction does not merely function expressively, he indicates in a 1935 speech,
“Revolutionary Symbolism in America,” delivered to the American Writer’s Congress, but
operates as propaganda (268). Keeping this in mind, the purpose and style of existentialist
literature changes dramatically. Rather than a stamp of approval for egotistic conduct or selfloathing, the literary works of existentialism are presentations of situations that individuals face
and the corresponding attitudes with which they face them. Above all, existentialist literature
activates an intersubjective process of communication that alerts readers to the need for
consciousness of other consciousnesses. In What is Literature?, for instance, Sartre describes
how literature only comes into being through the “joint effort” of the author and the reader. “The
creative act,” he writes, “is only an incomplete and abstract moment in the production of a
work,” adding, “There is no art except for and by others […] realized through language” (51-52).
If we look at rhetoric as Burke does, whereby symbolic acts impress an attitude from one to
another in any communicative exchange, the scope of existentialist literature is altered such that
it does not function as a descent into the bleak depths of one’s singular consciousness. Rather, it
activates a forum of meta-communication that describes the sheer difficulty of living in a body
that, as Burke says, learns language in a world where only our linguistic resources bring us
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together. If there is anything absurd about existential literature, it is the dominant perception that
it represents the hopeless descent of the single individual’s consciousness.9
The writings of one of the few American existentialists, Walker Percy, is instructive in
this regard. First, in a very Burkean manner, he suggests that humans should be viewed as manthe-talker or man-the-symbol-monger.10 “Language, [or] symbolization,” he writes, “is the stuff
of which our knowledge and awareness of the world are made, the medium through which we
see the world” (The Message in the Bottle 17, 150). What this implicates for existentialist
literature is that the movement of such art “achieves a reversal through its re-presenting. To
picture a truly alienated man, pitcture a[n] [existentialist] to whom it had never occurred to write
a word” (93). The act of writing and reading is thus a communicative endeavor which quashes
the idea of existential alienation or, for that matter, art for art’s sake. Camus considers such a
distorted view of the literary process to be the invention “of a factitious and self-absorbed
society” since, as he writes in Resistance, Rebellion and Death, “art cannot be a monologue”
(255, 257). Burke shares a similar distrust of pure art in the pages of Counter-Statement. He
finds the expressiveness of the author “is too often confused with pure utterance” when it should
more properly be seen as “the evocation of emotion” projected to the reader (53). Whether they
know it or not, authors, writes Burke, use their “expressiveness as a means of making people
seek what they customarily fled and flee what they customarily sought” (67). To size
existentialist literature up more properly, as Burke might have us do, I propose that it be seen as
the presentation of rhetorical situations which emphasize the contingency of social experiences
brokered by intersubjective encounters between consciousnesses. “Existentialist literature was to
be social action,” writes Kaelin, adding, “It intended to produce change by offering its audience a
conception of the human individual consistent with (ironically enough) its true nature: man in
face of his coefficient of adversity, a given individual working out his destiny within an
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unfriendly environment” (103). This is the consistent, active category that binds such works of
art together. Consider existentialism, then, from this angle: consciousness itself is thorny and
isolated, but we negotiate our experiences through communicative interaction with other
consciousnesses.
I continually stress the focus on intersubjectivity within existentialism throughout this
project because it is the lost, or forgotten, component in both the popular as well as received
academic imagination. As will be discussed in the next chapter on rhetorical agency,
existentialism does not endorse an autonomous, unitary subject free to impose her will as she
pleases. What may be considered an existential struggle is the subject’s recognition that she is
not alone, that her consciousness necessarily projects outward, via communication, toward
others. As Percy writes, to fully understand existentialism, it is vital to see consciousness and
intersubjectivity as “inextricably related; they are in fact aspects of the same new orientation
toward the world, the symbolic orientation” (274). What existentialism—existentialist literature,
in particular—rebels against is the danger of identification highlighted above: it warns against
fleeing from being to merge the self into either a process of scientific rationalism, a determinism
set in advance by a god, or losing oneself in a public crowd. It posits intersubjectivity as a
dramatic interaction of the self’s being-with-others which should never degenerate into negating
one’s own being or freedom. This is often taken for an endorsement of fluid egotism, but it most
assuredly is not. While his novella, The Stranger, features a man condemned for his indifference,
Camus, for instance, warns readers from identifying him, as an author, with his characters. In his
book-long essay, The Rebel, Camus describes the radically contingent situatedness of the self
that is emphasized in such works of fiction: “I have need of others who have need of me and of
each other [….] This individualism is in no sense pleasure; it is perpetual struggle, and,
sometimes, unparalleled joy when it reaches the heights of proud compassion” (297).
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Existentialist literatures asks and attempts to answer the following questions: How can we live
authentically when we have a need to identify with others? That is, how can we symbolically act
when we have such a tendency to either lock up our consciousness within itself or to yield it alltoo-willingly to others or ideas? Contrary to accepted opinion, existentialism does not permit the
refuge of solipsism, but nor does it, for that matter, allow the perversion of communion Burke so
eloquently warned against.
Unfortunately, the present critical enterprise is not without difficulty since the characters
that inhabit existentialist literature, taken individually, are, to begin with, unlikeable fellows.
They are often selfish and preoccupied with only themselves. For instance, Dostoevsky’s
Underground Man and Camus’ protagonist, Meursault, from The Stranger, fail in their ability to
possess any empathy for, or reach out to, others. This should not, however, be construed as
encapsulating the projected ethos of their authorial creators. What we find over and over in
existentialist literature, on the contrary, is the presenting/presencing of situations where
individuals have the ability to act with others, rightly or wrongly, or do nothing. The authors of
existentialist literature intensify the freedom of contingency in the predicaments and situations
individuals face. Some characters rise to these challenges with honor, others fail to act at all, and
still others make terrible choices for unspecified reasons. Milan Kundera has written that while
some may consider Kafka’s works to be preoccupied with the individual’s solitude there exists,
on the contrary, “[n]ot the curse of solitude but the violation of solitude is Kafka’s obsession!”
(The Art of the Novel 111). Kundera’s observation can be extended to the entire canon of
existentialist literature. As Burke demonstrates, the literary transaction itself negates the
possibility of receding into solipsistic despair. Each literary act of existentialism is a rhetorical
enterprise; it cannot be judged merely by the admittedly pervasive failure of its characters—
Estragon and Vladimir, who never find Godot in Beckett’s play; the final pages of Antoine
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Roquentin’s diary in Nausea, which shows a man yielding to unjustifiable resignation;
Meursault’s acquiescence to his own execution; and the conclusion to Kafka’s The Trial, where
Joseph K. is inexplicably killed before a fair trial. There is, true enough, very little triumph in the
narratives of existentialist literature.11 Its pages are inhabited by anti-heroes who, as
Dostoevsky’s Underground Man recognizes, “produce a most unpleasant impression” (296). All
of these characteristics acknowledge, on the surface, a pessimistic scope, but it is important to
move beyond mere character assessment and consider the dramatistic situations in existentialist
literature. The world of human relations in these books is not governed by reason, or is governed,
rather, in a sphere beyond reason. It offers a world in which only the exercise of symbolic action
is at human disposal. For far too long now, however, many have evaluated existentialist literature
with a focus only directed toward the feelings its characters evoke rather than the situations or
attitudes the author presents. It is high time, then, to apply some critical energy to analyzing the
orientations of the works taken holistically.
While all literature may be said to function as acts of communication, existentialist
literature, in particular, highlights a two-fold aspect of it: the author is communicating to the
reader and the consciousness of the characters are haunted by their need to communicate. The
violations of solitude which Kundera describes reflect the total will-to-communication, which,
for Jaspers, is impossible to deny. Kaelin expresses existentialist literature in terms of “creative
communication”: an author exercises the rhetorical tool of invention, which necessitates a
communicative relationship (98). I would add that, like Burke’s parlor, the fundamental theme to
existentialist literature is about the process of communication itself, which is why I have
described it as a form of meta-communication. Its characters, mostly anti-heroes, experience the
need to communicate and the difficulties that arise from this necessity. They can neither escape
themselves with a flight into pure being nor break free of others; if they fail, it is because they
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attempt one or the other. The fact is, they exist, therefore they communicate. That they
communicate entails absolute contingency within the particularity of their situations, the ability
to choose, and the responsibility that stems from such choices.
How (Not) to Wait for God(ot)
Samuel Beckett’s play, Waiting For Godot, is an illustrative example of the two-fold
element of communication in existentialist literature. In fact, it operates as a Burkean parlor. In
Burkean dramatism, the statement, “all life’s a stage,” is not considered metaphorically, but
literally: it serves “as an aid for helping us find answers to the question ‘What related
observations follow from the proposition that “man is a person, who can act, as distinct from
things that can but move”?’” (“Rhetoric, Poetics, and Philosophy” 29). Burke adds, moreover,
that dramatism should not be seen as merely drama in and of itself. Rather, he considers it “the
systematic use of a model designed to help us define and place the nature of human relationships
and of the relations among our terms for the discussion of such matters” (29). It is important to
keep this in mind since technically, there is very little drama in Beckett’s play—if drama is
considered as the coherent structure of a narrative detailed with character trajectory and plot
devices. Beckett’s play is dramatistic, as opposed to dramatic, such that it reflects the human
condition of negotiating our contingent existence through only the resources of symbolic action.
Waiting for Godot functions as an intensification of the tensions that result from being bodies
that learn language—or, otherwise put in a Burkean vocabulary, the symbol-using animal.
Vladimir and Estragon show up in a Burkean parlor without any a priori justification.
While they attempt to figure out their purpose, they are abandoned on stage except for their
potential for symbolic activity. They know they are waiting for Godot, but they do not know why
this is the case nor when, if ever, Godot will come. They think, however, that should they find
Godot, their purpose will be finalized—that is, all will be well. Beckett, of course, does not
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permit them to find Godot—or allow Godot to find them—but this wont of purpose or
justification on the part of Vladimir and Estragon represents the Sartrean bad faith and/or the
drive towards Burkean identification. Godot, for them, represents a purposeful cause by which,
in their minds, they can escape the pure contingency of their situations. They symbolically
interact with one another and Pozzo, who intermittently appears on stage, because they have to,
not because they want to—ultimately, they would like to flee from being in order to be with God
or be with God(ot). The God/Godot link is so obvious as to perhaps not even warrant
mentioning, but it demonstrates the wish to escape being through pure identification. Whether
Godot is an authoritative figure such as a general or political leader or captain of industry (a
boss, if you will), or, for that matter, a god, he represents the Vladimir’s and Estragon’s hope to
lose themselves. If they find God(ot), they will then be able to finally abandon the world of talk
to which they are already assigned to.
Beckett’s play serves as one long exercise in communicative frustration for Vladimir and
Estragon. They are not permitted to escape themselves or their communicative abilities, which
are necessary. Vladimir cries out, at one point, “Let us not waste our time in idle discourse!”(51).
It betrays Beckett’s attempt to call attention to our condition, which is always situated in the
particular, not the abstract, and governed by the resources of symbolic action. It is why Vladimir
continues in the following way:
But at this place, at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or
not. Let us make the most of it, before it is too late! Let us represent worthily for
once the foul brood to which a cruel fate cosigned us! [….] The tiger bounds to
the help of his congeners without the least reflexion [sic], or else he slinks away
into the depths of the thickets. But that is not the question. What are we doing
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here, that is the question. Yes, in this immense confusion one thing alone is clear.
We are waiting for Godot to come— (51-52)
Notice how Vladimir recognizes the fundamental contingency and pervasiveness of symbolic
action but ultimately rejects it. He wishes to be like an animal of the wild, or function through
the properties of sheer motion, as Burke would say. If only, for Vladimir and Estragon, they
could react like animals and not have to think or communicate with others. Vladimir fails to
realize that there is no such thing as idle discourse. All language is purposeful in and of itself to a
particular end through its intersubjective rhetorical texture. The act of communication
necessitates a world pregnant with meaning, but Vladimir and Estragon, despite their verbal
flurry with one another, cannot recognize this. They have bad faith because they want to negate
their own ability to talk with each other.
As the play unfolds, it becomes clear Vladimir and Estragon want out of the Burkean
parlor, but Beckett denies them this possibility. It is why, in the final pages of Beckett’s play, the
two main characters contemplate suicide. They cannot abide by the meaning in life without some
greater purpose coming into focus. “I can’t go on like this,” says Estragon in the conclusion to
the play, indicating his exasperation with being a symbol-using animal (61). “We’ll hang
ourselves to-morrow,” Vladimir responds, adding the caveat, “Unless Godot comes.” “And if he
comes?” asks Estragon, to which Vladimir answers: “We’ll be saved.” A couple of lines later,
the play ends with Vladimir asking if they should go; Estragon agrees, “Yes, let’s go,” but
Beckett’s final word before the curtain is the stage direction, “They do not move.” The stage, or
Burkean parlor, is inescapable. The characters are suspended in communicative flux on stage as
the curtain draws to a close. They cannot escape the dramatistic stage of existence.
To understand this play as an exercise about communication divorces Beckett, the
dramatist, from his characters. The conditional situation of the play is what is significant, not the
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fact that Vladimir and Estragon do not find Godot. While it is necessary that the characters fail in
their attempt to erase their being in order to find a purpose or the purpose that God(ot) promises,
they still have one another as well as the ability to communicate. This, I think, is the lasting
impression of Beckett’s play, and it is why we have seen in recent years performances staged in
bleak or hostile landscapes. A performance was staged in San Quentin prison in 1957, Susan
Sontag directed it in Sarajevo in 1993 amidst a civil war, and the artist Paul Chan orchestrated a
performance of it in New Orleans’ 9th ward in 2007. The point of each performance was not to
emphasize the hopelessness of each situation but reflect the common bond of vulnerability,
which can only be met with communication as it is existentially understood. Ultimately, all we
can be sure of are the possibilities of symbolic action that we share despite the fact we cannot
compute it mathematically. “Life totters,” writes Jaspers as an illustration of this theme, “not
really understanding the speech it is itself using” (Man in the Modern Age 79). While our
abandonment is thus stark and visceral, it possesses that binding aspect of our nature,
communication, which ties us together and upon which a better future can be actualized.
Communicating from the Underground
While Beckett’s play is meant not just for an isolated act of reading consumption, but
public performance, existentialist novellas and novels suppose a greater difficulty. Dostoevsky’s
Notes from the Underground is an interesting case study in this regard. Walter Kaufmann, who
helped frame the existentialist canon with the 1956 publication of his reader, Existentialism:
From Dostoevsky to Sartre,12 included only the first section of Dostoevsky’s novella in his
reader. While quite obviously Kaufmann, serving as an editor, has page limits and structural
constraints prohibiting the inclusion of the entire work, it is curious that he dismisses the second
portion of Notes as unnecessary to Dostoevsky’s work as a whole. I draw attention to this prior
to discussing Dostoevsky’s book in order to demonstrate the purposeful disregard of any social
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interaction within the text by the protagonist with others, which happens only in the second part.
To read the first portion of Notes is to witness a long, polemical digression from a singular
consciousness. It is a quite fascinating soliloquy, but by reading only the first installment of the
text one fails to witness the narrator being rendered vulnerable by others—and that, ultimately, is
our situation—his situation—in existence. After being embarrassed by a group of associates—it
would be a stretch to call them friends—the Underground Man returns to his previous isolation
and decides that while he only likes playing with words himself, “what I really want is that you
all should go to hell” (290). This sentiment would later be reflected in Sartre’s play, No Exit,
whose conclusion finds the antagonist exclaiming, “Hell is other people!” While this may be
construed as support for an egotistic view or solipsism, the point of these works is to demonstrate
the inability to wish away other persons. A more fundamental question arises as well: who can
the reader believe—Dostoevsky, who is writing the book as an act of public communication, or
the Underground Man, who is mired in his contempt for humanity?
This question ultimately surfaces when considering any work of existentialist literature.
We have no choice but to communicate with others. Even if our interpersonal communicative
efforts fail, as in the case of the Underground Man, we must exercise the will-to-communicate in
some manner, and, in this case, it is the composition of “notes” for a reading public. It is why,
despite his evocation of solitude, the Underground Man continually peppers his writing by
addressing his readership as “gentlemen”. This betrays Dostoevsky’s attempt to speak through
his protagonist, who considers himself a coward but is aware that, in the act of writing, he is
reaching an audience: “If it is not for the benefit of the public, why should I not simply recall
these incidents in my own mind without putting them on paper?” asks the Underground Man
(214). The answer is simple: despite himself, the Underground Man cannot escape his total willto-communicate. By evoking a sense of personal feeling, Dostoevsky’s narrator is thus
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provoking his audience in a rhetorical act. Even though, as a character, the Underground Man
rejects his opportunity to be with others, calcifying his criticisms with self-righteous disgust, this
does not amount to a mere surface endorsement by Dostoevsky of a retreat into solipsism. In
fact, Dostoevsky is demonstrating the impossibility of the position in which such a character
adopts by virtue of writing as a communicative endeavor.
While the Underground Man is contemptible in his concern for others, he is not without
justification for his opinions. Like much of existentialist literature, the Underground Man rejects
the rationalist account of human nature prevalent in the nineteenth century, just as Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche critique Hegel and Plato, respectively. In particular, the self-assurances of
scientism are Dostoevsky’s target; he imbues the Underground Man with both distrust and hatred
for the wish to rationally codify the universe. The existentialist texture of this book is reflected in
Dostoevsky’s unwillingness to permit any finalized, teleological account for human actions and
motivations:
[S]cience will teach man […] so that everything he does is not by his willing it,
but is done of itself, by the laws of nature. Consequently we have only to discover
these laws of nature, and man will no longer have to answer for his actions and
life will become exceedingly easy for him. All human actions will then, of course,
be tabulated according to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up
to 108,000 and entered into an index […so that] everything will be so clearly
calculated and noted that there will be no more deeds or adventures in the world.
(200)
Dostoevsky teases out scienticism as resulting in a human nightmare where our very humanness
is erased—being as such is collapsed into a mathematical model of exactitude. The will to
calculate everything by scientific or religious decree is an illustration of bad faith; it reflects the
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wish to flee being as such and reduce human interaction to the re-activity of sheer motion.
Dostoevsky approaches human rationality as does Unamuno and other existentialists as well as
Burke,13 where it is considered but one aspect of our human capabilities. “You see, gentleman,
reason is an excellent thing, there’s no disputing that,” says the Underground Man, “but reason
satisfies only the rational side of man’s nature, while will is a manifestation of the whole life,
that is, of the whole of human life including reason and all the impulses” (203). Now Dostoevsky
is not explicit about the primacy of communication as Burke is, but consider the above passage
by adding “the will-to-communicate” as a manifestation of the whole life. This is what Jaspers
does in discussing existence in terms of the manifestation of communication—or the self’s
“communicative manifestation” in the world (Philosophy 92). As it has been remarked above,
though, manifesting communication as ontologically grounded provides a slippery ground for
which to evaluate and negotiate our human life-world.
It reflects our fallibility and the inability to perfect human interaction or relations. This is
why existentialists such as Dostoevsky can admit through his Underground Man that although
life “is often worthless, yet it is still life and not simply extracting square roots” (203). The above
statement captures the existentialist orientation to life such that there is no a priori justification
for the meaning of life, but at the same time a totalizing frame of relativity is avoided because
life itself, pregnant with meaning from our symbolic activity, is lived with others in an
interaction of meaning in existence. While on the one hand Dostoevsky could be interpreted as
being pessimistic here, a Burkean frame allows us to consider Dostoevsky’s Underground Man
as presenting life as dramatistic in scope. Man, writes Dostoevsky, “is a frivolous and
incongruous creature, and perhaps, like a chess player, loves the process of the game, not the end
of it” (208). Yet many people, as it was hypothesized when considering the Burkean parlor,
reject a dramatistic or existential view of life. It is why Vladimir and Estragon want to enfold
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themselves in God(ot) or flee being through suicide. Science and religion are not to be
eliminated, but their goal to discover a complete account of all human actions and motivations
can be seen as misguided. Existentialism proposes that we negotiate the hand we are dealt,
moving our chips forward without certainty as to whether we will win the hand. As Dostoevsky
writes in the conclusion to Notes from the Underground, “It’s a burden to us even to be human
beings—men with our own real body and blood; we are ashamed of it, we think it a disgrace and
try to contrive to be some sort of impossible generalized man” (297). This sentiment reflects
Beauvoir’s claim that “[u]niversal, absolute man exists nowhere” (Ethics 112). We are ashamed
of ourselves as symbol-users, that is, and thus we drive toward a state of perfection or entelechy
instead of accepting the ambiguities which being the symbol-using animal presupposes.
Existentialist literature attempts to move us toward accepting the insecurity of our contingent
situations without bad faith, which would be the self’s acquiescence to the temptations of pure
identification.
Awakening to the Pursuit of Meaning
Pure identification has many faces for its appeals come in many varieties. While
Dostoevsky’s Underground Man rejects the scientific form of identification so common in his
era, enfolding the self into a theological doctrine is a pervasive inducement evident throughout
human history. This theme is best captured in Herman Hesse’s Siddhartha, when its title
character meets with Gotama, the Buddha, and learns his teaching but ultimately declines the
offer to join his following. After spending a great deal of time learning from Gotama,
Siddhartha’s best friend and traveling companion, Govinda, asks to join the teachings and follow
the path of salvation. He is accepted, and then encourages Siddhartha to do the same. “When he
heard Govinda’s words,” writes Hesse, “Siddhartha awakened as if from a sleep” (29-30).
Siddhartha’s awakening is both literal and metaphorical; he realizes that if he were to join the
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Buddha, he would be fleeing his own being. He had been asleep during his time with the other
monks because he had tried to escape being as such. Upon recognizing this, Siddhartha does not
try to warn Govinda against accepting the Buddha—in fact, he is pleased that his friend will be
choosing his own path, for once—and suggests, despite Govinda’s protesting, that he be at
peace: “The Illustrious One’s teachings are very good,” says Siddhartha. “How could I find a
flaw in them?” (31). Notice that Siddhartha is not rejecting the logic of Gotama, only his own
following of it. That is, Siddhartha accepts the validity of the Buddha, but does not want to
enfold his being into the pure identification of Gotama’s following.
Before leaving, Siddhartha summons the courage to go speak with Gotama and tell him
that he is continuing his pilgrimage anew. Siddhartha ultimately rejects Gotama’s teaching, he
tells him, because he implicitly finds a gap in the ability “of rising above the world, of salvation”
(31). Specifically, Siddhartha cannot accept this “break” in the ability to communicate the self’s
Enlightenment:
To nobody, O Illustrious One, can you communicate in words and teachings what
happened to you in the hour of your enlightenment. The teachings of the
enlightened Buddha embrace much, they teach much—how to live righteously,
how to avoid evil. But there is one thing that this clear, worthy instruction does
not contain; it does not contain the secret of what the Illustrious One himself
experienced—he alone among hundreds of thousands. (34)
It is thus a function of the inability to communicate truth, or enlightenment, upon which
Siddhartha delivers his rejection. It is impossible to exactly know how to be the Buddha,
Siddhartha is suggesting, because only the Buddha himself experienced enlightenment himself. It
is why in our hypothetical Burkean parlor above Kierkegaard possessed a truth but dared not
demand others to submit to it, nor anyone else’s truth. To communicate truth is to simulate it,
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and, once simulated, you have but a mimetic process that can never capture the texture of the
truth sought.
As such, Siddhartha does not want to simulate the experience of Gotama’s enlightenment,
but find his own through his own actions and motivations. “I must judge for myself,” Siddhartha
tells the Buddha, adding,
I must choose and reject [on my own….] If I were one of your followers, I fear
that it would only be on the surface, that I would deceive myself that I was at
peace and had attained salvation, while in truth the Self would continue to live
and grow, for it would have been transformed into your teachings, into my
allegiance and love for you and for the community of the monks. (35)
Siddhartha declines the offer to join the Buddha because he is worried by the temptation of pure
identification and bad faith. He knows that to become one of Gotama’s followers would
necessitate subordinating the freedom of both his consciousness and his person to the Buddha’s
community of thought and being. Later in the book, when Siddhartha describes the Buddha to his
lover, Kamala, he articulates the temptation of such pure identification: “Thousands of young
men hear his teachings every day and follow his instructions every hour, but they are all falling
leaves; they have not the wisdom and guide within themselves” (72). This does not preclude
Siddhartha, however, of admiring Gotama as a man of wisdom to whom one can learn a great
deal from. For Siddhartha, Gotama is a teacher to be respected, not a leader to follow. One
absorbs the teachings of others and incorporates their texture so as to transform one’s life.
Teaching, that is, awakens the self to a higher sense of consciousness which thereby transforms
one’s motivations and actions.14
Pure identification purports to solve the riddle of the self, though. It presents an
opportunity to flee being and actualize a static state of existence, one which comports with the
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properties of sheer motion. Siddhartha reflects on his time with Gotama and realizes that he was
trying to fly from it through deception. He then comes to the conclusion that he is “one and [is]
separated and different from everybody else,” but at the same time he can no longer be afraid and
try to conceal being with a flight of fancy outside the self into “the unknown innermost, the
nucleus of all things, Atman, Life, the Divine, the Absolute” (38). In short, Siddhartha realizes
he should be concentrating on the existential meaning(s) that abound(s) in life, not a quest for the
meaning of life. To this end, he discovers the fundamental primacy of communication—that it
problematizes our lives, our goals, and our interactions.
When Siddhartha, after many years, encounters Govinda at the end of the book, he
describes to his friend why a finalized telos prohibits the ability to “see many things that are
under your nose” (140). Specifically, Siddhartha refers to the impossibility of two people
exchanging their truths to one another. When Govinda wants to know, after all these years, what
wisdom Siddhartha has divined, the latter apologizes for his inability to communicate them with
any true clarity:
I have had many thoughts, but it would be difficult for me to tell you about them.
But this is one thought that has impressed me, Govinda. Wisdom is not
communicable. The wisdom which a wise man tries to communicate always
sounds foolish [….] For example, a truth can only be expressed and enveloped in
words. (141-42)
The difference between the two men become quite clear: Govinda, after a long life spent with
Gotama and his followers, “still [has] restlessness in his heart and his seeking was unsatisfied”
because he continually looks for the meaning of life and is obsessed by it (139). On the contrary,
Siddhartha recognizes that language itself precludes the ability to actualize any finality to such a
search. For him, the fundamental disconnect is language and communication. “Words do not
83

express thoughts very well,” he tells Govinda. “They always become a little different
immediately after they are expressed, a little distorted, a little foolish” (145). Siddhartha thus
grants that we are abandoned to symbolic action within a natural world full of division, and, as
such, should “learn to love the world, and no longer compare it with some kind of desired
imaginary world, some imaginary vision of perfection, but to leave it as it is, to love and be glad
to belong to it” (144). Within this passage is a frame of acceptance which signals a comfort with
the dramatism of the Burkean parlor. Siddhartha acknowledges the implicit imperfections of
such a world governed by symbolic action, telling Govinda that this “is what prevents you from
finding peace, perhaps there are too many words, for even salvation and virtue” (146).
“Nirvana,” he adds, “is not a thing; there is only the word Nirvana.”
Siddhartha’s enlightenment, by contrast, is predicated on the existentialist commitment to
manifest a total will-to-communication. As such, he exercises authenticity. Siddhartha realizes
that he is within a Burkean parlor and chooses to see what is going on and then put in an oar.15
“[H]ere we find ourselves within the maze of meanings, within the conflict of words,” he
explains to Govinda, who reflects on the difference between the Illustrious One’s teachings,
which are “clear, straightforward, comprehensible” and his friend’s, which can be considered
“strange, wild or laughable” (147, 148). Yet Govinda realizes in the book’s final pages that
Siddhartha’s smile of extreme “simultaneousness” is similar to that of Gotama’s and it marks his,
Siddhartha’s, own enlightenment (151). Siddhartha is enlightened, Govinda realizes, because he
employs the Buddha’s teachings but adapts them to his own means; Siddhartha, that is to say,
does not enfold his being into pure identification. Whereas Govinda continually searches for the
explanation of first and final causes by trying to flee from himself, Hesse’s existentialist,
Siddhartha, persistently negotiates the situations that arise in life by his own choices—which are,
at times, misguided, but reflect, regardless, his own authentic experiencing of the world.
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Siddhartha’s rejection of the Buddha and his conclusions may be seen as pessimistic, but
they are merely a corollary to a human life-world that plays itself out in a Burkean parlor. On
this account, existentialist literature can be actively categorized as representative anecdotes that
exhibit an orientation to the world which highlights the contingency and non-reason, beyondreason and the irrationality of such a place where we have only recourse to symbolic action. It
directs us toward the maze of meanings within the human universe, which operates within a
natural world that it is distinct from but inextricably linked with. The situations which appear in
the pages of existentialist literature present uncomfortable aspects about our condition: the
inability to secure any prima facie cause or final goal to life; the difficulties involved in our
interactions with others; and the temptation of acquiescing to bad faith and identification. All
persons, in their particular situations, must negotiate the meanings in life, and this is where
existentialist literature directs us. Reading these works, one is disciplined to consider the
Burkean parlor to which the chance of circumstance has assigned him or her. It is the rhetorical
ploy and hope of these authors to convince the reader to begin concentrating on the maze within
the parlor rather than getting caught up and exasperated with the meanings outside of it. Don’t
fret for God(ot) to allocate a sense of purpose for you, is the coherent message of these works.
For, truly, hell is other people, as Sartre’s antagonist concludes in his play, but they are also, as
Merleau-Ponty writes of Sartre’s play, “indispensable to our salvation” since “[w]e are so
intermingled with them that we must make what order we can out of this chaos” (Sense and NonSense 41). We can but communicate in a world fraught with peril, but we can do so patiently and
with others authentically if we try. Resisting the urge to lock up consciousness in solipsistic bad
faith or purely identify the self with a cause is the very foundation not just of existentialism as a
philosophy, but a communicative ethics of a Burkean cast.
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Endnotes
5

Similarly, by 1968, for instance, Sartre wrote the following: “In our view Philosophy does not exist” (Search For a
Method 3).
6

For a discussion of Burke’s misreading of Kierkegaard, see Ercolini, “Burke Contra Kierkegaard.” Not only does
Ercolini recount Burke’s flawed interpretation of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, she suggests that Burke’s
unfavorable conception of existentialism comports with its unflattering characterization in America (215).
Elsewhere Burke associates existentialism with a preoccupation with nothingness as opposed to his, Burke’s,
linguistic negative (Language as Symbolic Action 10). Considering existentialism as nihilistic is a common refrain
used to critique existentialism, but I think a more careful review of the ideas and methods Burke sought reveal closer
connections and a spark a more fruitful Burkean conversation.
7

Implicit in this pre-postmodern connection is the chronological trajectory of the works of Burke and existentialism.
Besides the contributions of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, existentialism plays out in the same time period as Burke’s
written career, extending from the 1930s to the 1960s. I find in both Burke and existentialism a great deal of
anticipation of some the founding characteristics of postmodern thought.
8

I owe to Robert Wess, “Pentadic Terms and Master Tropes” (168), for the idea that the “Burkean parlor” functions
as a representative anecdote, but he sees it as a microcosm of Burke’s methodology writ large whereas I am
attempting to adapt it to existentialism.
9

While absurdity and existentialism are related in particular to Camus, it is important to note the context in which he
invoked absurdity. By absurd, Camus merely suggests there is no rational explanation for our being or existence, but
importantly, beyond that, he writes: “the absurd can be considered only as a part of departure” (Lyrical and Critical
Essays 159). This is significant for the common view of existentialism stops at, Oh, the existentialists think this
world—or this life—is absurd. Taken as a point of departure, though, we find existentialists prepared to deal with a
world not necessarily governed by reason. As Camus writes, “Accepting the absurdity of everything around is one
step, a necessary experience: it should not become a dead end. It arouses a revolt that can become fruitful” (346).
10

In Signposts in a Strange Land, Percy puts it another way, sizing up humans as homo symbolificus (120).

11

In an explicit connection between Burke and existentialism, Kaelin writes how the failures found in the pages of
existentialist literature are because they serve as “novels of reaction of which Burke had spoken: to depict its
pathetic shortcomings and abortive justice” (103).
12

On the stature of Kaufmann’s text, which is still in print, and its contribution to shaping public conceptions of
existentialism, see George Cotkin’s Existential America, 134-35.
13

And, for that matter, Richard Weaver, who, as discussed in Chapter 1, find the human capacity for rational
thought only one aspect of our selves—not the driving, motivating force.
14

Towards the conclusion of the book, Siddhartha observes that while he “came to distrust doctrines and teachers
and turn [his] back on them,” he has enjoyed learning under “many teachers” (141).
15

The fact that Siddhartha ends his days as a ferryman whose job it is to, quite literally, put in an oar is, ostensibly,
coincidental.
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CHAPTER THREE: PLAYING HEIDEGGER’S FOOL:
TOWARD A SARTREAN CONCEPTION OF RHETORICAL AGENCY
“About ‘humanism,’ perhaps more decorticated nonsense
has been written and spoken than any other single subject,
including God.”
- Richard Lanham, Literacy and the Survival of Humanism
Rhetoric is no stranger to controversy. It has perforce sought to regenerate and/or renew its own
justification as a study continually within the Western intellectual tradition. What distinguishes
the controversy of rhetorical agency as unique is that rhetoricians find themselves divided into
warring factions. It touches upon not only issues of method, but questions the very identity of a
discipline re-emerging yet problematized following the “rhetorical turn” in the humanities.
Whereas typically rhetoricians could organize and articulate a resistance to outside
epistemological truth-claims propounded by philosophy, the hard sciences, and theology,
rhetoric is now threatened from within.16 Castigating such villains as Plato and Bishop Sprat or
taking solace in the (perhaps) fatalistically appropriate defenestration of Peter Ramus will not
resolve the question of agency. But we can begin by blaming someone. I choose Heidegger. This
reproach does not follow from any paucity of philosophical validity or his moral failings as
university rector in 1933; it is my contention that the hullabaloo over agency in rhetorical
scholarship begins with a misunderstanding and negligence of existentialism and its relationship
to humanism, which we can trace back squarely to Heidegger. For postmodern rhetoricians, the
genesis of their ideas purportedly begins with Heidegger’s critique of Jean-Paul Sartre, which
destabilizes the notion of subjectivity and drives a wedge between his thought and the
malevolent forces of existentialism and humanism (Gunn, “Mourning Humanism” 78-80). Yet
this understanding is a passive acquiescence that unfairly dismisses existentialism and its
contribution to rhetoric. In Heidegger’s 1947 “Letter on Humanism,” he censures humanism(s)
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as presupposing “the most universal ‘essence’ of man to be obvious” with an a priori
understanding of humans as “an animal rationale” (202). While this may describe
Enlightenment/modernist modes of thought handed down from Descartes, Kant and Hegel—
reaching back, presumably, all the way to Plato—Heidegger’s attribution of this charge to
humanism is flawed. As Ernesto Grassi writes in Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance
Humanism, humanism “has no relationship to the rationalistic approach of Descartes and his
attempt to found a new philosophy of the sciences. On the other hand, modern thought,
beginning with Descartes, did everything in its power to obscure the importance of the
Humanistic tradition” (my emphasis, 78).
In contrast to what Heidegger intimates, humanism has a rich relationship with rhetoric
that extends back to the Greek sophists. Protagoras, among other sophists, invested his
exploration of negotiating human experience by emphasizing how language begets human interaction. Far from privileging rationality or lending a primacy to logical truth, humanism, Grassi
points out, offers a counter-statement by beginning “with the problem of the word, not with
things or beings. Its concern is with language in its primary sense as a way to give meaning in a
situation and to answer claims made upon man” (“Remarks” 127-8). Heidegger’s “Letter” may
have sparked, as Gunn writes, the post-theory movement that “finds its fullest expression in the
work of Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault” (80)—and whose contributions I
by no means wish to diminish—yet it comes at the expense of denigrating existentialism and
humanism to the ash-heap of modernity and ignoring the movement’s emphasis of rhetorical
themes that negotiate the postmodern problematization of agency. If, indeed, “rhetorical scholars
have been haunted for some time by the death of the humanistic subject” and suffering “from a
kind of melancholia” (Gunn 97-8), it owes to a mis-reading, if not outright neglect, of
existentialism’s contribution to re-sculpting humanism in a new frame based on “communication
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as a ‘way of being’—against the Kantian [and Cartesian] ‘I think’” (Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Sense and Non-Sense 93). Unfortunately, as Schrag points out, “Postmodernism will have no
truck with the existentialists’ resolve to salvage the ‘existential subject’ in the aftermath of the
demise of the sovereign rational subject. […] The existential subject goes the way of all the rest”
(Resources 45). The impetus of this study is that it’s worth another shot. The question of
rhetorical agency finds breathing room by re-conceptualizing Sartre’s articulation of subjectivity;
doing so requires exposing rhetoricians to postmodern misconceptions of existentialism and
reviving a more faithful understanding of the themes existentialism, Sartre in particular,
articulates.
One might imagine more traditionally attuned rhetoricians who seek to re-establish a
classical, Isocratean view of humanistic rhetoric (see Clark, “The Critical Servant,” and Leff,
“Tradition and Agency”) would refute Heidegger, but alas, he is not dealt with, and there is nary
a defense of Sartre or existentialism. While both sides of the debate generate a flurry of scholarly
activity addressing the opposition, each camp has grown entrenched, accusing the other of
straw(-person) arguments. The question of rhetorical agency thus finds itself locked in an
impasse: classical rhetoricians worry about the postmodern implications of the death of the
subject—whether, that is, rhetorical practice is viable, let alone efficacious (Geisler, “How
Ought?”); postmodern rhetoricians remain uncomfortable with the residue of modernism that
posits agency as the ability of a rhetor to instigate action based on a fluid sense of choice
(Lundberg and Gunn, “Ouija Board”). Foss, Waters, and Armada attempt to sidestep the
controversy by suggesting a “view of agency [that] privileges self over structure” and claiming to
“leave to others the concern about how postmodernism or posthumanism affects the teaching of
rhetoric” (“Agentic Orientation” 227), but the two are not mutually exclusive. Burying this aside
in an endnote, the authors fan the flames of the debate: to develop an agentic orientation is to
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pass judgment on how postmodernism affects rhetoric. The debate carries a significance which
must be addressed and directly confronted. In terms of the agentic action of the rhetorical
subject, we find, in the postmodern, the likeness of Prince Hamlet: distressed, flooded with an
excess of knowledge, and incapable of negotiating experience with any response-ability
whatsoever; in the traditional rhetorical conception of agency, meanwhile, we find Theodore
Roosevelt’s Man in the Arena: an autonomous agent, typically male, who instrumentally
exercises his will over others in order instigate action with moral clarity. Yet as Kenneth Burke’s
The Lord continually reminds his naïve interlocutor, Satan, “It’s more complicated than that”
(The Rhetoric of Religion 304).
Seeking common ground, Campbell denies this “vast chasm separating classical, modern,
and postmodern theories” of rhetoric, suggesting scholars instead explore “synthetic, complex
views of authorship as articulation, of the power of form, as it emerges in texts of all sorts, of the
role of audiences in appropriating and reinterpreting texts when they emerge and through time,
and of the links of all these to the cultural context, material and symbolic, in which discourse
circulates” (“Agency” 8). Heeding Campbell’s call, I move toward an understanding of agency
in this chapter that galvanizes rhetoric’s traditional relationship with humanism but is not
unnecessarily timid to acknowledge the contributions of postmodern thought. Clarifying and
exhuming the richer qualities of humanism that contribute to rhetoric also signals that which
should be divorced from Enlightenment/modernist notions of subjectivity. A more amenable
understanding of rhetorical agency to both postmodern and traditional rhetoricians might seek to
collapse both distinctions, and instead posit a complicated agentic process based on Sartrean
existentialism, which locates the possibilities of response-ability that an individual, whose
meaning is always appropriated by others, strives to make available in a particular situation. To
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accomplish this, a more rhetorically grounded, original reading of both Heidegger and Sartre and
the existentialists is essential.
In the end, rhetoric will still need its humanism, yet must neither swallow its past
deficiencies nor discard them whole. Grassi realizes this necessity by asserting how humanism
ruptures the primacy of logic and “takes rhetoric as the starting point for philosophizing and
attains a new understanding of scientific thought which no longer is identified with derivations
from necessary and universal premises. It breaks with the mathematical ideal of knowledge”
(Rhetoric as Philosophy 72). It is important, then, to clarify the differences between humanistic
and Enlightenment/modernist conceptions of thought in order to re-create a constitutive space for
a conception of agency to flourish. Driving this wedge by no means marks a critique of the
postmodern questioning of agency for it is not, in itself, a threat to rhetoric’s humanistic past.
Lundberg and Gunn are justified by asserting the “threat of posthumanism (or as it is known in
rhetorical studies, ‘post-modernism’) is a phantom tiger, a specter that haunts and causes great
trembling, but only because it is mistakenly said to bring the plague of agential paralysis” (93).
Indeed so, yet the postmodern camp has failed, perhaps intentionally, to adequately enfold the
problematization of the subject back into the undeniable aspects of humanism immersed in
rhetoric’s past. As Schrag indicates, “The future within a postmodern scheme of things makes
few demands, issues no call for decisive action, and appears to afford little in the way of
possibilities for an emancipation from oppressive power relations and distorted communication”
(Resources 46). Nick Turnbull points out that rhetoricalizing the process of agency and reason,
as in postmodern-influenced theories that advance anti-foundationalism, “does not rehabilitate
rhetoric” because it is not constitutive (“Rhetorical Agency” 220). Creating a breach between
humanism and modernism helps advance a Sartrean agentic orientation conducive to the
postmodern paradigm, for it returns us to identifying and correcting the misunderstanding to
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which Heidegger is here held responsible. The work of Giambattista Vico, of which Grassi is a
frequent commentator, elucidates this: reexamining his critique of Rene Descartes and Francis
Bacon divorces the humanistic study of topics, as Vico configures rhetoric, from the interior
search and positing of truth common to the Enlightenment (“On Method in Contemporary Fields
of Study” 35-9). Existentialism belongs to the former and not the latter. As I hope to make clear
in these pages, re-conceiving existentialism by adapting it to a rhetorical framework
constitutively affirms the humanistic component of agency by complicating yet preserving its
possibility while at the same time distinguishing itself from the assumed subjectivity of Cartesian
and neo-Kantian modes of thought. Making an effort to synthesize these admittedly tricky
elements of theory and practice elevates, strengthens, and provides a suppler rigor with which to
conduct rhetorical inquiry. A new, syncretic approach is therefore required.
I re-turn this understanding of rhetoric to an intimacy with existentialism by expanding
upon the earlier work by rhetoricians such as Campbell, Schrag, Hyde and Craig R. Smith.17 I
hope to suture the controversial wedge driven into the question of agency by advancing a
rhetoric culled from the ideas of Sartre among other existentialists.18 While exhuming the
humanistic potential that allows for identifying and analyzing the suasory discourse and
symbolic exchange which lead to action, rhetorical inquiry must simultaneously establish and
sustain an appreciation for the contextual economic, linguistic, and social forces that affect the
creation and delivery of, and response to, rhetorical activity—whether exercised in the form of a
speech, novel, essay, documentary film, editorial cartoon, et al. The ability to identify that which
constrains the causal effect of rhetorical acts—what Sartre refers to in Being and Nothingness as
facticity—is both vital and necessary. To maintain and enhance its legitimacy as a theory and
practice, however, rhetoric must acknowledge the possibilities of response-ability for the rhetor
as well as the audience in a given situation. Agency is very much, as Campbell suggests,
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perverse, promiscuous and protean (“Agency” 2); and as she herself once acknowledged,
existentialists such as Sartre consider humans as intrinsically rhetorical beings who must risk
their agency in a symbolic process rife with complications (“Rhetorical Implications” 157-8). I
maintain a confidence and hope throughout this essay that existentialism, while often considered
a philosophy that emphasizes the importance of subjectivity, offers, upon closer inspection, a
theory of agentic action based on the contingency of response-ability in a particularized,
destabilized life-world. These qualities dovetail comfortably with the vocabulary of rhetorical
scholarship, and in spite of Heidegger’s accepted reading, existentialism inherently provides a
foundation for a conception of agency that benefits rhetorical inquiry. In the following, I identify
the deleterious effects and misguided influence of Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism”—how, in
particular, it has lavished opprobrium and concealed the rhetorical texture of Sartre’s work,
demonstrate how existentialism corresponds to rhetoric’s historical relationship with humanism,
and detail how this contributes to a new understanding of agency that both revives and provokes
the possibility of agency for a de-centered subject in the contemporary world.
Heidegger’s Fool
Heidegger’s disengagement from existentialism has been viewed as leaving Sartre
holding on to the tattered remnants of Cartesian subjectivity. As Gunn writes, “In the Western
intellectual tradition, the critique of humanism is often said to begin with reaction to Jean-Paul
Sartre’s celebration of freedom” (79). Sartre’s 1945 lecture, “Existentialism and Humanism,” is
thus considered the “last gasp of humanism in continental philosophy,” a legacy that reaches
back to the sophist Protagoras’ declamation that man is the measure of all things (80). 19 Sizing
things up in Main Trends in Philosophy, Paul Ricouer observes: “The label ‘humanist’ then is
attached to any philosophy of the subject deriving from the Cartesian cogito or from Kantian
transcendental philosophy,” of which existentialism is erroneously conflated and rendered as
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“the chosen target for anti-humanism—as if it were the final, fully developed expression of a
philosophy of the subject” (351, 357). Ricouer suggests that by doing so, scholars make an
“unwarranted

and

purely

polemical

identification”

that

overlooks

the

“existential

reinterpretation” of the subject which destroys “the tranquil unity of the neo-Kantian subject”
(357).

It

must

be

recognized

that

both

Heidegger

and

existentialists

critique

Enlightenment/modernist conceptions of subjectivity. As Schrag writes, the existentialists “all
collaborated in an assault on the subject of modernity” and that “postmodernism and
existentialism would appear to be on common ground in their shared dissatisfaction with the
Cartesian invention of mind and the hegemony of the theoretico-epistemological paradigm”
(Resources 45). Heidegger merely accepts credit by divorcing himself from Sartre with an
assertive relish which not only conceals the existentialist anticipation of postmodern thought but
otherwise attenuates the rich dialogue which ensues between thinkers such as Sartre, Jaspers,
Marcel, Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir—not to mention Heidegger himself. The latter actualizes
this neglect by not only critiquing Cartesian thought but conflating it with humanism (“Letter”
202-10). Considering Vico’s severe treatment of Descartes in the humanistic pantheon of
thought, Heidegger’s reasoning is both misguided and flawed (see Grassi, Heidegger and the
Question 74-5, and Vico, “On Method in Contemporary Fields of Study” 32-45).
Sartre’s lecture, in fact, distinguishes two opposing camps of humanism. The first theory
“upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme value,” which, according to Sartre, leads to
fascism (44-5). The humanism of existentialism, by contrast,
remind[s] man that there is no legislator but himself [sic]; that he himself, thus
abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that is not by turning
back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one
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of liberation or of some particular realization, that man can realize himself as truly
human. (45)
Sartre offers a re-articulation of humanism, one that recognizes the sheer possibilities of
response-ability that persons retain at their disposal. As individuals, our acts are both committed
and purposive, but always compromised by negotiating that very experience with others. The
first humanism of which Sartre speaks may be compartmentalized with the Enlightenment
emphasis on meliorism with a clearly defined telos. As Hazel E. Barnes explains, “The kind of
humanism which Sartre is willing to claim for existentialism does not take human nature as
something already given, but as something which is perpetually being made” (Humanistic
Existentialism 225). Elsewhere Barnes explains that existentialism opposes the Enlightenment in
two distinct ways: first, existentialist “faith in the possibility of human improvement is not a
conviction of inevitable progress” (445); second, whereas the “progress of Rational Man was
quantitative [….] Existentialist faith does not clearly foresee its goal. Its confidence lies in the
conviction that if it moves forward, it will discover points worth climbing to” (An Existentialist
Ethics 446). Ultimately, Sartre suggests that the future is always open to doubt, unknowable, and
depends on agentic action, which is itself an erratic fluctuation of interaction between individuals
and not the providence of the instrumental manifestation of one’s individual will. Yet Jacques
Derrida derides existentialism as belonging to the first camp of humanism, failing to recognize
the dichotomy described by Sartre. Existentialism, writes Derrida, is a humanism because it
retains an “uninterrupted metaphysical familiarity with that which, so naturally, links the we of
the philosopher to ‘we men,’ to the we in the horizon of humanity” (“The Ends of Man” 131).
As discussed below, part of this mis-reading is based on Sartre’s own careless emphasis and
organization of his lecture, but it remains important to recognize here that while Sartre aims to
re-sculpt humanism by fragmenting the common understanding of human interaction, his project
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is received as but another philosophy of the subject that promises teleological progress. The
result: Sartre and existentialism have been cast as a myopic wing of outdated modernist thought
whose time has come and gone while Heidegger’s work has become privileged discourse and
sacred ground.
Tilottama Rajan describes Sartre’s reputation as distorted ever since the publication of
Heidegger’s “Letter”: “‘Heidegger’ has come to figure what can be kept and purified from the
phenomenological pre-text of deconstruction [and postmodern thought], while the ‘naïve’ parts
of this legacy have been condensed in ‘Sartre’” (Deconstruction and the Remainders of
Phenomenology 55). Much like Plato’s attack on rhetoric in the Gorgias, Heidegger employs a
specific style to denigrate existentialism in the “Letter.” The formula is simple and methodical:
exaggerate the idea(s) you are addressing (conflate Sartre with Cartesian logic); gain leverage
hiding behind abstractions (Plato’s search for Truth, Heidegger’s quest to interrogate the
question of being); and maintain an apodictic tone throughout which serves as luring bait for
posterity. Like Gorgias, Sartre is rendered a sophist dunce, both confused and puerile. An
intimate, personal letter, Heidegger’s “Letter”—immediately published, mind you—responds to
Sartre’s 1945 address. Interestingly, the lecture is a reprisal of a lesser-known magazine article
for Action he had published the year before, titled “A More Precise Characterization of
Existentialism.” While no evidence indicates Heidegger read this short tract, Sartre, in defending
existentialism from both fascist and communist critiques at the time in what amounts to an
apologia, admits the influence of Heidegger but, apropos the latter’s involvement with the Nazis,
declares this: “Heidegger has no character; there’s the truth of the matter,” adding, “If we
discover our own thinking in that of another philosopher, if we ask him for techniques and
methods that can give us access to new problems, does this mean we espouse every one of his
theories?” (156). Sartre thus exercises a simple ad hominem to account for Heidegger’s
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membership in the National Socialist Party but absolves his theoretical work insofar as it
stimulates philosophical thought. While it cannot be proved Heidegger was aware of or smarted
from Sartre’s attack on his character, we can nonetheless observe Heidegger’s resistance to being
grouped in the existentialist camp. Wishing to distance himself from the existentialist label is
neither surprising nor cause for censure,20 but I call into question Heidegger’s ability to
effectively evaluate Sartre’s philosophy in light of the fact he never deigned to touch Sartre’s
1943 opus, Being and Nothingness.21
Neglecting Being and Nothingness is a not insignificant oversight, for Heidegger,
postmodernists, and rhetorical scholars alike. While Sartre directly engages Descartes in a
discussion of consciousness, the heuristic of this work might be considered the degree to which
he demonstrates the failure of the cogito and how, by inverting it, an adumbration of
communication facilitated by alterity arises. Sartre declares the cogito as merely “a point of
departure that throws the subject onto the Other” (338). The self is “no longer [the] master of a
situation” because of the look of Other, he writes (355). This theme is most perspicuously acute
in Part III of the book, where Sartre’s focus shifts to the motility of language, the viscous nature
of the body, and the presence of the self and other. Sartre transposes the Cartesian ideal by
rupturing the interiority which the cogito privileges. As Michel Meyer observes in Rhetoric,
Language, and Reason, Sartre breaks consciousness from “its traditional Cartesian texture” well
before Foucault, Derrida and Lacan (29). Sartre makes this break explicit as well: “I exist
therefore for myself as known by the Other—in particular in my very facticity,” he writes. “I
exist for myself as a body known by the Other” (460). This relationship between the
consciousness of the self and the Other is brokered by an intersubjective communicative
relationship through the creation and exchange of discourse. “I am language,” Sartre asserts,
adding that language “forms part of the human condition […. and] is therefore not distinct from
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the recognition of the Other’s existence. The Other’s upsurge confronting me as a look makes
language arise as the condition of my being” (485-6). Despite his preoccupation with
consciousness and grappling with the cogito—which should not, as it has in the past, be
construed as an endorsement—Sartre can be seen as one of the first thinkers to develop a sense
of alterity and destabilize Cartesian subjectivity. He discounts autonomous expression and
thought in favor of recognizing the intersubjective construction of meaning. The self offers
discourse but its expression cannot truly reflect its pure conscious thought because the
communicative exchange is always beholden to the Other:
Thus the ‘meaning’ of my expressions always escapes me. […] I constitute my
language as an incomplete phenomenon of flight outside myself. As soon as I
express myself, I can only guess at the meaning of what I express—i.e., the
meaning of what I am—since in this perspective to express and to be are one. The
Other is always there, present and experienced as the one who gives to language
its meaning.” (486-7)
Far from being a fluid sense of subjectivity, agency, for Sartre, is a complicated process
facilitated by the self’s awareness of and communicative projection toward the presence of the
Other. The self engages the Other in a struggle over meaning over which it possesses only a
modicum of autonomy. Humans are endowed with language and must rely on it, but we neither
individually establish nor fully control its operations.
It may come as a surprise that there are close parallels here between Sartre and the posthumanist thinker, Judith Butler. In Excitable Speech, Butler writes: “The address that
inaugurates the possibility of agency, in a single stroke, forecloses the possibility of radical
autonomy” (26). She continues by positing a self as both ontologically grounded and thrown in
flux by the elusive quality of symbolic action:
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[L]anguage is the condition of possibility for the speaking subject, and not merely
its instrument of expression. This means that the subject has its own ‘existence’
implicated in a language that precedes and exceeds the subject, a language whose
historicity includes a past and future that exceeds that of the subject who speaks.
(28)
This is very much in tune with Sartre’s efforts at describing the unequivocal relationship between
the subject and its grappling with language: “No element of language can be invoked without the
whole of language foregathering behind it, in all its riches and restrictions” (Between
Existentialism and Marxism 279). Both thinkers posit that a self or individual consciousness
cannot guarantee its own expression because of the communicative remainder whose potential
for meaning is always processed with others, never autonomously expressed. As Butler writes,
“Because the agency of the subject is not a property of the subject, an inherent will or freedom,
but an effect of power, it is constrained but not determined in advance” (my emphasis, 139).
Agency, then, is that existential struggle in which the self engages being-with-others through
communication which leads to the possibilities of response-ability. It is characterized by a
tensional dynamic that arises between persons, dictated by circumstances, and is not an
instrumental manifestation of one’s own individual will.
Whereas rationalist thought, beginning with Plato, assumes the qualities of language as a
given, Sartre belongs to the humanist camp Grassi describes above which begins by interrogating
the relationship between the self and others through the operations of discourse. Sartre’s
assertion that “the being of human reality is originally not a substance but a lived relation”
demonstrates his commitment to distinguishing his humanistic endeavor from the
Enlightenment/modernist method (735). In Being and Nothingness, the communicative exchange
of meaning also reflects an ontological disposition of our human orientation: “[T]o know how to
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speak is not to know how to pronounce and understand words in general; it is to know how to
speak a certain language and by it to manifest one’s belonging to humanity…” (657). Sartre’s
continued interest with language as indivisible to human experience is captured by the
contingency within which the self necessarily acts by discursively engaging others. For Sartre,
being is manifested through the creation of meaning, which requires an outward corporeal
projection and reception of discourse. “Language,” he writes, “does not speak all by itself,” for
each individual “finds himself in the presence of meanings which do not come in the world
through him” (660, 666). While Sartre here anticipates the rhetorical turn by discussing how the
operations of language and communication throw the self into doubt and thereby destabilize
subjectivity, he neglects to discuss rhetoric proper. For lacking a vocabulary to deal with
rhetoric, he can be faulted for not “completing” the intersubjective project first generated in
Being and Nothingness,22 but not ignored.
Gunn, for instance, betrays an unfamiliarity with Sartre’s text by advancing the idiom of
haunting to help recover the ethical foundations of rhetorical practice (“Mourning Humanism”
80). Gunn’s interest in haunting as a means of re-creating the possibility of agency for rhetorical
practice is not flawed as such, but using Sartre as a foil bypasses his original contribution to the
idea and drives an unnecessary wedge between postmodernism/post-humanism and
existentialism. While Gunn relies on Derrida and Lacan to inform his articulation of hauntology,
he fails to acknowledge how Sartre conceives of consciousness, the cogito in particular, as
haunted (Being and Nothingness 364). The self, Sartre affirms, “comes to haunt the unreflective
consciousness” of itself (349). Later he writes of the consciousness of the self: “I am haunted by
this being which I fear to encounter someday at the turn of the path, this being which is so
strange to me and which is yet my being and which I know that I shall never encounter in spite of
all my efforts to do so” (481). Improbably—or precisely because Sartre is dismissed and Being
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and Nothingness is not considered viable reading for rhetorical scholars—Gunn discredits Sartre,
whose work “provides a necessary centrality for the Cartesian cogito,” and embraces “the figure
of the specter or revenant as a haunting reminder that we can never completely reckon with the
past, nor secure the future” (79, 83). This overlooks the fact Sartre first raises the notion that
consciousness possesses a specter that affects and problematizes one’s own subjectivity.
Elsewhere, Lundberg and Gunn, who distill from Heidegger’s “Letter” that Sartre proffers “an
arrogant, romantic humanism that leads to a ruthless, righteous instrumentality,” pivot and
develop a hauntological postmodern articulation of agency. “We favor an uncertain posture
towards the flows of agency and agents implied by an open disposition toward the séance,” they
write, “a posture that embraces a restless and roving insecurity as an antidote or even perhaps a
subversive supplement to any civil pedagogy” (“Ouija Board” 86). Again, there is no protest
offered here with invoking the idiom of haunting as a method of inquiry to describe or
understand agency. But if future scholarship in rhetorical studies is to be preoccupied with the
haunting of the subject, it should be recognized that the haunted rhetorical agent is inextricably
tied to Sartre. Postmodernism can have all the fun it wants in beating the corpse of the modernist
subject and problematizing rhetorical agency; accusing Sartre of what amounts to a charge of
Cartesian necrophilia, however, is both dubious scholarship and harmful to future research.
Considering existentialism’s foreshadowing, if not downright proximity to many post-theories—
“hauntology” is but one—Sartre’s baleful reputation on behalf of the accepted Heidegger
narrative intimidates rhetorical scholars from a consideration of Being and Nothingness and
examining the rich elasticity of Sartre’s creative, strange, and prolific career.23
What can or should be seen as truly problematic in the pages of Sartre’s tomb is not that
he attempts to advance an updated, neo-modernist version of subjectivity, but his tone and
attitude towards how the self encounters the Other. Sartre laments how the Other, by virtue of
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his/her presence, limits the self’s freedom to render shame and humiliation. It is as if Sartre is
whining about the death of the subject, and perhaps, admittedly, he is. Sartre’s famous play, No
Exit, undoubtedly contributes to this sorrow by the antagonist, Garcin’s, assertion: “Hell is—
other people!” According to Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the play, Sartre should be
evaluated on his discussion of alterity as an act of recognition rather than a detection of the
pathos with which he responds: “If other people are the instruments of our torture, it is first and
foremost because they are indispensable to our salvation. We are so intermingled with them that
we must make what order we can out of this chaos” (Sense and Non-Sense 41). While MerleauPonty was both a colleague, and, as Sarte acknowledged, an inspiration, it is odd but nonetheless
significant that thinkers who otherwise express disdain for Sartre’s philosophy find merit in his
plays and novels. In Theodor Adorno’s polemic, Negative Dialectics, he ridicules existentialism
as reveling in “obtundity,” possessing an “authoritarian style,” and beholden to an “old idealistic
category of the free act of the subject,” yet “honors Sartre that this [complication of subjectivity]
shows up in his plays, against his philosophical chef d’oeuvre” (127-128, 49-50). Fredric
Jameson agrees, suggesting “the ‘ideas’ of this philosopher’s play [No Exit] are wholly different
in quality from the thoughts developed in the philosophical works” (Sartre: The Origins of a
Style 3). Derrida joins in as well, denigrating the “humanism that marks Sartre’s philosophical
discourse in its depths” but praising the adroit method with which he “very surely and very
ironically take[s] [humanism] apart in [the novel] Nausea” (“The Ends of Man” 153).24 These
three “compliments” assume the Heidegger-driven narrative of Sartrean existentialism as
privileging modernist subjectivity and ignore Sartre’s actual efforts to struggle with how the self
exists in a necessarily eristic relationship with alterity. Because Sartre grapples with the cogito in
Being and Nothingness, it is presupposed that Sartre upholds the tradition rather than confronts
it. His attitude may not comport with the postmodern vehement opposition to subjectivity, but
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Sartre provides an early, unique conception of alterity whereby the Other’s presence provokes
the necessary task of discursive engagement without which the self cannot function.
Surprisingly, though, many consider Heidegger, not Sartre, the inspiration for
postmodern thought. One explanation for this comes down to a matter of vocabulary: Sartre
explores consciousness intersubjectively but is beholden to a modernist lexicon. In the peroration
to Excitable Speech, Butler dismisses the “discourse of modernity” as “tainted” because it
“reinvokes the contexts of oppression in which they were previously used” yet suggests
“compel[ling] the terms of modernity to embrace those they have traditionally excluded” (1601). Sartre, then, should not be dismissed, but updated and transformed so as to extract the rich
qualities of his work which are hobbled by his outdated grammar. Heidegger, for his part, deftly
creates an innovative semantic form with which to communicate that is amenable to postmodern
discourse. Heidegger intimates this early on in his grand work, Being and Time: “With regard to
the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the following analyses, we may remark that it
is one thing to report narratively about beings and another to grasp beings in their being. On the
latter task not only most of the words are lacking but above all the ‘grammar’” (34). For this
Heidegger, not Sartre, should be commended. It is the Heidegger of Being and Time who trailblazes an entirely new conception of ontology, writes Ilham Dilam in Existential Critiques of
Cartesianism, whereas Sartre “engages with Cartesian thinking” in order to suggest “the body is
no longer an instrument of the mind, nor a veil which hides others from me, nor is consciousness
the being in which I am insulated from other people” (97). Both provide remarkable
contributions to how scholars consider the relationship of the self to language, but Heidegger
does not emphasize, as does Sartre, meaning as it relates to others.25 In the “Letter on
Humanism,” Heidegger perceptively questions our human ability to expressively master the
control of language, warning about “the seductions of the public realm as well as the impotence
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of the private,” yet fails to consider language as fashioning a primacy of intersubjective meaning.
“Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of Being,” writes Heidegger,
adding, “In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a
living thing. Nor can it ever be thought in an essential way in terms of its symbolic character,
perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification” (199, 206). Again and again,
Heidegger enfolds language into his search to ask about the meaning of being for beings
themselves, whereas Sartre insists upon the significance of interrogating how beings create and
struggle over meaning. Often a neglected part of his oeuvre, Sartre would pursue this theme
continually, writing, as late as 1974, “In other words, man is the being who transforms his being
into meaning, and through whom meaning comes into the world” (Between Marxism and
Existentialism 160). While Heidegger exercises what might be considered a purely philosophical
bent into the self’s questioning of the meaning of being, expressed as Da-sein, Sartre probes
broadly rhetorical themes whereby the self’s understanding of consciousness necessarily relies
on the creative, complicated production of intersubjective communication. A more Sartrean
expression of being is given by Simone de Beauvoir: “To make being ‘be’ is to communicate
with others by means of being” (The Ethics of Ambiguity 71).
It should be stressed that there is no discounting of Heidegger’s critique of the
Enlightenment’s attachment to logic and the primacy of rationality here, only a rejection of its
conflation with humanism. When he writes, for instance, “we are so filled with ‘logic’ that
anything that disturbs the habitual somnolence of prevailing opinion is automatically registered
as a despicable contradiction” (226), I merely rejoin that this is very much in keeping with Sartre
as opposed to driving a wedge between Heidegger himself and existentialism. Two works of
weighty significance in the existentialist oeuvre, Kierkegaard’s critique of systematic philosophy
in the pseudonymously published Prefaces and Unamuno’s Tragic Sense of Life, presage the
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questioning of the confidence inherent to the Enlightenment’s emphasis of logical/rational
thought. Heidegger’s decision to divorce himself from existentialism can be accepted but must
acknowledge a debt to existentialism and phenomenology. Edmund Husserl, to whom Heidegger
dedicates Being and Time and would allegedly later expel from the University of Heidelberg, 26
observes the deficiencies of modern thought; the bankruptcy of equating philosophy with
science; and warns against the teleology of European rationality as early as 1911
(Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy). While Heidegger’s argumentative style is
perhaps more strident in executing the death knell of the modernist subject, “Letter on
Humanism” is consistent with the counter-discourse of subjectivity inherent to existentialism.
While much is made of Sartre’s mis-reading of Heidegger—“a monstrous translation,” in
Derrida’s words (“The Ends of Man” 130)—few if any scholars have questioned Heidegger’s
accuracy in evaluating Sartre. Considering Heidegger’s purposive disregard of Being and
Nothingness and a possible resentment owing to the ad hominem with which Sartre explained
Heidegger’s membership in the N.S.P., it is curious that some avail to judge Sartre based on
Heidegger’s limited interpretation found in “Letter on Humanism.” Attributing to Heidegger the
origins for erasing or problematizing rhetorical agency raises another uncomfortable problematic
for scholars—there was an incentive for Heidegger to shift his stance on the subject’s ability to
decide upon or choose to engage in rhetorical practice. Discrediting the sheer possibility of
agency absolves Heidegger of his speeches and articles in support of the Furher. In particular, the
locus of Heidegger’s November, 11 1933 address in Leipzig, “Declaration of Support for Adolph
Hitler and the National Socialist State,” delivered the day before the plebiscite vote to manifest
support—again—for Hitler as Fuhrer, can be expunged by virtue of Heidegger’s later negation of
agency. He begins the speech thus:
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The German people has been summoned by the Fuhrer to vote; the Fuhrer,
however, is asking nothing from the people. Rather, he is giving the people the
possibility of making, directly, the highest free decision of all: whether the entire
people wants its own existence [Dasein] or whether it does not want it. Tomorrow
the people will choose nothing less than its future. (49)
Bringing into light this speech is not aimed at embarrassing Heidegger or showing his moral
failings so much as a demonstration of how agentic action, for both rhetors and the publics to
whom they address, is continually problematized…but never wholly eliminated. In delivering
this speech, Heidegger, as a university rector, was thrust in a precarious position from which he
shortly thereafter absconded owing to serious misgivings (see “Letter to the Rector of Freiburg
University”). So, too, were the German people, or Volk: coming out of a depression, looking for
something to rally around, their freedom of choice was limited to voting for but one candidate
only, or not voting at all. Yet both Heidegger and the German people, in a particularized
situation, responded to the possibilities of agentic action. The volitional constraints of
Heidegger’s speech and the vote itself requires more probing into their motives than the cursory
analysis provided here, but what should be emphasized, in examining agency, is the responseability of rhetorical practice. Whereas responsibility of both rhetors and publics often possesses a
moral framework, the duty of scholars is to, first and foremost, identify symbolic acts that enable
an ability—any ability—with which to respond. For Heidegger to exculpate himself, it was
necessary not only to qualify his membership, which he does in “Letter to the Rector” and the
1976 interview, “Only a God Can Save Us,” but to distance himself from the theoretical
underpinnings he advanced at the time.
The passage cited above is easy to evade ex post facto on account of a mutual
professional hostility between Heidegger and the N.S.P. leadership in 1934 and beyond, but to
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complete the transition, Heidegger had to synthesize a critique on his rhetorical practice as well
as his theoretical scope. In the “Declaration” speech, for instance, Heidegger asserts: “From now
on, each and every thing demands decision, and every deed demands responsibility” (52). This is
certainly keeping with the existentialist view of contingency and action. Along with MerleauPonty and Camus, Sartre struggled in the French Resistance against the Vichy government,
writing afterward, “We were never more free than during the German occupation [….] The
circumstances, atrocious as they often were, finally made it possible for us to live, without
pretense or false shame, the hectic and impossible existence that is known as the lot of man”
(“Republic of Silence”). The point here, again, is not to uphold the French existentialists as
morally superior to Heidegger based on the value of their decisions. What needs proper focus is
the complicated aspect of agentic action, which, always already problematized and situated,
offers the possibility of the ability to respond. Heidegger’s apologia can very well be accepted,
but his brokering of yet another teleological theorem must be questioned with more
introspection. His claim to have initially supported National Socialism because it appeared to
contribute, in his view, “to overcoming Europe’s disarray and the crisis of the Western spirit”
(“Letter to the Rector” 62) is diametrically contrasted with Heidegger’s later claim that all
“human thought and endeavor” “will not be able to effect an immediate transformation of the
present condition of the world” (“Only a God Can Save Us” 107). However qualified, though,
humans are response-able in their interactions with others—no matter how manipulated the
situation is. If this very possibility is eliminated, then there is little sense in exploring rhetoric at
all. Rhetorical scholarship requires the ability to detect and monitor the degree to which
symbolic acts foster or limit action, probing the depths of motive and the economic and social
contingencies therein. Far from entertaining notions of Truth or the Good, rhetoric reflects that
which was and that which is possible as both potentiality and actuality. Heidegger’s theoretical
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retreat into the question of being and the poetics of language are valuable in themselves, but his
later qualification of response-ability—of persons being able to respond in a given situation and
the significance of recognizing the self as thrownness into negotiating one’s existential beingwith-others—limits the possibility of agentic action without which rhetoric, as a study, cannot be
conceived. Heidegger deserves recognition for his contributions to creating an ontology that
breaks from the Western intellectual tradition, yet the cost of dismissing the canon of
existentialism and the tradition of humanism—as opposed to Enlightenment/modernist
thought—is too high a price for rhetorical scholars.
The (Stipulated) Freedom of Agentic Action
In the aforementioned lecture, “Existentialism and Humanism,” which began as a
magazine article and was later published in essay and then expanded into book form, Sartre
atempts to clarify, defend, and organize existentialism as a holistic body of thought. “My
purpose here,” Sartre begins the address, “is to offer a defense of existentialism against several
reproaches that have been laid against it” (25). Specifically, Sartre responds to conservativeladen charges that existentialism inaugurates a “quietism of despair” that plunges human beings
into anguish. Both the lecture and the preceding magazine article, “A More Precise
Characterization,” offer an apologia of not only existentialism as a philosophy, but the thinkers,
including but not limited to Heidegger, who are associated with it. What invites such severe
admonishment for those critiquing the lecture is Sartre, in the introduction, asserts that “we base
our doctrine upon pure subjectivity—upon the Cartesian ‘I think’” (26). First, Sartre
inappropriately characterizes existentialism as a doctrine. As he would write later in his career, “I
do not like to talk about existentialism [anymore ….] To name it is to wrap it up and tie the knot”
(Search For a Method xxxviii). What lends existentialism its dynamic texture as a philosophy is
the very notion that it is against systematic philosophy and consists of a series of conversations
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between thinkers who grapple with ontology of communication through a myriad of rhetorical
devices. But the real umbrage taken with the quote, which deserves its share of rebuke, finds
Sartre intimating that existentialism champions the cogito and pure subjectivity. Oddly, this
reverses that which Sartre explores in Being and Nothingness, where he considers “the cogito as
a point of departure that throws the subject onto the Other” (338). Later in the 1945 lecture, he
suggests what ties existentialism together is “that we must begin from the subjective” by
emphasizing the existence of the self over its essence and that “there cannot be any other truth
than this, I think, therefore I am” (26, 38). Sartre fails again to employ the appropriate
vocabulary and forgets to invoke the subjective as a point of departure and posit the projection of
the self into an intersubjective relation of being; he only hints at this by declaring existentialism
begins from the subjective. A little while later, though, Sartre switches tack and returns to
qualifying modernist thought as he had in Being and Nothingness:
But the subjectivity which we thus postulate as the standard of truth is no
narrowly individual subjectivism, for as we have demonstrated, it is not only
one’s own self that one discovers in the cogito, but those of others too. Contrary
to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of Kant, when we say “I think” we
are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of
the other as we are of ourselves. […] I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about
myself, except through the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my
existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself. (“Existentialism
and Humanism” 39)
Throughout the lecture, Sartre plays fast and loose by casually tossing around “subjectivity” and
“freedom”—themes not exactly prized by postmodern thought. While I hope to have
demonstrated Sartre’s innovative way in dealing with subjectivity in Being and Nothingness in
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spite of his lack of facility in dealing with it in the lecture, an analysis of the existentialist
concept of freedom is in order to begin articulating existentialism as a grounds for agentic action.
Freedom is a concept that smacks of the Enlightenment, meeting both mistrust and
resistance in postmodern thought. Consider the above quote from Gunn, which scorns Sartre’s
“celebration of freedom” via Heidegger’s critique, and the work of Raymie McKerrow, whose
project of a Critical Rhetoric, informed by Michel Foucault’s resistance to “normative
structures,” offers a Critique of Freedom that identifies discourses of power and “symbolism
which addresses publics” (96-101). Derrida, meanwhile, finds the “thematization” of such terms
as responsibility and freedom as “always inadequate” (The Gift of Death 26). “In order to be
responsible,” he avers, “it is necessary to answer to or answer what being responsible means”
(25). Existentialists over and again stipulate freedom and responsibility, but do not re-frame the
terminology in a satisfactory manner. It has thus been inferred that Sartre and existentialism, by
virtue of engaging such a concept as freedom, advance the very same ideograph that President
George W. Bush communicates, most evident in his 2005 Inaugural Address (27 instances).
Arrogating this neo-conservative articulation of freedom to existentialism is not only mistaken, it
suppresses a potential counter-statement that would discomfit those who envisage freedom as a
possession to be won or lost. Rather than purport, like postmodernism, to offer a critique of
freedom, existentialism stipulates freedom as a condition that inheres a rhetorical texture to
human experience. In “Existentialism and Humanism,” Sartre speaks of how we, as humans, are
condemned to freedom. It is not an object that can be granted, commandeered, or misplaced en
masse, let alone provide the grounds for a “celebration”; freedom, for Sartre, is a pervasive and
problematic quality that reflects a particularized self who perforce negotiates the radical
contingency of one’s experiences with others. Existence is not only rife with complications, it
provides no a priori excuse—neither God nor human nature is responsible for our actions. The
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existentialist discussion of freedom is not a political attribute that can be acquired or jettisoned
but an orientation that throws beings into a lived relation. It requires a recognition of the human
propensity to communicate and foster action in particularized situations, and this awareness
thrusts the self into actualizing the response-abilities available. The self neither automatically nor
necessarily guarantees responsibility, in a moral sense, upon realizing this, but acknowledging
freedom as this condition catalyzes the possibility for the self to become response-able in a
particular situation. Somehow, though, existentialism is seen to possess a modernist texture
which it by no means encourages.
The condition of freedom in which persons find themselves thrown into a symbolic
relation with others, then, is the starting point for which a Sartrean conception of agency begins.
The actualization of our response-abilities as individuals are both committed and purposive, and
never determined in advance—regardless of the purity of one’s motives. As Hyde writes,
“Existentialists speak a rhetoric in the name of freedom” (“Existentialism” 232). Yet
existentialism compromises our common understanding of freedom, handed down from the
Enlightenment, which suggests that a subject possesses autonomy over one’s agentic action.
Sartre demonstrates how the freedom the self possesses is always already qualified by a struggle
over which others dictate the meaning of one’s choices and expressions. If, as Gunn writes,
rhetorical criticism should become “a movement to demystify discourses that presume freedom
and autonomy” (“Refiguring Fantasy” 45), postmodern rhetorics need a counter-statement and
re-articulation of freedom commensurate with such criticism. Existentialism provides just such a
constitutive space. Sartre offers this by recognizing the “perpetual disequilibrium” of an
individual’s situational constraints and possibilities; additionally, he warns, “it would be a
mistake here to accuse” existentialism “of giving to man a freedom-fetish” (Search For a Method
151). An existentialist understanding of agency would reject, then, an agentic orientation that
111

privileges “choice because its location is internal,” as Foss, Waters, and Armada have recently
proposed (221). Existentialism does not fully dispose of an agent’s choice to act, but
compromises that very choice because it only arises through an unavoidable commitment to act
with others. As Barnes writes, “Existentialist freedom of choice emphatically does not mean that
a person can do whatever he chooses or that all persons are born with equivalent potentialities”
(An Existentialist Ethics 58). Freedom, rather, is a conditional gateway to an agentic orientation
that places both situational constraints and possibilities of response-ability where an individual
necessarily engages with others. Sartre maintains that “one chooses in view of others, and in
view of others one chooses himself” (“Existentialism and Humanism” 42). Elsewhere he writes:
the human condition requires us to choose in ignorance; it is ignorance which
makes morality possible. If we knew all the factors which condition phenomena,
if we gambled on a sure thing, the risk would disappear; and with the risk, the
courage and the fear, the waiting, the final joy and effort; we would be listless
gods, but certainly not men. (What is Literature? 242)
An agent possesses choice insofar as one necessarily commits to negotiating social experience as
an encompassing being-with-others. Emirbayer and Miche’s definition of agency “as a
temporally embedded process of social engagement” (“What is Agency?” 963) keeps with Sartre
such that existentialism can be seen to provide rhetorical agency with a de-centered view of
subjectivity by which to determine how a rhetor more fully actualizes the possibilities available
in communicating with others so as to instigate action. Based on a conditional understanding of
freedom that maintains the possibilities of response-ability, a Sartrean conception of rhetorical
agency problematizes the degree, or motive, of choice a rhetor finds available in a given
situation. Campbell defines the Sartrean rhetorical agent as “initiat[ing] a symbolic process
which mediates between his private vision and the perceptions of others in order to create the
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preconditions out of which cooperative action may arise. He acts as a catalyst and can be
successful only insofar as others participate in his act” (“Rhetorical Implications” 158). As a
Sartrean project, rhetorical agency becomes an agglomeration of the possible response-abilities
available to an individual who performatively interacts with others in a given situation. An agent
rhetorically acts insofar as she brokers a symbolic offering to which others lend it meaning and
decide how to interpret and respond to the address.
Moving Forward
The task for rhetorical scholars conducting inquiry and navigating the question of agency
becomes one of identifying and evaluating the elastic flux of potential and actualized responseabilities between rhetors and publics engaged in symbolic action. This is not to be construed,
however, as a call to affirm purely causal relationships between rhetoric and action. Whereas the
historicism of a linear, absolute progression that traces means to ends conceals the vagaries of
communication, rhetoric exposes the ruptures inherent to it. In addition to availing oneself and
others to the possibilities of response-ability in a situation, a Sartrean conception of agency
emphasizes the creation of and struggle over meaning. The rhetorical subject pitches forward in
communication unaware of how, and by what means, others will re-construct the meaning of
one’s expression. How publics respond or do not respond, and with what ability, is never predetermined. Inscribing an existentialist texture to rhetorical agency doesn’t allow for a telos or a
final delivery of ends through a perfect assortment of means. Meaning is always thrown into a
tensional activity that must be negotiated by all individuals as a catalyst for action. As Craig
Smith writes, “Existentialists are not always in agreement on their ends, but implicit in their
philosophies is the elevation of a means, rhetoric” (“Medieval Subjugation” 170). Elevating the
means of symbolic action divorces rhetoric from its preoccupation with the Platonic Good of
responsibility—which, posited a priori, inscribes a moral texture to rhetoric that it does not, or
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should not, possess—and inaugurates a better appreciation for recognizing the possibilities of
response-ability in situational activity. A more appropriate rhetorical orientation leads us back to
St. Augustine, who suggests, in On Christian Teaching, the indifferent nature of rhetoric. The
point of distinction with Plato here is that invoking the Good must ensue or follow action itself
and manifest itself as judgment, not as prescription.
Similarly, existentialism lacerates this conflation of responsibility with the Good. As
Merleau-Ponty writes, “The very will to be good makes goodness false, since it directs us toward
ourselves at the moment we should be directed toward the other” (Sense and Non-Sense 74).
Sartre addresses this specifically as well: “A Platonic Good that would exist in and by itself
makes no sense,” adding that “it matters little whether the Good is” (Selected Writings 197, 199).
The Good, for existentialism, cannot be pursued; it must ensue as a result of the self’s
commitment with others. Sartre adds: “The notion of Good demands the plurality of
consciousnesses and even the plurality of commitments [….] So the Good is necessarily the
quest of concrete subjectivities existing in the world amidst other hostile or merely diversely
orientated subjectivities” (200). Responsibility cannot be posited prescriptively as moral
guidance, then. It is, rather, a judgment that ensues based on the possible response-abilities
available in a particular situation. Rhetorical criticism would here find itself as an injunction to
trace the ensuing potentialities and actualizations of response-ability and only then pronounce a
moral judgment on the responsibility of an act.
For his part, Derrrida is absolutely justified in calling into question the thematization of
responsibility. It has, as he suggests, been exercised in paradox and secrecy—if not, I would add,
outright abstraction so as to conceal its moral texture (The Gift of Death 27). Yet it is also
important to recognize how existentialism cultivates a fresh perspective on responsibility: the
term is not tethered to a call for a moral Good, but deployed as the recognition, as Karl Jaspers
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writes, of a complicated “process and the choice of possible action” (Man in the Modern Age
159). Re-framing the concept of responsibility into a search for the response-abilities available in
a particular situation also shifts the method by which we understand a rhetorical act: whereas
rhetorical practice, in a traditional sense, envisages an individual agentic act that pursues a goal,
we might now understand rhetoric as persuasion that ensues based on the existentialist
engagement of being-with-others through communicative resources that are necessary flawed
and unequipped to transmit a perfect distillation of meaning. Rhetorical criticism should aim to
discover the ensuing response-abilities of individuals who are limited by contextual factors
(facticity) yet awash in the possibilities of choice that are necessarily corroborated, resisted, or
commandeered anew by others. Even if a symbolic act advances as didactical or propositional in
its tone, the rhetorical subject’s address is arrested at the behest of others who furnish its
meaning.
To recognize the efficacy of rhetorical practice as ensuing and not as something pursued
is to locate an agent as waging an element of risk. A rhetorical actor does not agentically act but
rather interacts in a performative engagement with others whereby communicative meaning
always eludes the rhetor in address. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “the phenomenon of
communication and meaning” is only made possible by abandoning “the fantasy of pure
language” (The Prose of the World 22). At the same time, the possibilities of response-ability
remain manifest insofar as we necessarily interact with one another:
Language must surround each speaking subject, like an instrument with its own
inertia, its own demands, constraints, and internal logic, and must nevertheless
remain open to the initiatives of the subject, always capable of the displacement
of meanings, the ambiguities, and the functional substitutions which this logic its
lurching gait. (Sense and Non-Sense 87)
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We cannot then but have agency, yet this agentic orientation is not based on a fluid availability
of choice; agency redounds as our conditional freedom throws us into a displacement of meaning
with others, always and again beholden to the contingencies that arise. Individuals actualize
response-abilities, but the admixture of language, motive, and contextual structures temper the
degree of responsibility one wishes to attain.
What I hope to have catalyzed here is a qualification of the postmodern reception of both
existentialism and humanism, which is typically manifested askance. Similarly, a traditional
understanding of rhetorical agency requires channeling the existentialist re-framing of humanism
in the contemporary world. As Richard Lanham writes, “Humanism’s social task begins, then, by
making man self-conscious about his motives” (Literacy and the Survival of Humanism 137).
Existentialism emphasizes this component of experience, and requires us to re-examine agentic
action as necessary but also intersubjectively mediated by communication between the self and
others. Heidegger is no doubt a torch-bearer who exposed the deficiencies of both classical and
modern philosophy, but “Letter on Humanism,” as a grounding for understanding rhetorical
agency, obscures more profitable investigations. While Heidegger claims to have ended the
whole of Western metaphysics and philosophy, we should ask ourselves whether he should be
permitted to erase the possibility of rhetoric itself. Occluding agency and, with it, the
contributions of existentialist thought, intimidate scholars from exploring new avenues of
rhetorical practice whereby the traditional, Isocratean agentic orientation can be both
problematized and strengthened. The work of Sartre reflects the rhetorical texture of human
experience—nay, the unavoidable necessity of it (Campbell, “Rhetorical Implications” 157)—
and should be expanded, not dismissed.
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Well, at least since 1965, with the publication of Edwin Black’s Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method. The
question of agency, then, amounts to this 40-year internecine struggle coming to a tipping point, with, seemingly,
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I hope to specifically capitalize on and further develop Campbell’s 1971 article, “The Rhetorical Implications of
the Axiology of Jean-Paul Sartre.” My only qualification of these scholars, whose work I consider invaluable, is that
they did not go far enough in asserting the relationship between rhetoric and existentialism, which I will argue
should be continually interrogated and matured.
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While Sartre is the particular focus here, it is impossible to discuss existentialism without acknowledging the rich
dialogic texture of the movement, beginning with Soren Kierkegaard and extending through Miguel de Unamuno,
Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir.
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It is a charge Sartre would no doubt accept, considering he writes, in Being and Nothingness, “Man can no longer
encounter anything but the human” (681).
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No uncommon thing, that, for it became a rite of passage among existentialists to say they were not
existentialists—Camus, Marcel, even Sartre would later distance himself from the label. Viktor Frankl writes, for
instance, that “it is safe to say that there are as many existentialisms as there are existentialists” (Psychotherapy and
Existentialism vii). Additionally, Hazel E. Barnes asserts in Humanistic Existentialism that Albert Camus was never
more of an existentialist than when he distinguishes himself from Sartre (244).
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Heidegger gave away his copy to Hans-Georg Gadamer (Rajan 56, 308n4; see also Richard Wolin, The Terms of
Cultural Criticism 238).
22

Emmanuel Levinas writes that Sartre, “though stopping short of a full analysis, makes the striking observation that
the Other is a pure hole in the world [of the subject] (Humanism of the Other 39). Fredric Jameson accuses Sartre of
“cutting the dialectic off short” at the end of Being and Nothingness and leaving a number of “unanswered
questions” (Sartre: The Origins of a Style 182, 203). In an interview with Richard Wolin, Jurgen Habermas
expresses a similar sentiment by decrying the fact that “Sartre doesn’t solve intersubjectivity in the third part of
Being and Nothingness (497). This critique of Sartre is warranted only insofar as scholars recognize the significance
of Sartre’s demonstration of the cogito’s failure and engage his “point of departure” as opening up new pathways of
rhetorical inquiry. See Campbell, “The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory” and “The Rhetorical
Implications of the Axiology of Jean-Paul Sartre.”
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For more on the relationship between Sartre and postmodern and/or post-humanist theories, see Martin Beck
Matusick’s consideration of Foucault and Sartre in “Existential Social Theory After the Poststructuralist and
Communication Turns” (149-57) and Rajan’s assertion that Sartre anticipates Slavoj Zizek and Julia Kristeva (68-9).
24

Derrida goes so far as to endorse the protagonist of the novel, Roquentin, who “levels the worst charges against
humanism, against all humanistic styles” (153; see 160n). Again, I would caution conflating humanism with the
professed Enlightenment/modernist model of epistemology. In the same essay, Derrida points out the similarities
between Heidegger and Sartre, suggesting that despite the former’s “not insignificant rhetoric” leveled at the latter in
“Letter on Humanism,” both perpetuate an outdated “metaphysical humanism” ( see 134-150).
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See Hyde, “The Call of Conscience: Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric,” for an analysis of how the
Heidegger of Being and Time, recognizing Aristotle’s Rhetoric, does emphasize existence as a thrownness into
being-with-others. In Hyde’s interpretation, Dasein does not inhere rhetoric as persuasion, but the “enactment of
krisis” and the “cultivation of phronesis” (382).
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See Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being 4, 172n12 for a discussion of the rumor. For Heidegger’s denial, see his
1976 interview, “Only a God Can Save Us,” in The Heidegger Controversy: A Political Reader.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORIZING EDIFICATION:
DIGGING THE THOU FROM THE THEY
“Just don’t get ontological. Now now.
I couldn’t bear it if you were
ontological with me.”
-

Woody Allen, The Insanity Defense (107)

In A Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke posits the limits of existentialism:
“Rhetorically, it could serve well during the period of Nazi occupation [of France],” he writes,
but “after the fall of the Nazis, the particular social conditions of the occupation no longer
prevailed” (254-55). By panning the movement as a passing fad, Burke touches upon a rarely
considered theme (yet fails to develop or pursue this observation in full)—that existentialism
operates primarily as a method of communication with which to negotiate the contingencies of
human experience, not a descriptive enterprise intended to categorize an onto-theological
metaphysics. Burke’s pithy observation demonstrates how existentialism functions rhetorically
as opposed to advancing a philosophical dogma. Perhaps this explains why only sixteen years
after attempting to define the philosophy in a magazine article, “A More Precise Characterization
of Existentialism,” Jean-Paul Sartre, writing in 1960, dismisses it as an ideology and “a
parasitical system living on the margin of Knowledge, which at first it opposed but into which
today it seeks to be integrated” (Search For a Method 8). “In fact,” Sartre adds, “existentialism
has suffered an eclipse” (14). His later attenuation of existentialism owes to a dialectical
movement to enfold it as a method by which, as Hazel E Barnes writes, Sartre’s project of a
“revitalized neo-Marxism” could be actualized (An Existentialist Ethics 33). Sartre’s purpose in
altering the goal of existentialism possesses a rhetorical, not merely dialectical, texture. If
existentialism has been eclipsed, it is precisely because it opposes the crafting of a systematic
philosophy and maintains a “passionate concern with questions that arise from life, the moral
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pathos, and the firm belief that, to be serious, philosophy has to be lived” (Kaufmann 51). Burke
is thus correct in his assessment of existentialism as a rhetorical enterprise, yet it should not be
limited to one specific historical exigence but expanded to encompass the possibilities of
communication across a broad range of circumstances that require rhetorical action.
Existentialism theoretically lays the groundwork for conceiving an edifying species of
rhetoric—a genre that both encompasses and transcends the traditional Aristotelian models of
deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Specifically, edifying speech functions ontologically. It
represents discourse which seeks to re-position attitudes or encourage an audience to adopt a
different orientation as the primary means of persuasion. Geared towards challenging the
individual selves within a public rather than securing agreement from a public towards a specific
goal, it possesses a thoroughly interrogative texture that brings about a radical questioning of
consciousness—not unlike Michel Meyer development of a problematological rhetoric. As such,
edification is a communicative rhetoric that necessitates a change in viewpoints prior to
actualizing a change in endpoints. The conception of a telos, or the ends of a discourse, is thus
qualified. Whereas the civic discourse model of rhetoric often proposes to advance or maintain
legal and social structures for a better future, edifying speech suggests that change must also
occur beyond structures—by individuals who engage the socius through an interrogation of
accepted norms and the enactment of new conceptions of being itself.
While the first chapter suggests existentialism advances a neo-Sophistical worldview,
here I intend to expand and develop the qualities of existentialist communication that function as
edifying public address. The following will identify examples of this genre. Existentialism must
be seen beyond Burke’s limited purview of merely contributing to the resistance in occupied
France. While it is acknowledged that existentialists such as Sartre and Albert Camus designed a
method to actively struggle against the German occupation,27 the implanted seeds of an edifying
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rhetoric, first developed by Soren Kierkegaard, can be seen to adapt to kairos across the broad
contingencies that arise as exigencies in life. Karl Jaspers refers, for instance, to a multiplicity of
boundary situations whereby existentialist communication begins with the recognition “that in
existence I am always in a particular situation. I am not general, not the entirety of possibilities. I
exist in certain social circumstances at a certain time in history” (Philosophy 183). To this Sartre
himself adds: “The speaker is [always] in a situation in language; he is invested by words” (What
Is Literature? 30). Considered rhetorically, existentialism crafts a unique genre of public address
that encourages individuals to singularly impact the society by whom they are inscribed. For the
edifying rhetor, only by first attempting to re-position individual consciousnesses can sites of
resistance or particular responsive action ensue. The performance of such a publicly-inscribed
communicative act is expressed solely toward individual auditors themselves, not a mass or
universal audience. In performing this directional speech, an edifying rhetor renders
conspicuous, or explicitly severs, the consubstantiality of a public in order to initiate this process
of interrogativity. As the title of this chapter indicates, the method of this style of address is the
process by which, through discourse, a rhetor draws out the singular Thou28 from the public
They.
Edifying rhetoric also exposes the gap, or lack of guarantee, between a given discourse
and the material conditions it seeks to realize. It is why no deliberative telos is offered and
edifying rhetoric remains relegated to the realm of fostering a shift in attitudes or a change in
consciousness. Edification calls attention to the paucity of law and social theory because neither
can ever guarantee a perfected structure of human relations. The point is not to herald the
attributes of anarchism, but to suggest that social change is not homologous to creation of new
laws or the changing of those which are extant. We might draw in scope, then, with Emma
Goldman, who, in her 1917 “Address to the Jury,” stated:
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Never can a new idea move within the law. It matters not whether that idea
pertains to political and social changes or to any other domain of human thought
and expression—to science, literature, music; in fact, everything that makes for
freedom and joy and beauty must refuse to move within the law. How can it be
otherwise? The law is stationary, fixed, mechanical, ‘a chariot wheel’ which
grinds all alike without regard to time, place and condition, without ever taking
into account cause and effect, without ever going into the complexity of the
human soul. Progress knows nothing of fixity. It cannot be pressed into a definite
mould. It cannot bow to the dictum, ‘I have ruled,’ ‘I am the regulating finger of
God.’ Progress is ever renewing, ever becoming, ever changing—never is it
within the law. (“Address to the Jury”)
Though Goldman was, in fact, an anarchist, her point is taken for the rhetorical purposes outlined
here such that it is the creativity of our actions, not the alignment of legal structures, which foster
social change. Edifying rhetoric outstrips linear logic and seeks to bring about the adoption of
new attitudes and/or changes in consciousness as the first step towards activating resistance and
social change. The persuasion sought in this rhetorical dynamic is not beholden to advancing or
visualizing specific results, either; it ensues based on the responsive action of the auditors. As
Kierkegaard writes in The Point of View, “Even though a person refuses to go along to the place
which one is endeavoring to lead him, there is still one thing that can be done for him: compel
him to become aware” (50). This marks the ontological movement of consciousness sought in a
rhetoric of edification. Awareness, or the confrontation of one’s orientation to the social world, is
the primary bridge upon which responsive action is initiated.
Rather than rely on propositional assertions that seek agreement, consent, or
legitimization from a public, edifying speech features stipulations of doxastic knowledge which
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challenge normative truth claims. Edifying rhetoric employs this confrontation of doxa because,
as Richard Rorty indicates, it is a thoroughly re-active movement of consciousness. Just as
existentialism finds within its corpus Kierkegaard’s protean, if not radical, conception of
Christian faith and Jean-Paul Sartre’s original postulations of freedom, the examples of edifying
public address considered in the next chapter begin with similar stipulations of accepted beliefs
and facts. Like Kierkegaard, Erasmus, in Praise of Folly, attempts to encourage others to reconsider or interrogate what it means to be Christian. The masks of pseudonym and irony
conceal the interrogative method, which strives to draw forth a moment of acute, ontological
shock that severs one’s Christian-ness from a function of identity. Angelina Grimké Weld’s
abolitionist rhetoric sought to challenge the justificatory argument for slavery rooted in scripture
in her pamphlet, “Appeal to Christian Women of the South,” and confronted Northern audiences
by explaining how their apathy was complicit in perpetuating slavery in her address, “Speech at
Pennsylvania Hall”. To precipitate change, she refuted the accepted perceptions of slavery and
called upon citizens, particular to the specific context, to change their viewpoint as the first step
to activate responsive conduct towards the abolition of slavery. John Ruskin, meanwhile, throws
into doubt the dominant social theory of the Victorian era, utilitarianism, in his essay, “Unto This
Last,” by demonstrating that the field of economics is an amoral fiction of one’s statistical
imagination. For Ruskin, social improvements must begin with a rejection of the quantification
of human life. He wants his audience to start viewing life itself as a qualitative endeavor as
opposed to a theoretical construct. Invited to suggest his ideas on the impending design and
construction of a new Market Exchange in London, Ruskin, in his public lecture, “Traffic,”
refuses to capitulate and instead interrogates the audience members to ask the purpose behind the
building. In each of these cases, the speakers communicate through an edifying frame of address
that confronts publics in order to arrest an acute moment of ontological awareness for each
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individual auditor or reader. Each rhetor discursively interrogates others so as to re-position
consciousness as means with which to re-orient a public to future action.
The edifying method of speech possesses a uniquely confrontational aspect in that it does
not proceed didactically to coerce or demand capitulation through judgment. An edifying rhetor
throws the burden of meaning and action onto individuals within publics during the speech-act.
As Craig Smith writes, the rhetoric of existentialism “advocates, it does not dictate” (168). It
“want[s] people to speak a rhetoric rather than merely allowing themselves to be spoken by a
rhetoric” (Hyde 231). Rorty explains in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that “edifying
discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of
strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings” (360). In “Kierkegaard’s Theory of
Communication,” Raymond Anderson demonstrates how this form of communication
emphasizes “process rather than result,” whereby the goal “is not to clarify an idea, secure
acceptance of a proposal, or arouse emotion, but to stimulate the recipient into independent
activity” (9, 7). The rhetor who edifies admits that the expression offered is communicated on
insecure ground where it may very well be dismissed or judged as insufficient or misguided. It is
a rhetorical approach limited in scope such that an edifying rhetor must acknowledge up front
that he/she might fail. While limited, this existential leap of edifying rhetoric is an inherently
ethical communicative act: the meaning and telos of a rhetor’s discourse is deferred to others.
Expression is offered to begin the process of awareness and actualization towards future change,
but the individual auditor possesses the freedom to interpret it however one wants, including
outright dismissal. For this reason, edifying speech is communicated affectively so as to bring
about the process of interrogativity, but with the awareness that it proceeds in risk.
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Jaspers considers this risk significant, for it is nothing less than a rejection of the dignity
humans often assume in assigning to themselves the distinction of possessing a wholly rational
being with which to communicate.
Such dignity is jeopardized in existential communication, and at the same time it
remains indelible. […] Communication liquefies all things, to let new solidities
emerge. None of them may be held fast as certain; the communicative potential is
still obscure, but it encompasses all we know. Communication is conceivable only
with a limitless mobility of standpoints, and thus with pliant readiness to yield.
(Philosophy 69)
This risk jeopardizes the social construction of identity and meaning engendered between
persons in a rhetorical situation. Often we seek to rely on rationality to suture this gap, but it is,
for the edifying rhetor, insufficient. As Hyde indicates, existentialism “is rooted in [a] reactive
stance against the tradition of classical rationalism” (216). Would that humans were all rationally
perfect actors, there would be no need of rhetoric—or existentialism, for that matter. The future
can never be calculated from either a rhetorical or an existentialist point of view. Future
developments are a creative process that rely on the performative interaction we have with one
another. Yet this is not to suggest humans are incapable of rationality. While acknowledging the
capacity for rational thought and behavior as “indespensable,” Richard Weaver writes how our
selves are just not merely limited to it: “humanity [also] includes emotionality, or the capacity to
feel and suffer, to know pleasure, and it includes the capacity for aesthetic satisfaction, and, what
can only be suggested, a yearning to be in relation with something infinite” (Language is
Sermonic 204). Similarly, the existentialist Gabriel Marcel traces the rationally dominated view
of human life back to Aristotle, considering it a false formula (Problematic Man). It is at best,
according to Marcel, a psychological project that attempts to conceal “the rapport between
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reason and articulate language” (24-25). This reflects, in short, a resistance to confining
ourselves to a rationally dominated utilitarian view of human relations. To deny these aspects of
human experience, messy as they may be, is the very stuff of inauthenticity, or, as Sartre would
say, bad faith. Marcel proposes that instead of searching for a static realm of perfection through
rationality, we should maintain “ourselves actively in a permeable state” of flux where no
equilibrium can be guaranteed—to either the self or others (Philosophy of Existentialism 38).
Edifying rhetoric explicitly taps into this flotsam of contingency, drawing out the
problematization of unity between the rhetor and his/her individual interlocutors. Its aim is to
bring about not just judgment but a process of interrogativity which aims to arrest, to introspect,
to unsettle, and, above all, to motivate other individuals individually.
The following sections theoretically map the genre of edifying rhetoric. First, I review
Rorty’s discussion of edifying discourse in the last chapter to his seminal work, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature. While he accurately describes existentialism as advancing an original style,
Rorty fails to locate it as a rhetorical construct and thus marginalizes it. The work of Kierkegaard
is then examined to highlight the dangers of appealing to phantom publics. While his writings are
very distrustful of mass audiences and democratic majorities, I show that Kierkegaard ultimately
seeks an authentic rhetoric that permits a singular movement of consciousness and responsive
engagement. Functioning as a rhetorical appeal, I demonstrate how edifying rhetoric attempts to
rupture the consubstantiality of a public in order to speak directly to individual selves. The
Stokeley Carmichael idiom, dig yourself, is aligned with Kierkegaard’s development of indirect
communication as a method by which to enact edification. Edifying speech is next considered as
a foil to communicating with a universal audience. As counterpoint, Michel Meyer’s
problematological conception of interrogativity is invoked to portray edification as a rhetorical
construct that privileges a radical questioning of consciousness. The distinctions between
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soliciting judgment and interrogativity are drawn out as a basis of exploring the Socratic method.
Edifying speech, I argue, privileges the Socratic role of asking questions and directing speech to
individual auditors, but not so as to clarify the truth of a given matter. Unlike the Socratic
rhetorical encounter, edifying speech suspends judgment in order to sustain interrogativity
continually in flux. I conclude by consenting that edification is a species of rhetoric that might
not succeed as what we typically construe as efficacious discourse, but suggest it furnishes
rhetorical inquiry with a unique method to classify those discourses which solicit an ontological
shock of consciousness.
Rorty and Edifying Discourse
For Rorty, edifying discourse is a style that “put[s] the very idea of universal
communication, and of systematic philosophy, in doubt [….] Nobody will predict his own
actions, thoughts, theories, poems, etc., before deciding upon or inventing them” (387). We find
here a creative, if not wholly radical, emphasis of inventio. There exists no a priori method or
system from which to communicate a given argument in edifying rhetoric because edifying
rhetoric is a creative method that seeks to stultify doxastic knowledge. As such, Rorty explains
that existentialism “is an intrinsically reactive movement of thought, one which has point only in
opposition to the tradition” (366). By emphasizing the recalcitrance of existentialism, edifying
thinkers, in Rorty’s view, intentionally remain on the periphery. Rorty insists on emphasizing
edification as a philosophy rather than a method of communication, yet he continually betrays
the rhetorical texture readily apparent in existentialism:
[T]he point of edifying philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to
find objective truth [….] Edifying philosophy is not only abnormal but reactive,
having sense only as a protest against attempts to close off conversation by

126

proposals for universal commensuration through the hypostatization of some
privileged set of descriptions. (377)
Existentialism starts from the proposition that nothing is finished, that life itself is open to the
creativity and responsibility of our words and actions. The claim of all edifying rhetoric, to
which existentialism subscribes, reflects that we can never actualize perfected structures of
human relations.
A contradiction arises in Rorty’s conception, though, between rhetorical invention and
the reactive nature of edifying discourse. Whereas “[g]reat systematic philosophers are
constructive and offer arguments,” writes Rorty, “[g]reat edifying philosophers are reactive and
offer satires, parodies, aphorisms. They know their work loses its point when the period they
were reacting against is over” (369). But how can edifying rhetoric at once keep the conversation
going yet dissipate as the conditions of a dominant discourse change? While it is portrayed here
as fleeting and trivial, I argue that existentialist communication does not willingly abdicate its
own contentions within an argument; it merely reflects the rhetorical view that communicative
action plays out in narrow, finite situations that unfurl with meaning and the possibilities of
responsive action. Conceived existentially, rhetoric amounts to singular performances of
communicative acts directed to others—not so as to finish or win an argument, but as a
situational, suggestive movement of consciousness that relates to kairos.
All rhetoric, besides, is, to a degree, reactive. To deny this would empty rhetoric of its
capacity for eliciting a response from an audience in situations characterized by the exigencies
that arise in life. We communicate because we have to communicate with one another, and since
persons communicate via imperfect media—symbols—there is perhaps always sought, but never
completed, a teleological sense of unity where material conditions can reflect that which a given
discourse advances. When rhetorical public address is evaluated, there is the temptation to link
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causal relations between the speech-act and the historical actualities that follow. Taken as a
persuasive speech-act, rhetorical performance is often seen as purifying the exigence that arises
or teleologically concluding the situation at hand. An edifying conception of rhetorical action,
however, problematizes the exigence at hand. The tensions within the rhetorical situation are
intensified, not eliminated. Operating as either a method of criticism or a performance of
communication, edifying rhetoric thus exposes the rupture between speech and the world. All
rhetoric fails in that it proceeds symbolically, not materially. That rhetoric fails to perfectly
corroborate our given reality and future possibilities of actualization does not mean all speech
wallows in failure, though—it merely signals the uneasiness with which communication is
offered and received. Whereas “the principle objective of wisdom such as it has been defined at
all times consists after all in exorcising uneasiness” so as to achieve a “spiritual equilibrium,”
Marcel writes (Problematic Man 78), rhetoric can be seen as reflecting the existentialist
admission of uneasiness in human social relations. As such, Marcel indicates that “one can at
bottom only limit oneself to specifying directions, far from formulating dogmatic statements
which would run a great risk of deforming the subtle realities which one intends to treat” (71).
Edifying rhetoric thus does not proceed with didactic assertions of truth or the affirmation of
endoxa but as suggestive offerings to a public that question the present towards a future which
lacks any guarantee. What such discourse re-acts against, then, is not just systematic philosophy,
but the thought that communication could somehow be endowed with qualities that would render
communication no longer necessary. Jaspers confirms this, writing, “Since communication in
existence is a process, not something complete, its reality is a sense of being deficient”
(Philosophy 66). The existentialist articulation of this deficiency thus expresses itself as an
aversion to persuading a mass audience through the procurement of a categorical agreement with
whom one addresses.
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Kierkegaard, the Crowd, and Indirect Communication
A consistent theme of existentialism is its deep distrust of public majorities and their
influence on the single individual. This revulsion is made manifest by Kierkegaard in his pithy
declaration, the crowd is untruth, and is corroborated by others in the existentialist canon29.
Tracing this theme, Howard Tuttle notes:
This abstract nonentity, the public, is not composed of real persons; it is everyone
and nobody, an aggregate of units who have no names. As a class of abstract
spectators, it can create nothing real or helpful. […] The individual who was
previously responsible to eternity has been replaced by an equality of numbers,
and the individual has been relegated to the crowd. (31)
Adapting existentialism to a rhetorical method of address requires inverting this dynamic to
reveal how an individual may impact a public. The objective is to prevent persons from
abdicating their potential responsive action by merely floating with the ebb of a mass public. It is
not, as some might assume, a call to egotistic self-action; rather, edifying rhetoric is speech that
proposes to enable our being-with-others in a more pro-active manner. Demanding interrogation,
existentialism seeks an authentic rhetoric that neither conforms nor gratifies but energizes and
motivates the individuals within an audience to experience a moment of ontological awareness
and re-orientation.
For Kierkegaard, the crowd is untruth because it is a collective will that disciplines
people to shake off the self in order to ebb and flow with a phantom public majority. “[T]he
public is a colossal something,” he writes in Two Ages, “an abstract void and vacuum that is all
and nothing,” to which he adds: “The public is all and nothing, the most dangerous of all powers
and the most meaningless. One may speak to a whole nation in the name of a public, and yet the
public is less than one ever so insignificant human being” (93). Crowds seek the agreement of
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universal truths that can be broadly projected across the particular contingencies of life.
Kierkegaard rejects this monolithic stratum of human relations and conduct as “cowardliness”
(Point of View 108). In Two Ages, he poses the dilemma thus:
It is not uncommon to hear a man who has become confused about what he
should do in a particular situation complain about the unique nature of the
situation, thinking that he could easily act if the situation were a great event with
only one either/or. This is a mistake and a hallucination of the understanding.
There is no such situation. The presence of the crucial either/or depends on an
individual’s own impassioned desire directed toward acting decisively, upon the
individual’s own intrinsic competence, and therefore a competent man covets an
either/or in ever every situation because he does not want anything more. (67)
This extended passage conveys the edifying resistance to a rhetoric of universality. Kierkegaard
suggests that in “the present age”, dominated by the democratic mass, persons have lost the
fervor and zeal for independent thought characteristic of “the age of revolution”. “[T]oday,” he
writes, “we are everywhere lavishly regaled with pragmatic rules, a calculus of considerations,
etc.” (70). It is not a critique of democracy as such; Kierkegaard laments, rather, the dearth of
authentic communication within democratic communication. “To win a crowd is not such a great
art; all that is needed for that is some talent, a certain dose of untruth, and a little familiarity with
human passions” (Point of View 109). While at first glance this resembles a Platonic critique of
rhetoric, it is offered as the means with which to conceive a new style of communication:
edifying discourse.
Kierkegaard seeks a rhetoric which does not merely elicit consent, but directs a
dialectical movement of a singular consciousness in the communicative act. For him, “persuasion
is not a matter between two people but is the path in the life-view” (Two Ages 19). Passing
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judgment on a speaker or a speech, he suggests, is an inherently passive exercise. Kierkegaard
craves those communicative acts which solicit an interrogative movement of consciousness
within a rhetorical situation instead of having the participants “shrewdly transform themselves
into a crowd of spectators who with the enormous smugness of shrewdness would pretend that
they were the ones who cunningly and ironically led [the speaker] on to this high enthusiasm…”
(73). In distinction to the rhetoric which Kierkegaard finds so deficient, if not treacherous, he
reflexively describes the edifying form of address as indirect communication.
The task of indirect communication is to encourage reflection in the communication
recipient. “It means that one does not begin directly with what one wishes to communicate but
begins by taking the other’s delusion at face value,” he writes (Point of View 54). The objective,
Kierkegaard writes in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments
(hereafter CUP), is that “the secret of communication specifically hinges on setting the other
free” (74). Persuasion here is not pursued directly, through gaining agreement from an audience
brought together by discourse. Instead, communication is offered inter-personally through
variegated forms—that is, one speaks to a public, but addresses the singular consciousnesses
who comprise a mass. According to Kierkegaard, his maieutic method of adopting pseudonyms
“shake[s] off ‘the crowd’ in order to get hold of ‘the single individual,’ religiously understood”
(Point of View 9). Kierkegaard rejects a direct persuasion model of argument, noting, “By a
direct attack, [the speaker] only strengthens a person in the illusion and also infuriates him” (43).
The rhetor must strike a delicate balance between the confrontational texture of edification and
the possibility of the auditor’s dismissal. An indirect manner of address seeks to sustain the
auditor’s attention by moving from the aesthetic or poetic; only after having established a rapport
with the audience can a rhetor proceed to move towards the ethical. A communicative act should
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be “approached from behind,” in Kierkegaard’s view—one invites an individual, not an entire
audience, to individually persuade themselves upon listening to or reading a communicative act.
“Direct communication,” by contrast, “requires certainty, but certainty is impossible for a
person in the process of becoming, and it is indeed a deception.” Because its privileges
objectivity, grounded in rational discourse, direct communication “communicates right away and
at most resorts to assurances about its truth, to recommendations and promises about how all
people someday will accept this truth—so sure it is” (CUP 74). Kierkegaard, however, seeks to
intensify the intersubjective relationship in the communicative act by avoiding direct
communication, which aims to dominate a rhetorical act through appeals to validity. Indirect
communication opposes suturing an agreement between the rhetor and the audience or relying on
the credibility of a set of data.30 It ruptures soul-sharing between persons and locates meaning as
an active process of individual awareness and responsive reflection. “[C]ommunication is a work
of art,” writes Kierkegaard; “it is doubly-reflected, and its first form is the subtlety that the
subjective individuals must be held devoutly apart from one another and must not run
coagulatingly together in objectivity” (79). Persuasion within edifying rhetoric thus ensues based
on the conscious interrogative reflection of singular individuals. As such, the power of suasory
discourse in edifying speech is possessed neither by the rhetor nor the ad populum influence of
the crowd. It exists only in the possibility of the individual who interprets the discourse. In one
instance, Kierkegaard speaks to the unknown individual in whom he seeks to arouse a moment of
acute ontological shock: “I do not know who you are; I do not know where you are; I do not
know your name. Yet you are my hope, my joy, my pride, and covertly my honor. It comforts me
that you now have this opportunity” (Point of View 105). It is only through the individual’s
heightened awareness of one’s own consciousness that Kierkegaard can claim any efficacy or
success. In short, he wants you, the auditor/reader, to consider the discourse offered in hopes of
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bringing about change. Any rhetorical efficacy of the discourse, meanwhile, “depends upon very
many things and above all upon whether he himself is willing. Compel a person to an opinion, a
conviction, a belief—in all eternity, that I cannot do” (50). By distinguishing the individual from
the crowd, Kierkegaard here offers the essence of edifying rhetoric.
Kierkegaard also takes time to point out the contrast of rhetorical styles between his
position and that of a politician. Whereas the latter covets a crowd, en masse, convinced of his
ability to call publics together through discourse, the former elevates the single individual to “the
category of spirit, of spiritual awakening.” This characterizes edification insofar as it operates,
according to Kierkegaard, as “diametrically oppos[ed] to politics” and the traditional model of
civic discourse (The Point of View 121). Having neither “orated [n]or thundered…[nor]
lectured,” Kierkegaard does not wish to be confused with a politician because his goal is not to
secure the agreement of a majority (88). Instead, he seeks to
become involved with everyone if possible, but always individually…in order to
split up a crowd or speak to a crowd, not in order to form a crowd but in order that
one or two individuals might go home from the gathering and become the single
individual. (109)
Kierkegaard’s hostility to the crowd, whom he repeatedly considers full of untruth, is not
expressed as an admonition of deliberative democracy, but the lack of authenticity that flourishes
in a democracy. He cautions against putting stock in a mob orator to deliver social equipoise: “If
the age is waiting for a hero, it surely waits in vain; instead there will more likely come one who
in divine weakness will teach people obedience” (124). This is the danger he continually warns
against—that the phantom public will discipline individuals so as to dissipate their
consciousnesses in what Sartre would later call bad faith or what Burke might consider pure
identification.
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To better understand the method of indirect communication in edifying discourse, it is
instructive to examine Kierkegaard’s rhetoric in relationship to what he, as a writer, sought to
accomplish. In The Point of View, one of his last works as an author, Kierkegaard recounts the
tactics of his career, and how he had to employ poetic devices as a precursor to engage the
audience with his true goal throughout his life’s work. His goal was to describe the personal
difficulty of “becoming a Christian, with direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous
illusion, Christendom…” (23). “Becoming a Christian” is, for Kierkegaard, that ontological
moment of awareness he seeks to encourage in other individuals. Explaining the rhetoricity of
his written oeuvre, Kiekegaard rejects the direct communication model of persuasion and looks
to form a “communication of reflection.” Much of his early written work, Kierkegaard writes, is
carried out “maieutically with esthetic production” in order to attract specific individuals within
an audience. Kierkegaard’s project moves to an awakened religious consciousness; the aesthetic
writings open up a dialogue with individuals so “the religious is introduced so quickly that those
who, moved by the esthetic, decide to follow along are suddenly standing right in the middle of
the decisive qualifications of the essentially Christian, are at least prompted to become aware”
(Point of View 7). Kierkegaard’s writings reflect the transition between speech, thought, and
action. His own objective was spiritually motivated but he did not want his readers to merely
agree with him; Kierkegaard sought to provoke an interrogation of his readership. While all
edifying rhetoric does not necessarily share Kierkegaard’s belief or want to encourage a more
dynamic understanding of Christianity—at times, in fact, it can be used to vehemently discount
religious themes—the model is consistent insofar as it includes the stipulation of terms and a
communication intended for particular selves within a public to re-orient oneself to the discourse
offered. Most importantly, Kierkegaard resolves to dig the thou from the they. The mass society
of Christendom, for Kierkegaard, represents an illusion of religious belief—it functions as the
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crowd or they which disciplines the individual. To him, only a person’s subjective consciousness
arrives at an understanding of a truth about God. Christendom, writes Kierkegaard, has
misappropriated Christianity. “My task,” he writes, “is to revise the definition of a Christian”
(Attack Upon ‘Christendom’ 284). Along with encouraging an awareness and inspiring reflection
in the subjective consciousness of an individual, Kierkegaard sees his “task” as “precisely to
shed light on this scoundrel trick that to the benefit of the princes of the Church, of the pastors,
of mediocrity—under the name of Christian fervor and zeal (how sophisticated!)—has procured
these millions” (Point of View 125). Kierkegaard seems intent on preparing individuals with how
to wield through the rhetoric of not only the crowd that surrounds the individual, but the
messages disseminated therein.
Even though Kierkegaard’s objective throughout his career is to usher in the truth of
Christianity, he continually confronts what he calls Christendom and refuses to consider himself
a Christian. The motive here, for Kierkegaard, is to arrest an individual’s complicity in the
identification of being Christian with other Christians as the defining characteristic of being
Christian. Kierkegaard thus effects an irruption of the consubstantiality in considering oneself a
Christian. The chapter heading of one of the essays that comprise his Attack Upon
‘Christendom’ is entitled, “When all are Christians, Christianity eo ipso does not exist.”
Kierkegaard begins the work by adding, “When once it is pointed out, this is very easily seen,
and once seen it can never be forgotten” (166). While Burke speaks of the cunning and ingenuity
of the identification properties of rhetoric, Kierkegaard’s edifying communication seeks to
simultaneously expose it and diminish its power. “If we are all Christians,” Kierkegaard writes,
“the concept is annulled, being a Christian is something which lies before the beginning [….] for
the whole thing rests upon the assumption that we are all Christians, which is precisely the
knavish way of doing away with Christianity” (166-7). Earlier he writes, “where all are
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Christians, the situation is this: to call oneself a Christian is the means whereby one secures
oneself against all sorts of inconveniences and discomforts” (27). By communicating to the
singular other within a public, though, a rhetor who edifies offers reluctant testimony in the
communication situation in order to foster a double-reflection in the individuals to whom one
addresses.
Kierkegaard also discusses what might be considered the consubstantiation of
Christendom, achieved through a discussion of priests.31 The “priestly corporation which
speculates in human numbers” attempts to maintain Christian publics, Kierkegaard writes, “in
such a cheap and agreeable way” (Attack 151). Pointing this out—irrupting the consubstantiality
of Christendom, that is—comprises what Kierkegaard calls “the difficulty of my task.” There
exists, indeed, a great difficulty for edifying rhetorical invention insofar as it aims at reactivating awareness and not attaining categorical agreement. To resist the properties of
Christian identification, Kierkegaard considers the idea of a Christian nation or continent to be
an illusion “due doubtless to the power which number exercises over the imagination” (30).
Priests, Kierkegaard contends, are those persons of authority who strive to maintain a calculus of
numerical advantage that the identity of being Christian affords. They have constructed and
perpetuated what he considers Christendom, “acquired millions and millions of Christians” so as
to establish an identity, not a faith. Kierkegaard attempts to divorce Christianity from being a
possession. To do so, Kierkegaard, writing in 1855 shortly before his death, refuses to call
himself a Christian. “It is this I must constantly reiterate,” he says, “and which everyone who
would understand my quite peculiar task must train himself to be able to understand” (Attack
282). Although Christianity is the centripetal force of his work as an author, Kierkegaard’s
refusal to identify himself as a Christian is meant to inspire the double reflection in members of
his audience so that they might re-consider Christian faith as opposed to merely reveling in their
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identity as a Christian in Christendom. “For my part I do not call myself a ‘Christian’ (thus
keeping the ideal free),” he adds, “but I am able to make it evident that the others are that still
less than I” (283). Ultimately, Kierkegaard’s communicative efforts are, like all edifying
rhetoric, not to address the public itself but rather inspire and unsettle the individuals within a
public.
Dig Yourself (Out of Identification)
By cutting through the consubstantiation of publics, edifying rhetoric does not flatter the
mass. Whereas the traditional rhetorical actor may be seen to encourage publics to seek a sense
of unity through discourse, the edifying rhetor does not allow this to happen. Edification exposes
the ingrained failure in the attempt to truly identify with one another. It is, as Jaspers writes, a
rupture: “I destroy communication by my very pursuit of it in the largest possible number”
(Philosophy 55). This primary deficiency or failure does not bring about a quietism of despair
but the opportunity to struggle with one another, which Jaspers describes as the manifestation of
existentialist communication. “It is a struggle,” Jaspers writes, “in which both combatants dare to
show themselves without reserve and to allow themselves to be thrown into question” (60). The
dare Jaspers refers to is the risk which Kierkegaard sought to undertake—the very stuff of
edifying rhetoric.
One way to consider the manifestation of this jeopardy or risk is expressed by Stokely
Carmichael in his “Black Power” speech at the University of California-Berkeley in 1966. “Dig
yourself,” he demands of the audience throughout the speech. This command functions as a
directive to the particular selves of a public to individually struggle with the rhetor’s expression.
The meaning and responsive action of a communicative act is thrown toward members of the
audience: each auditor must re-configure what is being articulated, what is at stake, and how to
respond. Even if this is not verbalized explicitly, dig yourself, employed as a trope, attempts to
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unsettle through an edifying double-reflection where the auditor or reader is asked to reconstruct
the meaning of what is communicated and then interrogate oneself with questions he or she
might otherwise ignore. While dig yourself is a colloquialism particular to Carmichael and the
American vernacular, it is permeates all edifying discourse. For instance, in Letters to a Young
Poet, a text central to an existentialist understanding of communication, Rainer Maria Rilke asks
of his interlocutor to “dig deep into yourself” (11). An act of edifying rhetoric can be seen to
communicate with a public as an exigence arises, but directs its address to particular selves
within a public. As Hyde writes, “existentialists are for an authentic rhetoric: a rhetoric of the
Self and for the Other (Self)” (234). The command, to dig yourself, is not just a suggestive
phrase, but an immanent call between singular consciousnesses amidst the thicket of public
fanfare.
While the conditions of the rhetorical situation may call for addressing an audience
composed of one or more publics, the edifying rhetor always communicates dialogically on the
interpersonal level. She does so in order to arouse the cognizance of interpellation within
individual communication recipients. “[T]he very act of addressing,” writes Charland, “is
rhetorical” because “[i]nterpellation occurs at the very moment one enters into a rhetorical
situation” (“Constitutive Rhetoric” 138). Typically this is seen as the foundation of efficacious
public address: calling forth a public or a people together through discourse. Charland suggests
this method of suturing an audience within a rhetorical situation is a ruse, writing, “In purely
objective terms, the only human reality is that of the individual; groups, whether as small as a
Sunday school class or as big as a whole society, are infused with an artificial identity” (“In
Search of ‘The People’” 242). The edifying rhetor tacks away from such interpellated unity,
rendering public communication singular because only individuals can dig themselves—a public
is incapable. Such a rhetorical construct is characterized by a rhetor who strives to activate
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individual reflection and re-action to what is communicated—to divorce, that is, persons from
the publics in which they are inscribed in order to arrest the individual’s apathy. The common
purview of a rhetorical situation is that the auditor is implied through discourse, as Edwin Black
explains in “The Second Persona” (111-12). However, by demanding that individual auditors dig
themselves, an edifying rhetor explicitly jars his audience loose from one another.
Invoking dig yourself exposes the flux between the identification and division of a public
within a communicative act. While Burke writes, in A Rhetoric of Motives, that “rhetorical
motive, through the resources of identification, can operate without conscious direction by any
particular agent” (35), edifying speech renders the formation and properties of identification
conspicuous for its interlocutors. In attempting to unsettle the particular selves within a public,
the edifying rhetor intends to irrupt the tethering of souls—that is, she looks to cause an irruption
of the consubstantiality which betokens identification For Burke, identification trumps
persuasion as the key principle of efficacious symbolic action because to an audience, the rhetor
“can seem to have ignored rhetorical considerations” (37). As a result, the publics addressed, “in
varying degrees of deliberateness and unawareness,” impose upon themselves, by virtue of the
ingenuousness and cunning of identification, the motive(s) of the rhetor: “[T]he persuasive
identifications of Rhetoric, in being so directly designed for use, involve us in a special problem
of consciousness, as exemplified in the Rhetorician’s particular purpose for a given statement”
(36). Yet by asking individuals within an audience to dig themselves, an edifying rhetor calls
attention to the process whereby identification is often substantiated. Edification is composed of
those rhetorical acts which distance themselves from calling forth an identification between
rhetor and audience despite the fact that, as Burke suggests, it is the rhetorical trope par
excellence. The risk here is that an edifying rhetor risks not only his or her expression, but limits
the breadth of the potentiality of one’s persuasion in a communicative act.
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Interrogating the Universal Audience
What edifying discourse, considered as a rhetorical construct, proposes instead is a
methodological counter-statement to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s development of the
universal audience. Whereas a rhetor’s appeal to the universal audience is a calling forth, through
discourse, of an audience composed of highly rational men and women to agreement, edifying
rhetoric suggests this is impossibile. The edifying wager, which may be purchased at the expense
of an orator’s own efficacy, is that public agreement, when reached, has a stagnant effect that
limits the possibilities of change. Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write that “argumentation
addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the reasons addressed are of a
compelling character, that they are self-evident, and possess an absolute and timeless validity,
independent of local or historical contingencies” (32). Communicating to a universal audience is
advanced as a revelatory practice that purports to unveil the essence of things for a public to
understand and consent to. Edifying speech, by contrast, vivifies the radical particularity of
existence for each individual and seeks to re-orient the auditor’s relationship to one’s immediate
experience within the realm of social interaction.
Interestingly, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are transparent in their disdain of the
existentialist method of communication. They suggest that whereas typically a speaker who
recognizes a “thesis [that] harbor[s] inconsistencies which would lay him open to the charge of
incoherence […] will normally make a choice between them,” existentialists such as Kierkegaard
adopt various methods of address which “represent the furthest degree of dissociation to which
the desire to advance every possible alternative can lead, without any renunciation of
incompatible arguments” (486). The speech genre of edification set forth here does not require
them, however. It is but one option readily available to the edifying rhetor who, employing
indirect communication, begins with an aesthetic appeal before moving towards an ethical
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questioning of consciousness. Edifying speech can and does proceed argumentatively within a
rhetorical situation, yet its aims are different than the usual deliberative function of rhetorical
practice.
What drives a wedge between edification and the program of Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca is the emphasis of dissociation. The authors of The New Rhetoric write that dissociation
“consists in affirming that elements which should remain separate and independent have been
improperly associated” (411). The theoretical purpose of dissociation, they suggest, is that “it
leads to a solution that will also be valid for the future, because, by remodeling our conception of
reality, it prevents the reappearance of the same incompatible elements” (413). Here Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca are accurate in describing a major function of edifying speech: it breaks
accepted connections to which a public subscribes so as to remodel our conception of reality.
However, the authors write that to argue effectively and not bring about exclusion from a public,
a rhetor should seek to employ dissociation as a “compromise” and at “minimum cost” (413).
Edifying rhetors, it might be said, and as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out themselves,
exacerbate dissociation within a given discourse. They don’t seek to compromise at a minimum
cost for the public agreement of a universal audience, but jar loose the connective tissue of
conventions, norms, facts and values.
As distinct from the calling forth a universal audience, edifying speech aligns more
closely to Michel Meyer’s problematological conception of rhetoric and his critique of Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca. “The notion of a universal audience does not help much,” writes Meyer.
“It cancels out the subjectivism associated with the idea of audience, but, on the other hand, it
ceases to be an operational concept, since it can only be understood as a metaphor” (Rhetoric,
Language, and Reason 49). “Rhetoric,” he adds, “cannot ground objective validity in an
imaginary audience that nobody in particular can impersonate” (50). Meyer distrusts the
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universal audience because the rhetor must proceed in an “assertoric” manner in order to call it
forth; doing so seeks a judgment which would thereby silence the problematicity in question
rather than consider the new questions which inevitably arise from a rhetorical act. As Meyer
sees it, “Playing with the problematological character of discourse, the locutor produces an
answer, knowing it is a request, a request directed to the Other for another answer, a request that
immanent in the first answer” (99). Edification also proceeds as a problematological request,
and, by risking its request to the freedom of the other, edifying rhetoric becomes a thoroughly
affective and interrogative communicative act to singular others as opposed to the reaching of an
agreement with a universal audience.
Edifying speech thus assumes Meyer’s call for a radical, interrogative questioning as the
basis of rhetorical address. Because the edifying rhetor attempts to spark within the auditor a
moment of acute, ontological shock, such rhetoric causes a radically immanent questioning of
oneself. To wit, Meyer writes:
When one does put a question to someone, the other must become aware that he is
in question, that he must justify himself by adopting a definite standpoint on the
very question as he justifies his answer. A speaker is all the more convincing
when he leaves the conclusion to the other to draw, rather than immediately
supplying him with the answer and leaving him with little choice in the matter.32
(Problematology 223)
Rather than securing agreement from an audience, then, the rhetoric which Meyer advances
throws each auditor into a process of interrogative questioning in order to share in the creation of
meaning.33 Similarly, this is what the edifying rhetor demands: activating the auditor’s role in the
rhetorical situation so that he or she might channel the discourse spoken, interrogate it, attempt to
furnish it with meaning, and then actively respond in the future. To bring this about, however,
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requires challenging the audience as a whole because the rhetor must elicit the interrogation of
each auditor individually.
Such an argumentative method explicitly rejects Aristotle’s advice in the Rhetoric. He
warns against interrogative techniques, writing that “if the opponent resists, you seem to be
[already] defeated; for it is not possible to ask a series of questions because of the [mental]
weakness of the audience” (3.18.4). For Aristotle, an interrogative questioning must only be
pursued if “the balance of truth is in one’s favor” (3.18.6). An argument by edification proceeds
otherwise; it tacks away from what is typically considered the arrangement of efficacious
discourse in order to heighten the tension of the rhetorical encounter through interrogativity—
both in the speaker’s discourse and the auditor’s reception of it. Moreover, the edifying rhetor
admits up front that truth is not necessarily on the speaker’s side—at least to the extent that
edification challenges accepted truths and norms. The risk of exclusion is thus always present
since the auditor may grow alienated or chastened and dismiss the edifying rhetor. The rhetorical
transaction in edifying discourse is that while immersed in the communicative act, listeners must
process the expression and begin to question themselves. In composing and communicating an
edifying address, then, it is incumbent upon the rhetor to seek ways in which to confront
individuals within a public without having audience pass judgment too quickly. Kierkegaard’s
development of indirect communication is one such way—a stylistic appeal to which an
audience is first treated to an aesthetic display of poetics. A delicate balance must be struck in
order to challenge the auditor through a frame of interrogativity but not lose those to whom one
is addressing to dismissal.
There is a subtle difference between eliciting interrogation and making a judgment worth
exploring in a rhetorical act as well. Aristotle, for instance, suggests “rhetoric is concerned with
making a judgment” (2.1.2). Edifying speech moves us away from judgment, however. While
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casting judgment requires an act of individual preference, it is inherently passive since an auditor
can maintain a disengagement from the discourse presented. As mentioned above, audiences can
limit themselves to merely passing judgment on the speaker’s ethos if they choose. Interrogation,
by contrast, entails an act of deliberating self-consciousness by the other in the processing of a
rhetor’s given discourse. Whereas calling forth a universal audience solicits judgment, often
bifurcated, in order to reach agreement, a rhetoric of interrogativity demands a movement of
consciousness that cannot be grounded in the evaluation of ethos. As Raymond Anderson writes,
“The persuasive speaker seeks to capitalize on ethos; the edifying speaker seeks to minimize it”
(5). In the edifying rhetorical encounter, the auditor is directed to internalize the expression and
then re-orient oneself to the message. Passing judgment deflects back to the speaker or her
discourse, but interrogation engages the auditor as a necessary participant in what that message
will mean going forward. As Meyer writes, “A judgment has a validity that is independent of the
situation which brings it forth, whereas interrogation is circumstantial; it ensues from a
contingent occasion linked to given individuals in a particular situation, and truth cannot depend
on it” (Rhetoric 70). Elsewhere he notes that “judgment represses interrogativity (hence its
autonomy) to the benefit of an essence which justifies what it says as being true, that is, not
false” (Problematology 94). Notice how Meyer suggests judgment privileges essences,
justificatory discourse, and that which is true as opposed to interrogation, which is directed
towards the contingent and the particular engagement of the other. His critique of judgment
stems from the fact that casting or passing judgment on a matter purports to eliminate the
problematicity of a given discourse, which, in Meyer’s view, can never be fully resolved. The
very nature of language—and how it is operationalized in communication—precludes the ability
to arrive at a telos, according to Meyer. It is why he also levels of a critique of Plato, who seeks
“precisely a conception of answerhood which eliminates any possible reference to the
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problematicity of a statement” (Problematology 79). Yet the figure of Socrates, in the Platonic
dialogues, privileges questioning and the dialogic encounter (Bahktin; Grano), which might be
considered edifying discourse or resembling problematology, so how might we reconcile such
contradictory elements? Can not Socrates be considered an edifying rhetor? In a word, no.
Meyer’s judgment/interrogativity distinction clears this up. In the next section, I suggest that
Socrates may resemble edifying rhetoric such that he engages only individual interlocutors and
exercises the use of the question, but whereas edifying rhetors solicit an interrogation of the
other’s consciousness, Socrates, in Plato’s re-telling, seeks only to bring about clarification
towards judgment.
Exploring the Socratic
In the Gorgias, Socrates explains to Polus, Gorgias’ student, that he distrusts rhetoric
because it seeks to persuade an audience without fully being aware of a discourse’s content. In a
philosophical engagement, on the contrary, Socrates says he only has to
know how to produce one witness to the truth of my assertions, the man himself
with whom I am holding the argument (the others, the mob, I can dispense with);
and I do know how to put the vote to one man at a time, though I will not hold
conversations with a crowd. (474)
In the Apology, similarly, Socrates tells the audience that it might seem “strange that I do go
around counseling these things and being a busybody in private, but that in public I do not dare
to go up before the multitude to counsel the city” (31c). It is unmistakably clear that, despite
Plato’s readership in the last 2,000-plus years, Socrates wants to have no truck with the hoipolloi. On the one hand, Socrates resembles edifying discourse in that he distrusts crowds and
the mob. Notice how he quite literally dispenses with the crowd; a rhetorical act of public
speech, Socrates declares, is beneath him. Despite this initial likeness, edifying speech offers a
145

counterpoint to Socrates: while one should be aware of the dangers of ad populum fallacies and
the static quality of mass agreement,34 it is still vital to address publics confronted with an
impending exigence. One should not fear or dismiss the need to engage a rhetorical situation, but
operate within the occasion in order to elicit the process of interrogativity for others. Socrates
refuses to hold a conversation with a crowd…except, that is, when he has to defend himself in
court, which comprises Plato’s Apology.
Socrates discursively draws out the individual from the jury in his trial, keeping with the
methods of edifying speech. In Heidegger’s reading, Plato intimates, through Socrates, that
rhetoric is about clearing an ontological foundation for the directing of another’s soul (Plato’s
Sophist). In edifying speech, we have the same ontological clearing, but its purpose is a
movement of interrogative consciousness for which there are no ready made answers that resolve
the exigence. The auditor must decide what orientation he or she wishes to adopt and whether
and in what manner to responsively act. Socrates differs in the Apology by “beg[ging]” the jurors
to
leave aside the manner of my speech—for perhaps it may be worse, but perhaps
better—and instead consider this very thing and apply your mind to this: whether
the things I say are just or not. For this is the virtue of a judge. (18a)
Earlier, he accuses his accusers of having “said little or nothing true, while from me you will
hear the whole truth” (17b). That is, Socratic rhetoric is offered as a test of validity of what might
be deemed the truth. One wins an argument insofar as an agreement is commensurate with an
approval of the terms to be validated. The wedge between Socratic and edifying speech is that
the former seeks to determine the validity of a given issue to which he, Socrates, and his
interlocutor engage. As Grano notes vis-à-vis Bakhtin, the Socratic method is “aimed at testing
truth and undermining false conceit” (7). Zappen, also drawing from Bakhtin, describes Socratic
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rhetoric as that which tests “people and ideas, not a means of persuading others to accept his
ideas, thus imposing his ideas upon them” (66). Socrates’ objective, mapped out in the Gorgias
and quoted above, is to produce truth witnesses. While he may deploy a set of questions in the
dialectical encounter so as to challenge an interlocutor, it does not amount to Meyer’s conception
of radical questioning as the basis of a rhetoric because Socrates continually seeks a clarification
towards a more general conclusion.
Questions, in the Socratic encounter, are deployed in order to secure answers which
would teleologically solve a dilemma. The use of questions themselves, however, do not
necessarily translate to Meyer’s construct of rhetorical questioning. For Meyer, questioning is
not just the method, but the objective: “The more the speaker uses explicit interrogatives, the
more has judged his statement to be problematical; he takes on as his own task the posing of
questions which his listener could or would have posed” (Problematology 247). Yet even in
Plato’s aporetic dialogues, which are heralded as a more ironic display of playful ignorance and
non-knowledge (Vlastos), Socrates interrogates his foils through anacrisis, “a means for eliciting
and provoking the words of one’s interlocutor, forcing him to express his opinion and express it
thoroughly” (Bakhtin 110, quoted in Grano 8). In doing so, Socrates remains beholden to a
Perelman and Aristotelian frame of mere agreement. The Socratic method should be seen as
thoroughly teleological as opposed to edifying discourse, which seeks a residual transformation
of consciousness suspended in the flux of meaning. The exchange of discourse is always a messy
affair, and it is through the negotiation of this muck which we collectively share our experiences
and transform them into future action. Meaning never rests from an edifying and
problematological viewpoint; the struggle is forever on-going. Dialectic, however, suggests that
meaning can somehow be completed in acts of discursive exchange.35 As such, Meyer finds that
“Dialectic [ultimately] ceases to be interrogative, and instead becomes the method (episteme) for
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arriving at the answer, at that which is valid in truth in reality” (Problematology 72). Meyer
considers Socrates as suffering from a need to tease an argument toward its completion, whose
interest is only “in resolving problems, closing off the question—[through] methods of
resolution” (96). In contradistinction, edifying speech exacerbates the dissociative tension or
problematicity of a rhetorical situation and leaves meaning continually pursued in the ongoing
exchange.
Since a problematological orientation which aligns with existentialism implies that
meaning is continually transformed in permanent flux, resolving a particular exigence is not the
telos sought in a rhetorical act. The objective of the rhetorical situation in edifying discourse
amounts to the very act of addressing that particular exigence in order to generate an
interrogative conversation with the individuals of a public. It is comfortable with the ambiguity
of meaning and agrees to negotiate it with others in a permeable state. Up until now I have
suggested, drawing from Meyer, that Socrates, whether assuming the airs of madcap ironist or
serious apologist, seeks the clarification of terms so as to finalize meaning in the dialectical
encounter. Yet if Meyer’s problematological design has merit, ultimately, Socrates will be
dissatisfied with this process—and he often is. Whenever meaning is threatened in the Platonic
dialogues, Socrates himself feels threatened by this crisis. The Socratic mask of irony, I’m
suggesting, is a screen to veil the sheer horror of contingency and the irresolute, wholly
discursive texture of meaning. Edifying rhetoric employs irony as well, but does so in order to
intensify the struggle over meaning. We find over and over again, however, that Socrates feels
exposed by the fallibility of the dialectical encounter to secure meaning. As such, he goes on the
attack like a wounded animal. Socrates maintains a playful tone, but he betrays exasperation
about the exchange of discourse as thoroughly objectionable. After growing perturbed with
Protagoras’ inability to articulate conceptions of the role of the sophist, virtue, and poetry,
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Socrates sighs: “It is the truth, and our minds, we should be testing. If you want to go on with
your questions, I am ready to offer myself as an answerer; or if you prefer, be my respondent, to
bring to conclusion the discussion which we broke off in the middle” (Protagoras 348a). Socrates
is visibly irritated by the lack of closure in the discussion. He wants meaning, damn-it, and he
wants it now. This crisis of meaning and its resulting Socratic sting is also apparent in his
critique of Agathon’s eulogy about love in the Symposium. With the Socratic gift of mock
deprecation and playful ostentation (Vlastos), he exclaims:
I was so naïve that I thought the point of any eulogy was to tell the truth about the
subject! I thought that, with the truth before you, you were supposed to select
from among the facts the ones that were most to your subject’s credit and then
present them so as to show him in the best possible light. […] What you do is
describe your subject in the most generous and glowing terms, whether or not
there’s any truth to them. It needn’t bother you if you’re making it up. Our
assignment apparently means that each of us is to deliver a specious eulogy of
Love, rather than actually praise him. (198d-e)
Continuing this playful dance of condescension, Socrates asks Phaedrus if it would be acceptable
if he, Socrates, could dispense with declamation or form and deliver a speech “which tells you
the truth about Love and lets words and phrases out in any old order?” (199b). While Socrates is
flexing his acerbic wit leading up to his speech, it masks how very threatened Socrates is by the
struggle for definition and the validity of the terms in question. He wants to grasp the meaning of
love with clarity and without pretense—a cue, it would seem, for the deficient gaps inherent to
rhetorical discourse. Socrates can be seen as a rhetorical figure who closely resembles yet
ultimately differs from edifying rhetoric. So what, then, might edifying rhetoric look like?
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Endnotes
27

Burke’s reasoning is as follows: existentialism couched their sites of resistance as a literary movement concerned
with the aesthetic as a way to elude censorship yet indirectly or simultaneously curry support (254). “The movement
had relevance,” Burke writes wistfully if not condescendingly, “as the translation of a political predicament into
‘cosmological’ terms” (255). He goes on to suggest that after the War, existentialism founded a dialectical
movement that could be “reduced to suicide.” The objective here, in mapping a theoretical construct of edification,
is to harness the rhetorical strategies of existentialism’s rhetoric of resistance and project them broadly onto
exigencies that may arise.
28

In a broader sense, the speech genre described here relies upon and adapts the word of Martin Buber, who calls for
the I to speak to a Thou, not an It. Writing on Buber, Czubaroff suggests a clear distinction between instrumental
rhetoric, which is pragmatic and geared towards an epistemological orientation, and dialogic rhetoric, which
flourishes on an existential-ontological nexus of situating the self with the other (174-76). My work aims to adapt
the dialogic encounter, which is often described interpersonally, to rhetorical situations that involve mass publics.
29

See Friedrich Nietzsche’s description of the herd instinct in The Gay Science; Jose Ortega y Gasset’s
characterization of the mass-man in The Revolt of the Masses; and Heidegger’s discussion of the they in Being and
Time.
30

“In a logical system,” writes Kierkegaard, “nothing may be incorporated that has a relation to existence, that is not
indifferent to existence” (CUP 110).
31

This is not unlike Burke’s conception of the priestly function of upholding the status quo in Attitudes Toward
History.
32

Meyer expresses a similar, though no less instructive, thought in Rhetoric: “An argument is all the more
convincing for a given person (or group of persons) when this person is led to draw the conclusion for himself (or
herself). The force of an argument varies directly with the freedom left to the addressed individual: the arguments
that are imposed are seldom convincing; an argument is all the stronger when the addressee is free to reject it” (51).
33

As Meyer writes in Rhetoric, “Meaning is neither the answer nor the question but the link between question and
answer” (91). Because we rely on the exchange of discourse to negotiate experience, rhetoric, for Meyer, locates
humans as forever suspended in the struggle over meaning.
34

Ober notes the ad populum fallacy was a real danger to Athenian democracy, to which Demosthenes represents
the epitome of rhetoric that merely flatters the prevailing majority: “But it is not the speech (logos) of a rhetor,
Aeschines, or the power of his voice which are his worth, but it lies rather in his preference for the same things as
the many and in his hating and loving the same things as his homeland. Having such a disposition, everything a man
says will be patriotic” (quoted in Ober 167).
35

It is here Grano, it would seem, disagrees. “In Socratic practice,” he writes, “an interpenetration of voices
produces unfinalizable dialogue, as evidenced by various textual collisions between Socrates’s interior voice and the
exterior voices of others (diviners, interlocutors) that cannot settle into a dogmatic one-sidedness” (10). While it is
admitted that Plato’s dialogues can be interpreted as inhabiting a world of endless, dialogical play, this does not
appear to either Plato or Socrates’ intent. A key feature consistent throughout the Platonic universe—across the early
aporetic dialogues to the later, more didactic ones such as the Republic—is that Socrates insists on having others
clarify their terms so as to answer the problem. Note: this Socratic critique, taken holistically, is not an effort to
impugn the Socratic method found in Plato’s dialogues, but only to draw out the differences between it and edifying
discourse. The two remain, as outlined above, closely related; using Socrates as a foil is but the means to more
clearly articulate the theoretical mapping of edification.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE RISKS OF EDIFYING PUBLIC ADDRESS:
A GUIDE
Most of my endeavor has always been to
unsettle my neighbors, to rouse their hearts,
to afflict them with what I can.
-

Miguel de Unamuno, Perplexities and Paradoxes (5)
Every act of communication implicitly
affirms the possibility of communication.
-

Stephen Howard Browne, Angelina Grimké (80)

The previous chapter theoretically mapped out the contours of an edifying rhetoric. This
chapter explores examples of what such a method of public address looks like. My objective here
is to identify and analyze rhetorical acts that are delivered through an edifying frame and to
examine, in particular, works not typically associated with existentialism. The work of Erasmus,
Angelina Grimké Weld and John Ruskin is considered here as rhetoric which edifies. Each rhetor
challenges accepted norms in order to spark a reflection of consciousness in the individuals of
the public to whom they address. In edifying rhetoric, soliciting a sharp questioning of the self
marks the necessary first step towards activating a future movement of praxis in others.
Edification is endowed with risk and often fails historically in a causal manner for the rhetor
addresses the exigence of a situation without visualizing a specific endpoint. The edifying rhetor
is she who admits to not being able to guarantee a teleological description of actualized
structures which will commence in the future. Edifying speech concentrates on the means, not
the ends, of a rhetorical act; it operates solely on the level of appealing to other consciousnesses
in hopes of bringing about an acute ontological moment of awareness and reflection in others. It
is within this communicative dynamic that the consubstantiality of a public is divorced from
itself with the hope that individuals or citizens can negotiate their social experience with more
committed, responsible actions. An edifying act of rhetoric, moreover, does not advance so as to
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bring closure to a given exigence but to intensify the problematicity of a situation. It is a call not
just for agreement or change, but emphasizes a need to re-orient the other’s attitude or
consciousness in a particular location at a particular time. The heuristic of analyzing Erasmus,
Grimké and Ruskin is such that despite our divorce from the particularity of their communicative
acts, we may trace and perhaps feel the dynamic, arresting qualities latent in edifying rhetoric.
The edifying frame of rhetoric inherent to existentialism, the view here suggests, should
serve as the movement’s legacy. It may not be seen as a profitable enterprise towards purchasing
an efficacious impact on publics, but functions as a valuable rhetorical tool to help future
rhetorical actors invent, arrange, and stylize their discourse suited to individuals within a public.
As the examples here demonstrate, adopting an edifying frame often results from the failure of
the civic model of deliberation. That is, edification offers another avenue or method with which
to impact persons. Desiderius Erasmus, for instance, jettisoned his didactic communicative style
and shifted to an edifying frame in Praise of Folly, published amidst the controversial period of
the Reformation. A satirical tract written for his friend, Sir Thomas More, Praise of Folly reflects
his wish to negotiate the concerns about the Catholic Church: rather than have it implode by the
impending Lutheran revolution, Erasmus, through the wit of a divine pseudonym, cultivates a reconception of Christian faith in which a change of consciousness could better organize the
Church and pacify those expressing serious grievances. His project failed in that he was assailed
by both Catholics and Protestants alike during his life. The Reformation, moreover, did split
Europe, and by 1559, twenty-three years after his death, Erasmus’ works were banned by Rome
and all throughout Europe (Levi 29). Slavery, likewise, was not abolished through Grimké’s
rhetoric of the 1830s—it was, in fact, prolonged and expanded until the Civil War—yet her acts
of public communication stand out as encouraging her contemporaries to challenge apathy and
create sites of resistance whereby those to whom she addressed might find “satisfaction of
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having done what [they] could” (323). It was not an indulgent enterprise but the sincere
commitment of one’s effort to redress the sins of slavery, which, for Grimké, began with a
challenge to the consciousnesses of those unknowingly complicit in perpetuating slavery. Then
we have Ruskin, who protested against utilitarianism and theories about the political economy.
These ideas were, in fact, energized by the Anglo-American emphasis on Social Darwinism in
the late 1800s, yet it was Ruskin’s series of essays, which comprise Unto This Last, that sparked
a moment of arresting consciousness for a young Mohandas K. Gandhi—inspiring him to return
from South Africa to his native India. One resorts to edifying rhetoric, it would seem, when legal
and social structures prove ineffectual. The implementation of edifying rhetoric reflects the need
for a change in consciousness or attitudes, not merely the altering of preexisting social norms.
While each rhetor considered here navigates a unique spatial and temporal exigence—
and indeed, it will become clear, unsuccessfully so—their contributions remain heuristically
solvent insofar as the rhetorical performances elevate individual awareness and prepare the
groundwork for individuals to engage praxially within a public sphere. Rhetoric should not be
seen as only that which is historically efficacious. What residue of their work remains open for
study and/or celebration as “good oratory,” I suggest, is that in reading their rhetoric today, one
finds arresting moments of consciousness which cause a renewed questioning of the self. Though
any rhetorical situation depends on a particular exigence and none of these writers, it would
seem, composed for posterity, the works of Erasmus, Grimké, and Ruskin remain fresh because
they ontologically strike later readers into a problematological questioning of the self’s
orientation to spirituality, race, and economics adapted to the present. Then as now, the future
remains open to deliberation which constitutes, as Aristotle wrote in the Rhetoric, “whatever, by
their nature, are within our power [to change] and of which the inception lies within us” (1.4.3).
In edifying rhetoric, change begins with a movement of consciousness—and even then, there are
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no assurances or guarantees that evaluating consciousness will move in a manner commensurate
with the rhetor’s objectives. This movement, however, marks the first step of empowering
agency in others.
Erasmus and the Goddess of Edification
In 1504, Erasmus of Rotterdam published Enchiridion Militis Christiani, which translates
to the Handbook of the Christian Soldier. One of his first written works, the Enchiridion serves
as a strict and didactic “moral ‘how-to’ book” for Christians to become more authentically
spiritual (Rummel 138). In a 1518 prefatory letter added to a later publication of the Enchiridion,
Erasmus betrays his objective: “I could see that the common body of Christians was corrupt not
only in its affections but in its ideas” (138). Specifically, he intended to challenge “those people,
I mean, who reek of earthly things and twist the Gospel teaching to serve earthly appetites,
compelling it to be the slave of human ambition and to enhance their own discreditable gains and
their despotic rule” (139). According to Levi, the “whole background” of the Enchiridion “was
neo-platonist, from the Socratic exhortation to self-knowledge to the psychology of spiritual
progress” (24). Erasmus delivers his instructions in an assertive manner. Yet the didactic,
logical-driven model of persuasion ultimately fails Erasmus in this early work. Later, instead of
playing the scold, he sought a new manner with which to communicate his evangelical
humanism—and found one, on a 1509 English retreat to Thomas More’s estate, where he
composed Praise of Folly, which was published in 1511. As Erasmus would write in a public
apologia for Folly addressed to the disapproving theologian, Martin Dorp,
My aim in Folly was exactly the same as in my other works. Only the presentation
was different. In the Enchiridion I simply outlined the pattern of Christian life.
[…] And in Folly I expressed the same ideas as those in Enchiridion, but in the

154

form of a joke. I wanted to advise, not to rebuke, to do good, not injury, to work
for, not against, the interests of men. (Folly 215)
The objective in reviving an analysis of Folly here is to demonstrate how Erasmus did not merely
write a joke, as he insists, but adopts, in his most enduring work, an edifying frame of rhetoric.
To show the contrast between the frames in which Erasmus communicated, first consider
the Enchiridion. It reads as a series of rhetorical questions and epistles that operate through the
construction of polemical syllogisms: “What good is it that a few grains of salt have been put on
your tongue if your soul remains unsalted? The body has been annointed [sic], but the soul
remains unannointed” (144). This increasingly predictable formula often comprises Erasmus’s
claims, and the rhetor functions as a scold.
You gaze with awe at what is purported to be the tunic or shroud of Christ, and
[yet] you read the oracles of Christ apathetically? You think it is an immense
privilege to have a tiny particle of the cross in your home. But that is nothing
compared to the mystery of the cross. (145)
Religion is articulated here as an ongoing individual quest whose purpose is never actualized in
the visible world, which Erasmus would also pursue in Folly. Any claims to a perfect finalization
of spirituality are deemed in-authentic. Erasmus is dissatisfied with the observance of what he
calls “silly little ceremonies, instituted by mere men” (151). Rather than encouraging a moment
of ontological awareness for the reader to consider, he attempts to describe the faults of his
audience: “You venerate the wood of the cross; better to follow the mystery of the cross” (152).
An individual’s relation to objects cannot establish faith by itself, Erasmus suggests—only an
inner-reflection of the subject can bring this about: “Do not tell me now that charity consists in
being an assiduous churchgoer, prostrating yourself before the statues of the saints, lighting
candles, and repeating a certain number of prayers. God has no need of this” (150). Again,
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Erasmus disputes and rallies against the conspicuousness of religion as opposed to how he
conceives of the individual’s subjective relationship with spirituality, yet he does so from a
privileged ethos whereat he, Erasmus, a theologian, delivers knowledge as a possession rather
than a process.
Erasmus’s tone in the Enchiridion scoffs at his readership, singling them out,
individually, as in-authentic. While Erasmus seeks to encourage a more authentic re-conception
and form of Christianity, his method of address belittles the reader and orients a hostile
relationship between rhetor and auditor. He relies on guilt and shame to incite his reader to
change. The following affirmations provide a glimpse of the kind of explicit admonishment that
Erasmus’ instruction offers: “With greatest care must you repair the bankruptcy of the soul”
(143); “If you confide in him without reflecting…God will hate your gross and flabby religion”
(144); and “There are no vices more dangerous than those which simulate virtue” (146). The
writing here proceeds didactically, very sure of itself. It features, coincidentally, the confidence
of assertion which Erasmus lobbies against.
Praise of Folly serves as a conduit for Erasmus to amplify his fundamental intention
cloaked through another rhetorical device and forum. In contrast to his earlier work, which relies
on explicit instruction, speaking through the Goddess Folly enables Erasmus to express himself
more creatively and activate publics who engage the address. As Gordon states, “What the author
labors at in the Enchiridion he plays with in the Moria [Folly]” (77). A distinguishing
characteristic, writes Gordon, is how, in the latter work, the reader’s “mind is undone by
speech…and is indirectly prodded to reach out for faith to achieve wholeness” (198). This is by
no means unintentional. To accomplish his task, Erasmus sought an edifying method to carry and
even conceal his message, which was not to grant expediency to the growing Reformation, but to
appeal to the Church in such a way to redress its problems. According to Levi, “Folly’s
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inconsistencies are deliberately introduced in the interests of achieving the extraordinary control
of satirical nuance and ambiguity Erasmus required, if he was to solicit reform and not set fire to
a revolution” (16). Whereas Erasmus solicits reform in the Enchiridion through a deliberative
model of persuasion, Erasmus, by adopting an edifying frame, allows for his readership to
become involved with his message in Folly. Doing so attenuates the ingrained hostility between
rhetor and auditor; provides a more entertaining, inviting style in which to address the reader;
and, by virtue of an ambiguous method, forces the reader to question the veracity of the
construction and grammar of the text as well as the opinions advanced therein.
In Folly, Erasmus speaks to the audience, not at them. In this Erasmus admits the
fallibility of himself (author) and the narrator (Goddess) whom he chooses to employ:
Why I have I appeared today in this unaccustomed garb? Well, you shall hear the
reason if you have no objection to lending me your ears—no, not the ones you use
for preachers of sermons, but the ears you usually prick up for mountebanks,
clowns and fools, the sort of ears that once upon a time our friend Midas listened
with to Pan. I’ve a fancy to play the Sophist before you, and I don’t mean by that
one of the tribe today who cram tiresome trivialities into the heads of schoolboys
and teach them a more than feminine obstinacy in disputation—no, I shall follow
the ancients who chose the name Sophist in preference to the damaging title of
philosopher or lover of wisdom. (64)
In this opening passage, Erasmus invites, rather than demands, the reader to consider that which
will be advanced. Folly qualifies her own ethos by playing the sophist, as opposed the
Enchiridion, where Erasmus, the theologian, wields his authority as leverage. Doubt is thus
thrown onto just what, exactly, the meaning of the text is. The auditor must discover for oneself
the arguments and opinions present, reconciling the silly and the serious throughout. In stark
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contrast to the later Socrates, who, under the guidance of Plato, “seeks demonstrative knowledge
and is confident that he finds it” (48), Erasmus shifts his discourse in a new trajectory.36 Whereas
the Enchiridion operates from the logical progression of syllogistic admonishments, Folly’s
method includes a seething cauldron of digressions, qualifications, and paradoxes, all of which
obscure the message being carried so the reader can ontologically consider it.
In the above passage, Folly speaks of her “fancy to play the sophist.” How to reconcile,
then, Socrates’s refutation of sophistry in Plato’s Gorgias? In a paradoxical manner, Erasmus
attempts to collapse this dichotomy by relying on both the sophistic and the Socratic. Clarence
Miller suggests as much in referring to the Erasmus of Folly as a “dialectical sophist” and a
“consummate rhetorician” (85). Erasmus supports the claim by ridiculing philosophy as “a
profession for asses” since “the happier branches of knowledge are those which are more nearly
related to folly, and by far the happiest men are those who have no traffic at all with any kind of
learning and follow nature for their only guide” (Folly 114). Those who would “strive after
wisdom are the furthest from happiness,” writes Erasmus, because only fools “speak frankly and
tell the truth, and what is more praiseworthy than truth?” (116, 118). Erasmus tethers the Socratic
method to sophistic utility, throwing doubt on Platonic notions of wisdom and truth. In the
previous chapter, edification was theorized as borrowing from the Platonic Socrates insofar as it
privileges questions and irony, but distancing itself from the Socratic insistence on securing
meaning or wisdom. Erasmus is a theologian willing to risk the truth by offering it up so others
can more profitably think of it themselves. It is a joint, intersubjective process which Erasmus
initiates. Years after expressing his frustrations about the common lot of Christians by attempting
to dominate the rhetorical situation, Erasmus respects his audience and appeals to them not just
as an equal, but as an imaginary goddess of silliness so that they might come to consider the
veiled truth locked deep within themselves. Erasmus challenges the auditor to abandon a
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physical, external devotion to spirituality and turn towards subjective introspection as the best
means with which to glorify God. The distinction between the two works is that the Goddess
Folly is addressing the reader, not Erasmus himself. Erasmus’ assertion that “the mystery of
salvation had been hidden from the wise but revealed to little children, that is, to fools,” proceeds
as less hostile (197). Erasmus does not command or declare; he edifies. There is continually a
double-reflection at play in the communicative transaction. As the goddess Folly comically
entertains, the reader perhaps laughs and enjoys the occasional bout of whimsy, but, more
significantly, the reader reflects. The reader necessarily reflects. The process of reading Folly
becomes itself a task of ontological awareness and a movement of consciousness.
The inversion (and subversion) of wisdom and truth are applied to Folly’s analysis of
Jesus Christ. Christ as a fool is central to Erasmus’s objective—or, better yet, Erasmus’s wont of
cultivating a subjective consideration of spirituality in his reader. Having acclimated the reader
to the style and tone of the work, Erasmus, finally, can devote the last portion of Folly to
impressing the exigence of his religious discourse on the individual. Folly’s observations that
Christ’s “special delight [was/is] in little children, women and fishermen”; his decision to ride a
donkey when he could have strode upon a lion; and his naming of all “those who are destined for
eternal life his sheep, though there is no animal so stupid” (198)—are evidence of Jesus’
proclivity for the lighthearted, according to Erasmus. And “though he is the wisdom of the
Father,” Erasmus adds, “[Christ] was made something of a fool himself in order to help the folly
of mankind” (198). In his description of Christ’s teaching to the apostles, Erasmus writes how
Jesus “taught them to shun wisdom, and made his appeal through the example of children, lilies,
mustard-seed and humble sparrows, all foolish, senseless things, which live their lives by natural
instinct alone, free from care or purpose” (199). Erasmus wants the pious to consider themselves
not without a degree of folly and to consider wisdom, moreover, as an intersubjective process
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that is never eliminated. This is keeping with Erasmus’s critique of religion found in Enchiridion,
but by elevating spiritual levity, as a tool through which he can discursively render the spiritual
realm as a subjective pursuit, not an epistemic assumption or attainment, Erasmus shifts the
approach of his argument from admonishment and hostility to awareness and invitation. “[Only]
the biggest fools of all appear to be those who have once been wholly possessed by zeal for
Christian piety,” he writes, perhaps itself a twist of phrase in which Folly indicts her progenitor,
Erasmus, as foolish (201). An admission, of sorts, which criticizes the stern rhetorical frame
Erasmus formerly communicated from.
Crafting his address through edification, Erasmus, in the very last pages, permits
himself—perhaps cannot abstain himself from—a dalliance in the polemical spirit of the
Enchiridion. Yet his moral and spiritual exhortations arrive after 200 pages of otherwise ludic
prose, highly stylized and entertaining. Like Kierkegaard, Erasmus shifts the rhetorical model of
address by at first aesthetically arousing the reader’s interest, and only afterwards advancing
one’s point of view. By then, the reader is amenable to considering Folly’s suggestions. The
reader has not been scolded, but invited, after an aesthetic appeal, to consider a rhetoric
commensurate with the exigence. For Erasmus, edification provides an indirect method of
persuasive discourse, drawing the auditor’s attention with an aesthetically pleasing (albeit
nonplussed) mediation of irony and paradox, only to advance an argument once one’s attention is
captured.
Oddly, the critical reception of Folly has pointed out that these last past pages are not
consistent with the rest of the text. That, however, is an almost indulgent and perverse tautology:
the entire text up to the peroration is not consistent with itself. Erasmus deploys the goddess,
Folly, as a method to indirectly engage and entertain for the very purpose that, having drawn the
reader in, Erasmus can advance his evangelical humanistic ideals. It should not be a startling
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surprise, given Erasmus’s work in the Enchiridion, that Folly should attack “the crowd” for
thinking “the sacrifice of the mass means no more than crowding as close as possible to the
altars, hearing the sound of words, and watching ritual down to the smallest detail” (205). But is
this the Goddess, at this point, addressing the reader? The following passage, referring to
authentic spirituality, mirrors the quotes cited above from the Enchiridion: “the pious man
throughout his whole life withdraws from the things of the body and is drawn towards what is
eternal, invisible and spiritual” (205-6). We find an almost exact textual replication between the
two works, but the timing, style and method leading up to what Erasmus wanted to, at bottom,
express change the dynamic completely. The communicative texture of Erasmus’ rhetoric is
altered so as to privilege the freedom of his interlocutor in the rhetorical situation.
The search for meaning in Praise of Folly operates on a meta-textual level, then. In
Erasmus’s expression and interaction with Folly, a female Goddess, I contend that the two of
them, together, call into question the discursive creation of a constituted authorship and identity.
This is not an ideological position advanced inasmuch as that which can be detected in the blur
of text itself. Erasmus writes (and Folly says): “I am myself wherever I am, and no one can
pretend I’m not—especially those who lay special claim to be called the personification of
Wisdom” (67). But just who, exactly, is the “myself” of this statement referring to? At one
point, Folly exclaims how she wishes she “could change [her] face and don a theologian’s garb!
Still, if I had too many of the trappings of theology I’m afraid someone might take me for a thief
and accuse me of secretly pillaging the desks of our Masters” (187). Folly, of course, wishes in
vain: quite obviously, she is herself a theologian’s creation, based on theological principles; her
lament articulates that which brings her forth by the author’s discourse. Elsewhere Folly refers to
“my friend Erasmus, whom I mention by name from time to time by way of a compliment”
(190). And so is it that Erasmus employs the voice of Folly, or is it Folly who utilizes the pen of
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Erasmus? The reader must negotiate this question subjectively throughout one’s reading of Folly,
at all times pivoting to consider the meaning of the text, which, as edifying discourse, is left open
to struggle with. This struggle is a function of Erasmus not only trusting his audience, but
respecting them. Like all edifying rhetoric, Erasmus jeopardizes his expression as a rhetor. It
proceeds as a flight outside himself which hopes to spark a movement of consciousness in others.
Unlike the Enchiridion, where meaning is established and clarified by a rhetor who wields
authority from a privileged ethos, Erasmus, in Praise of Folly, questions his own assertions as an
example for his readership so that they, too, can undergo a questioning of consciousness.
Minnich and Meissner write how Erasmus cloaked his opinions by using “rhetorical
ambiguities that abhorred the clear distinctions, stark assertions, and univocal truths
characteristic of scholastic theology,” thereby solidifying his “belief that the path of wisdom lay
in rhetorical eloquence rather than in the rational analysis of the scholastics” (605). The authors
assert that Erasmus chose this “polished style [as] an elaborate attempt to veil [an] inner
arrogance” brought about by his “injured narcissism” (622). While I admit to having neither the
capacity nor training to challenge the accuracy of Minnich and Meissner’s psychoanalytic
interpretation of Erasmus’s life, the latter’s motivation in composing Folly as an opportunity to
“redeem some sense of inner value” can be resisted (623). Both before Folly was published, in
his letter to Thomas More, and in his apologia, delivered to Martin Dorp a few years following
the initial publication, Erasmus is very clear about his motivation for exercising irony,
obfuscation, ostentation, and wit. “Jokes,” he writes to More, “can be handled in such a way that
any reader who is not altogether lacking in discernment can scent something far more rewarding
in them than in the crabbed and specious arguments of some people we know” (Folly 59). Later
he adds: “The world will pass its own judgment on me, but unless my ‘self-love’ entirely
deceives me, my praise of folly has not been altogether foolish” (59). Minnich and Meissner
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clearly disagree, deeming the writing of Folly as “allow[ing] the release and channeling of long
repressed energies in Erasmus, which found expression in an outburst of playful inspiration”
(610). The problem here is that Erasmus’s core message does not change from the Enchiridion to
Praise of Folly. I grant that Minnich and Meissner may very well be accurate that “a smoldering
rage seemed to color his experience and to diffuse itself more generally against all mankind”
once the “religio-humanistic ideals” failed to materialize (616). However, Erasmus, seen as
adopting an edifying frame of rhetoric in Folly, did not shift his beliefs or become disillusioned.
Rather, he merely amplified his message in a manner quite consistent with his earlier work so as
to more effectively advance those ideals. He found, in his mouthpiece, Folly, a whimsical vehicle
with which to drive the seriousness at the core of his thought.
Whereas in the Platonic dialectic mapped out in the Phaedrus, communication proceeds
in perfect agreement from soul to soul, edification functions intersubjectively as an imperfect
enterprise shuttling between active consciousnesses. Praise of Folly, the title of which is a Greek
pun, translated to Moriae Encomium, is, quite literally, addressed to a single individual, Thomas
More—Erasmus’ friend and colleague whose estate he was vacationing at in 1509. In edifying
discourse, the meaning of a rhetorical act is placed at the disposal of the interlocutor. The preface
appended to the work, which Erasmus addressed explicitly to More, reflects this central theme:
It is dedicated to you, so henceforth it is yours, not mine. There may well be
plenty of critical folk rushing in to slander it, some saying that my bit of nonsense
is too frivolous for a theologian and others that it has a sarcastic bite which ill
becomes Christian decorum. (Folly 56-57)
Though Praise of Folly has enjoyed a broad readership in its almost 500-year longevity, Erasmus
intended it to proceed intersubjectively—to arouse one’s individual consciousness in an act of
considerable folly. Erasmus leaves it to More, explicitly, but also to every other reader,
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implicitly. The above passage indicates that Erasmus also anticipated the fierce reaction with
which Folly was met—confirmed, no less, by the criticisms by Martin Dorp and other
conservative reactionaries. As Erasmus points out to More in the preface, he wanted to cause a
break from “the sensitivity of present-day ears which can bear to hear practically nothing but
honorific titles” (60). The caustic yet jovial tone of Praise of Folly, which functions as a species
of edification, is offered as a unique method to negotiate the terrain of a tumultuous period.
Erasmus was not disillusioned, as some have suggested, but attempted to find new ways in which
to communicate his ideas. While this particular work may not have enjoyed the imminent,
efficacious success Erasmus wished to induce in his contemporaries and avoid the Reformation,
Praise of Folly enjoys an enduring quality owing to its edifying style. Past and future readers
who encounter the work have and will continue to pick it up and ruminate over their own faith
and follies because Erasmus, through his silly Goddess, Folly, sparks individuals, then as now, to
consider a radical questioning of one’s own consciousness. Yet while Erasmus mediates through
an ontological rhetoric, he shies away, ultimately, from instructing individuals how to negotiate
their experiences. Whereas he seeks a more authentic faith, this does not translate into an explicit
account of social action itself. Edifying aims to bring about awareness and subjective reevaluation, as Erasmus has demonstrated, but in the remaining rhetors considered, a more
explicit level of transition from consciousness to action itself is articulated.
Edifying Rhetoric in the Works of Angelina Grimké Weld
This process of positioning a movement of consciousness as a gateway to action is
particularly acute in the two works of Grimké analyzed here—the pamphlet, “Appeal to the
Christian Women of the South,” written in 1836, and “Speech at Pennsylvania Hall” in
Philadelphia, delivered on May 16, 1838. After writing the “Appeal” and having it distributed,
Grimké was not permitted back in her native South Carolina for fear of imprisonment and mortal
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danger (Browne 72). Like Erasmus, Grimké would find her works both confiscated and banned.
The gathering mob outside her Philadelphia speech, meanwhile, shattered the windows of the
newly constructed Pennsylvania Hall while she was speaking and burned it to the ground later
that night. “In publicity leading up to the event,” writes Campbell, “she was denounced in the
papers by the Massachusetts clergy as ‘a Godless woman,’ a ‘he-woman,’ even ‘the devil
incarnate’” (The Rhetorical Act 198). We find, then, not just a level of risk in the expression of
Grimké’s rhetorical acts, but risk in the very act of her communicative efforts. Ultimately,
Grimké withdrew from public life shortly after the Pennsylvania Hall speech in 1838, yet lived
until 1879. Frequently battling illness and attending to the education and rearing of her children,
she participated in attending public events and conducted research for abolitionist texts, but her
active rhetorical life lasted only four years (Brown 167-69). Grimké’s rhetoric evinces how a
rhetor calls upon individuals to dig themselves such that both the rhetor and individual audience
members put themselves at risk. Both works addressed here begin by rupturing the
consubstantiality of the audience, engage the publics to whom she communicates on an
individual level in order to have them question themselves, and then lead from a greater
ontological awareness of the self to the possibility of enacting social change.
Consider, first, the opening paragraph of the Appeal:
Respected Friends, It is because I feel a deep and tender interest in your present
and eternal welfare that I am willing thus publicly to address you. Some of you
have loved me as a relative, and some have felt bound to me in Christian
sympathy, and Gospel friendship; and even when compelled by a strong sense of
duty, to break those outward bonds of union which bound us together as members
of the same community, and members of the same religious denomination, you
were generous enough to give me credit, for sincerity as a Christian, though you
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believed I had been most strangely deceived. I thanked you then for your
kindness, and I ask you now, for the sake of former confidence, and friendship, to
read the following pages in the spirit of calm investigation and fervent prayer.
(36)
Notice how the edifying discourse is characterized by a rhetorical movement that renders
conspicuous both the communication situation and the reader’s interpellated self. Grimké
reflexively calls attention to how she will address “you”—in this case, a privileged woman of the
South. Next, she speaks of a common affinity the rhetor and the audience share, Christianity; but
then, having recognized the consubstantiality, Grimké shatters it and asks the individual
communication recipient to re-consider what just such a faith amounts to on a singular basis.
Later in the address, she writes: “Oh! then that the Christians of the south would ponder these
things in their hearts, and awake to the vast responsibilities which rest upon them as this
important crisis” (54). Grimké solicits their consciousnesses first, and only then, later in the
speech, seeks commitment.
The Appeal functions, as Browne writes, with a “revitalized conception of human
agency” (81). The form departs from a standard work of rhetorical deliberation in that Grimké
repeatedly questions accepted religious norms and social customs. She then transforms the mode
of questioning into agential action: responding to why she, Grimké, should appeal to women to
foster change, she writes, “I know you do not make the laws, but I also know that you are the
wives and mothers, the sisters and daughters of those who do; and if you really suppose you can
do nothing to overthrow slavery, you are greatly mistaken” (Appeal 54). As a rhetor, Grimké
does not allow for indifference; her reader must choose, and if she does not choose, then that is a
choice for perpetuating the slavery establishment. Her essay challenges and confronts, above all.
At the very moment Grimké brokers a sense of identification—as a woman, as a Christian, as a
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southerner—she ruptures it to confront the individual reader in a moment of awareness. As
Browne writes, the Appeal attempts to
unburden these citizens from the weight of false community and the past it
represents. In this, the destructive phase of the text, the author refused to her
audience its own appeal to history, religion, gender, or class, the consequence of
which was to give guilt no place to hide—not even in faith itself. (72)
Grimké accomplishes this task by utilizing the edifying method of questioning—not just the
asking of questions to her audience, but by pursuing her interlocutors to question themselves.
Questions, in this frame, need not be answered to the rhetor. As Meyer indicates, the point of
rhetorical questioning is that it leads to interrogativity. “I appeal to you, my friends, as mothers;
Are you willing to enslave your children? You start back with horror and indignation at such a
question. But why, if slavery is no wrong to those upon whom it is imposed?” (51). Grimké here
counters the argument that slavery provides a good, carefree life for those enslaved by calling
forth an ontological moment of questioning for her readership to consider. She solicits empathy
by sparking a moment of thought in her readership.
After bringing about this spark of consciousness by refuting the Biblical justification for
slavery and burdening her reader to question the accepted legitimization of it, Grimké, in the
second half of the pamphlet, maps out a proposal to cultivate agency for her audience. A fourstep process that begins with the subjective and moves to the public sphere, she instructs her
readers to read, pray, speak out, and then, as the last step, act. Agency, for Grimké and all
edifying rhetoric, is a process with no guarantee of a teleological endpoint often associated with
deliberative speech. Action is the final step of this rhetorical movement, and does not necessary
translate to change—only the possibility of change. For Grimké, one must first study the Bible
introspectively and notice how the Old Testament talks of servants, never abject slavery, and that
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the figure of Jesus ushers in a sense of agape which prohibits one person from owning or
controlling another being. Whereas in her Pennsylvania Hall speech, Grimké instructs her
audience to read abolitionist publications, she adapts to the South in “Letter” and recommends
the agential action which is available to her readership. What renders the Appeal as a particular
embodiment of edifying rhetoric, however, is Grimké’s discussion of prayer. In an implicit
reference to the Book of Matthew 6:5-8, she writes:
When you have entered into your closets, and shut to [sic] the doors, then pray to
your father, who seeth in secret, that he would open your eyes to see whether
slavery is sinful, and if it is, that he would enable you to bear a faithful, open and
unshrinking testimony against it, and to do so whatever your hands find to do,
leaving the consequences entirely to [God]. (55-56)
Grimké’s suggestion of prayer is the subjective movement of consciousness found in all edifying
rhetoric. In the Appeal, as we saw with Erasmus and Kierkegaard, it is fundamentally religious in
scope, but with other existentialists, such as Sartre or Beauvoir, it possesses a thoroughly secular
analogue. Whether religious or secular in the content of the appeal, it is a rhetorical effect
galvanized by inspiring the other to think and to consider, ponder and ruminate, question and
evaluate as a prior condition to taking action. The process is made explicit, too, as evident in
Grimké’s four-step call to action.
Appealing through an ontological, subjective rhetoric is, at times, necessary. Edification
is employed as a tool to wield through public recalcitrance, which is often static and fraught with
an ingrained consubstantiality almost impossible to negotiate. Demanding agreement up front in
such a rhetorical act would be dismissed. As a southerner, Grimké is well aware of how
interpellated an affluent white female would be to question the norms of slavery. She therefore
sought to establish identification as a southern Christian woman—but only briefly—as a design
168

to later rupture consubstantiality and burden the individual reader to pray in secret. The above
passage suggests a movement from prayer, seen here as a radical questioning of the self (“to
open your eyes to see whether slavery is sinful”) to the possibility of agency (“to bear a faithful,
open and unshrinking testimony against it, and to do whatsoever your hands find to do”) to not
worrying about the teleological results of one’s actions (“leaving the consequences entirely to
[God]”). In edifying rhetoric, agential action is never predetermined or guaranteed; it is marked
by a movement in which the self negotiates its agential possibilities within one’s own public
sphere. Relying on spirituality as the main thrust of her appeal, Grimké locates the results of this
possibility in God, yet even the divine is no guarantee. For Grimké, creating sites of resistance is
an individual duty or responsibility—specifically, for her, a Christian one.
Only after beseeching her readers to experience an ontological shock of awareness as to
the cruelty of slavery does Grimké proceed with an explicit call to action. Speaking on the
subject proceeds acting on the subject in the Appeal:
Speak then to your relatives, your friends, your acquaintances on the subject of
slavery; be not afraid if you are conscientiously convinced it is sinful, to say so
openly, but calmly, and let your sentiments be known. […] Above all, try to
persuade your husband, father, brothers and sons, that slavery is a crime against
God and man, and that it is a great sin to keep human beings in such abject
ignorance. (56)
Grimké appeals to the very risk of the action entailed in her rhetorical address. She privileges
duty above the wickedness of certain laws and the possibility of failure. “Consequences, my dear
friends, belong no more to you, than they did to these Apostles,” Grimké explains. “Duty is ours
and events are God’s” (58). The ontological appeal of her edifying rhetoric serves to activate in
her readership a sense of duty to act regardless of the results. Later in the pamphlet, Grimké even
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calls attention to the rhetorical situation by admitting her purpose: “my object has been to arouse
you, as the wives and mothers, daughters and sisters, of the South, to a sense of duty as women,
and as Christian women, on that great subject […] until the polluted temple of slavery fall and
crumble into ruin” (64-65). Edification thus begins by arousing one’s consciousness as a catalyst
to induce action—or, in Grimké’s words, duty.
The same method applied to a different rhetorical situation appears in Grimké’s Speech at
Pennsylvania Hall. From the very beginning of the speech, delivered in a hostile setting, Grimké
confronts her audience by identifying with them and then rupturing the consubstantiality: “Men,
brethren and fathers—mothers, daughters and sisters, what came ye out to see? A reed shaken
with the wind? Is it curiosity merely, or a deep sympathy with the perishing slave, that has
brought this large audience together?” (318-19). Grimké’s purpose here is not limited to
garnering support for the abolitionist cause or to oppose the hostility to it—evidenced by the
gathering mob outside—but to arrest the apathy and complicity of the members of her immediate
audience. For Grimké, her listeners cannot merely agree with the abolitionist movement; they
must individually grow cognizant of the importance to join the struggle themselves—and then do
so, actively. The shared identification of their beliefs is considered a red-herring to activating
social change. It perhaps soothes one’s conscience, but Grimké wants each listener to experience
an ontological moment of awareness which will transform the individual to actively participate.
Notice the movement in the following passage, where Grimké positions a change of
consciousness as the necessary task leads to transformative change:
Do you ask, then, ‘what has the North to do?’ I answer, cast out first the spirit of
slavery in your own hearts, and then lend your aid to convert the South. Each one
present has a work to do, be his or her situation what it may, however limited their
means, or insignificant their supposed influence. The great men of this country
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will not do this work; the church will never do it. A desire to please the world, to
keep the favor of all parties and of all conditions, makes them dumb on this and
every other unpopular subject. (319)
Grimké does not permit her audience either apathy or agreement. She addresses them singularly,
such that “each” has a work to do once casting the spirit of slavery from one’s own heart. The
spirit of slavery, for Grimké, infects even those who are not slaveholders or those explicitly
hostile to abolition. It permeates those who would only acknowledge the ills of slavery, but not
wish to do anything about it. She observes later in the speech, for instance, “We may talk of
occupying neutral ground, but on this subject, in its present attitude, there is no such thing as
neutral ground” (321). Grimké thus forces choice, which is brought about by reflection and then
action. Though Japp considers Grimké’s rhetorical persona to speak “with the voice of moral
authority, as one ordained of God to bring a message to the people” (211), her speech is edifying
insofar as the power of her ethos and her message is continually thrown onto the audience
themselves. The objective, for Grimké, is to empower her audience, not merely herself. She does
not deliver truth so much as speak through a wholly reactive rhetoric to enable a sense of agency
in her listeners.
The extended passage above reflects this reactive nature of edifying rhetoric. Because
political and religious leaders, as well as the law, failed to redress the wrongs of slavery, Grimké
prepares an ontological framework in which her audience members can orient themselves to
action. To accomplish this, Grimké approaches her audience singularly—to the individuals
themselves as harbingers of change. They have to exercise their agency since politics and the law
are inadequate structures to create change. As Browne writes, Grimké “rhetorically separated her
listeners from themselves—that is, effected a break in consciousness between complacent
spectatorship and authentic engagement—she reconnected identity and agency immediately
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thereafter” (154). This observation indicates the consubstantial rupture of agreement with those
in her immediate audience who are predisposed to sympathize with abolition. Grimké suggests
that unless one is willing to make an effort to eradicate slavery, they can be associated with the
hostile forces outside the hall. This rhetorical effect is purely edifying in this instance. The
immediate audience must recognize their own complicity with slavery and anti-abolitionist
sentiment in order to be able to combat it.
In analyzing the speech, both Browne and Campbell consider Grimké a prophetic
witness. The power of the witness, writes Browne, is that the rhetor sees and speaks in ways “to
make others see and speak in ways heretofore unthought of” (155). For Campbell, “enact[ing]
the role of [a] prophet” creates a rhetorical persona that legitimizes one’s speech such that “to
reject [Grimké] and her word was to deny prophecy” (Man Cannot Speak for Her 30-31). These
comments are consistent with an edifying frame of rhetoric: as a speaker, Grimké wants the
individual members of her audience to see things differently, as she does, by thinking differently.
Once this new orientation of questioning one’s consciousness is provoked, then Grimké can
proceed to be specific by soliciting commitment from her audience. In both thought and action
throughout the speech, she wants listeners to recognize the risks and opportunities that are
presented. “Here is an opportunity for doing something now,” Grimké says toward the
conclusion. “Every man and woman present may do something by showing that we fear not a
mob, and, in the midst of threatenings and reviling, by opening our mouths for the dumb and
pleading the cause of those who are ready to perish” (322). The only recourse to action for
northern women at the time, she stresses, is the use of petition. Whereas men have the ability to
utilize the ballot box, women can exercise their agency by petitioning the government for a
redress of grievances, as articulated in the First Amendment. The point in urging the
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dissemination of petitions is both a means to combating slavery as well as locating for her
audience members a method by which to exercise their agency.
Grimké concludes the speech by citing how instrumental British women were in
abolishing slavery throughout the British empire. This provides a concrete example of how other
women, lacking the possibility to vote, functioned as agents of social change. The final statement
of the speech reads as follows: “Let the zeal and love, the faith and works of our English sisters
quicken ours—that while the slaves continue to suffer, and when they shout deliverance, we may
feel that satisfaction of having done what we could” (323). Here we find the hope of possibility
similar to the Appeal, but without the religious connotations. Grimké admits the risks and
immense difficulties in both rhetorical works because her goal is to arouse an ontological
realization of how speech itself can function as change. “There is nothing to be feared from those
who would stop our mouths,” she says in the Pennsylvania Hall speech (322). Agency itself is
thus a double-risk: it portends not only the possibility of one’s own failure in achieving an
objective, but one exercises it with the knowledge that great harm could be inflicted upon the
self. Grimké encourages her audience to own up to this double-risk. It is, as she indicates in both
works, a duty. Grimké’s edifying rhetorical works stand out as an exemplar of one who would
locate herself, and her listeners, deep in this risk.
John Ruskin and the Ontological Movement of Edifying Discourse
John Ruskin was a celebrated critic of aesthetics, renown in nineteenth century England
for his writings on paining and architecture. His work was featured in major British periodicals
in addition to the publication of his multi-volume work, Modern Painters, and The Stones of
Venice. His career trajectory changed in 1860, however, with the publication of a series of essays
on the political economy that comprise Unto This Last. Ruskin considered this his most valuable
work,37 yet it did not sell the 1,000 copies of its first printing ten years later (Wilmer 29). One
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review, decrying the new direction of Britain’s foremost art critic, declared that “the world
would simply refuse to be ‘preached to death by a mad governess; and denounced the essays as
‘windy hysterics’, ‘absolute nonsense’ and ‘intolerable twaddle’” (quoted in Wilmer 28). The
immediate reception of Unto This Last was neither well-received nor celebrated, yet its heuristic
quality may be seen in its latent rhetorical effect exercised on Mohandas K. Gandhi, who, in
1904, received the book as a present while working as a lawyer in South Africa. After reading
Unto This Last on a twenty-four hour train ride from Johannesburg to Durban, Gandhi wrote,
“The book was impossible to lay aside, once I had begun it. It gripped me. […] I could not get
any sleep that night. I determined to change my life in accordance with the ideals of the book”
(Gandhi 56). Ruskin’s impact on Gandhi, which the latter describes as bringing about “an
instantaneous and practical transformation in my life” (56), traces the rhetorical impact of an
edifying encounter. Ruskin’s essays do not tell Gandhi what to do as the manifestation of
instrumental will, but arouse a movement of consciousness in Gandhi to consider the possibilities
of one’s ability to foster change. Elizabeth T. McLaughlin captures this edifying rhetorical
movement in her book, Ruskin and Gandhi:
Gandhi interpreted Unto This Last primarily as an expression of attitude. […]
Gandhi read Ruskin as Ruskin longed to be read, as a teacher of virtue stimulating
growth through an I-Thou encounter that aided Gandhi to achieve his own
identity, to discover his “own deepest convictions,” and to fulfill his insight, as he
always did, by existential commitment. (23)
Ruskin’s rhetorical effect on Gandhi thus serves as a clear example of how edifying rhetoric
functions on the plane of attitudinal change and by attempting to position a movement of
consciousness. It also suggests that even those communicative acts which imminently fail posses
a latent rhetorical texture which inspires an edifying moment that encourages an individual to
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consider what it would take to bring about a personal transformation to foster social change
within one’s community.
In Unto This Last, Ruskin offers a refutation of economics proper. The book functions as
a reactive rhetoric to the age and public to whom it is spoken. Within the refutation redounds a
commentary on how the individual should negotiate one’s social interactions. It is not, however,
a ringing endorsement of a fluid sense of egotism. As McLaughlin writes, “Aware that the self is
a social self and the structure of personality and the structure of society influence each other,
Ruskin consider[s] inner moral change rather than the alteration of external arrangements the
best means of improving the social order” (55). In particular, Ruskin’s rhetoric reflects the
edifying position that social improvements begin with a change in the orientation of those
individuals who comprise a public. “[A]ll effectual advancement towards this true felicity of the
human race must be by individual, not public effort,” he writes in the book’s peroration, adding,
“Certain general measures may aid, certain revised laws guide, such advancement; but the
measure and law which have first to be determined are those of each man’s home” (226). What
he does not say explicitly, but is evident in all three aspects of edifying rhetoric considered here,
is that responsive individual effort is the necessary first step to bringing about change. For
edification, one leads to the other; that is, rather, the attitude of individuals must be re-positioned
in order to allow for a public space amenable to change to flourish.38 Part of this attempt to shift
the orientation of a public resembles the project of Kierkegaard, who, as Rubenstein points out,
intended to expose the flaws of an “overly confident nineteenth century” through an
“a/methodology [that] keeps existence and uncertainty as the heart of philosophical reflection”
(451-52). Similarly, Ruskin takes umbrage with the easy self-assurance with which utilitarianism
proceeded in Britain. He wants his readers to not merely swallow the logical efficiency of a
quantitative theory but to find a respect for and consider the social dynamic that an economic
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exchange possesses. “Observe, I neither impugn nor doubt the conclusion of the science if its
terms are accepted,” writes Ruskin in the opening of the series of essays. “I am simply
uninterested in them, as I should be in those of a science of gymnastics which assumed that men
had no skeletons” (168). He attributes the paucity of economics as the inability to deal with
“motive power,” which, “as an unknown quantity, enters into all the political economist’s
equations, without his knowledge, and falsifies every one of their results” (170). Motive power,
as Ruskin conceives it, “render[s] every one of the ordinary political economist’s calculations
nugatory” (171). Ruskin, it would appear, operates from a rhetorical worldview that privileges a
focus on the motives of a situation to evaluate it. This approaches Kenneth Burke’s interest in
motives as well as Deidre McCloskey’s critique of economic theory in her 1985 book, The
Rhetoric of Economics.39
Ruskin ultimately rejects economics as a science on the grounds that it does not
contribute value to human beings despite the fact that its very foundation purports to maximize
value. Since the study of the political economy assigns the ontological value of the single
individual to its codified formulas, the field remains, for Ruskin, a “bastard science, as medicine
from witchcraft, and astronomy from astrology” (Unto 209). Ruskin articulates the distinction by
teasing out the respective differences in obtaining wealth: “Profit, or material gain, is attainable
only by construction or by discovery; not by exchange. Whenever material gain follows
exchange, for every plus there is a precisely equal minus” (213). Profit, then, is a purely
subjective enterprise: only the single individual can “construct” or “discover” gain for oneself.
Supply and demand, meanwhile, relate only to a mass and rely on the “Science of Exchange,” a
flawed system that offers only the illusion of “gain” and “acquisition.” For Ruskin, a more
authentic or ethical theory of economics would have to be “dependent on more than [just]
arithmetic” (211). Specifically, he asserts that there exists no true profit in exchange because it is
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predicated on the advantage of how one person, through economic leverage, exercises
domination over another person. A more equitable consideration of economics, Ruskin asserts,
would have to identify “advantage on both sides […] to the persons exchanging” (214). We find,
in Ruskin’s terms, a dialectical operation where the motives of a given situation must be
considered.
Ruskin’s discourse on labor also operates through an existentialist method of analysis.
Characterizing positive labor as “that which produces life” and negative as “that which produces
death,” the immediacy of existence can be seen to dominate how Ruskin analyzes labor. His
criticism of capital that produces capital, additionally, employs metaphoric language, comparing
such tactics to “bulb producing bulb, never in tulip; seed issuing in seed, never in bread” (218).
Capital does not itself exist as such, for it is not producible for human consumption. Ruskin
dismisses such exercises of wealth insofar that capital does not contribute to the immediate value
of individuals: “Production does not consist in things laboriously made, but in things serviceably
consumable; and the question for the nation is not how much labor it employs, but how much life
it produces” (221). Ruskin is reflective in his treatment of the political economy, encouraging
greater awareness among individuals in the marketplace. Such value, for Ruskin, brings about
one revelatory fact: “THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE” (222). And as with Sartre’s notion
of responsibility for all persons, “the man is richest who, having perfected the functions of his
own life to the utmost,” writes Ruskin, “has also the widest helpful influence, both personal, and
by means of his possessions, over the lives of others” (222). Ruskin wants to sever the cord of
rationality binding the calculus of human behavior together so as to curry recognition of the
existential situation facing humanity. Ultimately, liberal capitalism and utilitarianism offends
Ruskin’s taste in Unto This Last by the assumption that “human actions [… are] guided by
balances of expediency” (169). He shudders at the thought that behavior can be calculated by an
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objective formula: “No man ever knew, or can know, what will be the ultimate result to himself,
or to others, of any given line of conduct.” He adds that an accurate description of economic
theory can be reduced to “‘the art of establishing the maximum inequality in our own favor’”
(182). To this, Ruskin protests again and again in order to oppose the certainty of the age as
manifested in writings on the political economy:
None of these things you can know. One thing only can you know: namely,
whether this dealing of yours is a just and faithful one, which is all you need
concern yourself about respecting it; sure thus to have done your own part in
bringing about ultimately in the world a state of things which will not issue in
pillage or in death. (188)
By privileging what he considers motive power, Ruskin highlights the rhetorical and
existentialist theme of radical contingency in situational action. All economic exchanges are
governed by a rhetorical transaction since “the chief value and virtue of money consists in its
having power over human beings.” Emphasizing this point sparks an immediacy of ontological
awareness which confronts the deterministic measures of economic choice.
Human behavior is neither governed nor dictated in a vacuum. As with the rhetoric of
Angelina Grimké, individuals, in Ruskin’s schematic, contain within themselves the potential for
agency. The system of economic exchange, for Ruskin, is not quantifiable since the “force of the
guinea you have in your pocket depends wholly on the default of a guinea in your neighbor’s
pocket” and that “money power is always imperfect and doubtful; there are many things which
cannot be reached with it, other which cannot be retained with it” (180-81, 188). Operating
through the seemingly relativistic guise of interaction, neither predictable nor necessarily
discernable, economic theory wrongly assumes rationalistic choice. Furthermore, Ruskin wants
his readership to consider the “wholly moral element in demand: that is to say, when you give a
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man half a crown, it depends on his disposition whether he is rich or poor with it” (207). The
essays lack a specific positive articulation of structural change, too, since the Ruskin’s modus
operandi is that of edification. The closest he approaches in advancing a cause is to consider how
people deal with economic exchange—that is, to see it a new light:
We need examples of people who, leaving heaven to decide whether they are to
rise in the world, decide for themselves that they will be happy in it and have
resolved to seek—not greater wealth, but simpler pleasure; not higher fortune, but
deeper felicity; making the first of possessions, self-possession; and honoring
themselves in the harmless pride and calm pursuits of peace. (227)
This passage resembles Grimké in her acceptance of the risks entailed with human action. The
edifying leap is thus that which affords no guarantee in results, but only the dedication of
responding to a duty thus exercised. “And though absolute justice be unattainable,” writes
Ruskin, “as much justice as we need for all practical use is attainable by all those who make it
their aim” (194). There is no endpoint offered in Ruskin’s rhetoric. He cannot guarantee the
perfection of economic structures, but he does want people to grow more cognizant and reconsider accepted norms and values.40
Towards the final pages of the last essay of the book, entitled “Ad Valorem”, Ruskin
maps out why he is interested in motivating the singular individual to respond to his work. He
addresses his readership on a completely intersubjective plane: “In all buying, consider first,
what condition of existence you cause in the producers of what you buy” (227). It becomes clear
that the objective of the essays is to encourage a moment of subjective awareness—the
relationship between the self and of others. This rhetorical movement is recognized in a letter by
Ruskin’s editor at the time, Thomas Carlyle: “You go down thro’ those unfortunate DismalScience people […] like a fit of British Cholera—threatening to be fatal. I have read your paper
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with exhilaration, often with laughter, with Bravissimo!—Such a thing flung suddenly into half a
million dull British heads on the say day, will do a great deal of good” (Correspondence 89).
Carlyle captures both the reactive and singular rhetorical texture of edification. Ruskin embodies
edifying rhetoric in Unto This Last because he confronts accepted norms and communicates to
his readership on an individual basis, teasing out the singular from the mass. While the book may
not have been met with commercial or political success at the time it was published, its rhetorical
power arrested Gandhi such that he recounts “discover[ing] some of my deepest convictions in
this great book of Ruskin, and that is why it so captured me and made me transform my life”
(Gandhi 56). To Gandhi, Ruskin was a poet—“one who can call forth the good latent in the
human breast.” In a sense, edifying rhetoric shares with poetry the risk of suspending meaning in
the ears, eyes, hands, and minds of the interlocutor. Like poets, edifying rhetors offer expression
with no guarantee of meaning or results. The rhetorical impact of edification is thus not dictated,
but affected through subjective consideration and interpretation.
Whither Edifying Public Address?
The three rhetorical figures considered here, combined with the preceding theorization of
edification, are offered to map out and identify a unique species of rhetoric with the hope that
rhetoricians can distinguish and employ such communicative strategies in the future. While
rhetoric is often associated with finding practical ends to particular situationa, the lasting virtue
of edification and the three rhetors considered here is that we find an individual change in
orientation or attitude instrumental to preparing the groundwork of future action. Edification
amounts to a building block whereby a rhetor recognizes the limits to the rhetorical situation and
attempts to create the conditions of a consciousness amenable to future change. As evident by the
historical failure of the three persons considered here, an edifying rhetorical act is not identified
by the causal success of the historical situation. Persuasion is something that ensues and is not
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something pursued. It does, however, seek to motivate the agency of the individuals to whom an
address is communicated, leaving the undefined future to the consideration and action of others.
The question of poetics within the edifying act is also something scholars should
consider. What, for instance, does beginning with an aesthetic frame amount to? Does it always
equate to immediate failure but fame in posterity? In the case of Erasmus, Grimké, and Ruskin,
we find three persons equally castigated by their contemporaries for their rhetorical efforts; none
of them lived to see the changes they were trying to effect. Is it merely the aesthetic flourish of
their style that we commemorate? Perhaps in part, but one cannot limit it to that. Erasmus,
Grimké and Ruskin have been read and will continue to be read because they focus and inspire
one’s attitude despite the distance in years, language, and geography. Edification, it would seem,
functions beyond the immediate exigence of a rhetorical situation; it prepares a shift in individual
consciousness that translates beyond the immediate historical setting. They certainly did not
intend to fail rhetorically in their communicative acts, but Erasmus, Grimké and Ruskin were
willing to wager their expressions as an index of duty or virtue. Each transcended structures of
law and politics for a moment of ontological awareness in the hopes that future social structures
may be sutured with individual attitudes that demand greater fairness, equality, and concerns for
others.
Endnotes
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For an analysis of the similarities between Erasmus’s Enchiridion and Plato’s Republic, see Gordon, 75-78, in
which the former’s invisible world and the latter’s noumenal world are conflated.
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In the 1862 preface of Unto This Last’s publication in book form, Ruskin writes that despite the fact the essays
“were reprobated in a violent manner [….] I believe them to be the best, that is to say, the truest, rightest-worded,
and most serviceable things I have ever written” (161).
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We find a similar rhetorical theme stressed in Ruskin’s 1864 lecture, “Of Kings’ Treasuries,” later published as
Sesame and Lillies: “There is only one cure for public distress—and that is public education, directed to make men
thoughtful, merciful, and just. There are, indeed, many laws conceivable which would greatly better and strengthen
the national temper; but, for the most part, they are such that as the national temper must be much bettered before it
would bear” (66).
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Oddly, McCloskey does not cite Ruskin, whose essay would seem to strengthen the argument.
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One of Ruskin’s objectives to reaching a more equitable social frame is discusses in the 1862 preface appended to
the essays in book form: “if we once can get a sufficient quantity of honesty in our captains [of industry], the
organization of labor is easy, and will develop itself without quarrel or difficulty; but if we cannot get honesty in our
captains, the organization of labor is evermore impossible” (163).
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CONCLUSION
“After this [rhetorical] turn [in the humanities],
joining communicative structures of speech-acts
with their existential praxis-dimension is not only
theoretically possible. It is crucial for a more
thorough critical theory of liberation.”
-

Martin Beck Matustik, “Existential Social Theory” (159)

This project has sought to establish and fortify new understandings of rhetorical inquiry and
existentialism. Often categorized as an epistemological subset of philosophy proper,
existentialism is advanced here as a rhetorical orientation to the world whose primary focus is
negotiating the meaning in life. This idea of a rhetorical worldview, grounded in an ontological
view of communication first conceived by the sophists and later actualized by existentialism,
suggests that the discipline of rhetoric should not be limited to explorations and evaluations of
suasory discourse. Specifically, I argue that rhetorical inquiry should expand its breadth into a
two-fold process that begins by recognizing how humans are existentially situated within the
world: equipped with only communicative resources to negotiate the meaning in life, humans
have little recourse to the security of scientific or theological truth(s) to guide their social
interactions and projects, let alone evince a meaning of life. Only having first established this
ontological framework of human relations and social interaction can or should rhetorical inquiry
move toward articulating methods of understanding about the efficacy of communicative
practices. The formatting of this project reflects this view of rhetoric in that the first two chapters
are concerned with the ontological foundations of rhetoric and its necessary convergence with
existentialism; the third chapter, which addresses the controversial topic of agency, serves as a
bridge which affords the possibilities of rhetorical action; and the final two chapters
conceptualize and apply a unique species of rhetorical address, edification, which is adapted
from the methods by which the existentialists themselves communicated. As such, it moves from
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emphasizing the significance of discursive interaction itself to the ways in which the content and
form of a particular kind of discourse can affect publics more authentically.
This is not to suggest that one is privileged over the other. Rather, it reflects my
understanding that to conduct rhetorical inquiry is to require a discussion of both. Rhetoric is
about the world and in the world such that humans necessarily interact with what Kenneth Burke
calls symbolic action. It is not limited to evaluating merely how we communicate; rhetoric deals
with the wherefore of communication by bodies that learn language. My thesis can be
encapsulated thus: In order to examine singular rhetorical acts one must first acknowledge the
fallibility and tenuousness of the very symbol systems by which we (have to) communicate
(with). Humans are primarily divided as singular consciousnesses in existence, yet the resources
of communication or symbolic action betoken a drive for identification with one another. The
need to suture this divisive gap manifests itself as both an urge and a necessity, but it is also
dangerous insofar as the illusion of consubstantiation can degenerate into bad faith. An authentic
rhetoric is necessary, then, to balance transcending the biological divisions of existence and the
totalizing frame of pure identification. I have argued that existentialism provides an orientation
to the world grounded in the primacy of symbolic action and the ability to negotiate social
experiences with an authentic rhetoric, edification, which cautions itself against the temptations
of pure identification. Conceived as a rhetorical construct, existentialism recognizes the
imperfections inherent to communication yet is prepared to face the contingencies and
uncertainties that abound with creativity and humility. While to many it remains a defunct
philosophy of the past, a more thorough-going research of existentialism demonstrates that its
focus resides in exploring why we, as humans, communicate, and how we, as humans, might
better communicate with one another. In this conclusion, I summarize and highlight the heuristic
value of each chapter while presenting some of the limitations to my study. I also consider how
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my project can catalyze future research in communication studies and where it can be located
among scholarship in the humanities—rhetorical inquiry in particular.
The first chapter of this project posits that existentialism revives a neo-sophistical
orientation of rhetoric. Based on the extant writings of the Greek sophists, I articulate a
worldview that is grounded upon recognizing the ontological aspects of communication. I argue
that while this rhetorical orientation to the world has been overlooked in the history of rhetoric
since Plato and Aristotle, subtle traces of it surface in the works of Cicero, St. Augustine and
Giambattista Vico. My central claim is that while it is acknowledged by more contemporary
rhetoricians such as Richard Weaver and Ernesto Grassi, its fullest expression is galvanized by
the existentialist movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Adapting the tenets of
existentialism in such a way moves rhetoric away from discovering the True or the Good and
locates rhetorical inquiry as an orientation to the world as much as an understanding of the
world. This neo-sophistical view of rhetoric begins, I argue, with Nietzsche’s proclamation of the
death of God—but this death by no means speaks to any factual account of God’s existence. It
merely signals the abandonment of human social interaction to symbolic action, which relies on
the imperfect process of communication between persons. Rhetorical inquiry and existentialism
converge in that both are concerned with negotiating the meaning in life as opposed to
discovering the meaning of life. The latter may reflect the methodologies and objectives of
philosophy, science, and theology, but it is beyond the communicative capacities/capabilities of
bodies that learn language, as understood by both rhetoric and existentialism. A neo-sophistical
view of rhetoric, I argue, operates as a function of the existentialist concept of freedom, as
mapped out by Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, and Simone de Beauvoir. A larger claim I advance
here is that we, as humans, are condemned to rhetoric in that we cannot escape the total will-tocommunication outlined by existentialists such as Merleau-Ponty and Jaspers. By emphasizing
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the ontological aspects of communication inherent to rhetoric, it is my contention that rhetorical
inquiry should no longer fall into the Platonic Trap, which subordinates rhetoric to dialectic and
that which is True or Good. I demonstrate how this focus on the purity of the validity of
communicative interaction ultimately harms rhetorical inquiry as a discipline.
My hope is that this chapter will add to the effort of rhetoricians who correct the
injustices leveled against the sophists. Some may inquire as to whether this is still necessary—an
understandable concern. To this I would rejoin that any time the term, rhetoric, is invoked in the
popular imagination as a way to signal empty speech or bullshit, this reflects Plato’s critique of
rhetoric found in the Gorgias, and, to a lesser extent, the Phaedrus. To gain more traction in the
popular imagination, rhetoric can be renewed as an intellectual enterprise which is existentially
grounded in a neo-sophistical worldview. The sophists were not simply literary mercenaries but
thinkers who understood how our lives are defined by the negotiation of communication. They
were, in short, the first existentialists. It is of great importance that rhetoric be understood as both
how language can be used more effectively and the significance of why language is
intersubjectively communicated by existing persons. Both the sophists and the existentialists
continually emphasize this, which should be emphasized as a central tenet to rhetorical inquiry
rather than be ignored or dismissed as a philosophical endeavor. Whether fair or not, it is the
duty of rhetoricians to rehabilitate an understanding of rhetoric—not just to advance scholarly
knowledge but to advance and teach the heuristic qualities of rhetoric. As such, definitions of
rhetoric should expand beyond merely an investigation of the faculties of persuasion and
encompass a broader vantage point upon which to understand social interaction. Existentialism
captures this lost orientation and helps re-articulate the marginalized understanding of rhetoric.
Chapter 2 begins a conversation between existentialism and Kenneth Burke, who is often
considered the father of contemporary rhetoric. I am careful to not call Burke an existentialist
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since it is misguided to reduce existentialism to identity or membership—for even the
existentialists themselves resisted the label. As the first chapter indicates, existentialism provides
an orientation to the world grounded in contingency and negotiated by communication, one
beyond pure reason and fully adapted by the ontological interaction of language. By contesting
Burke’s own understanding of existentialism, I suggest that his work aligns with it insofar as
both sought to collapse the distinctions between epistemology and ontology. Both, that is, were
preoccupied with the fungible texture of communication, which eliminates the possibility of
capturing knowledge as a static truth-claim. The unending conversations of the well-known
Burkean parlor, first described in his 1941 compilation, The Philosophy of Literary Form, is then
examined as a representative anecdote for existentialism. I argue that the contingency of the
parlor, which lacks any a priori justification, mirrors the existentialist understanding of human
abandonment in the world. The revelation here is that while each individual is a unique, solitary
consciousness, taken together, we, as humans, necessarily rely on one another to create and
furnish meaning(s) in existence. First, though, each individual must adopt a frame of acceptance
to enter the Burkean parlor without bad faith, which would necessitate focusing on the meaning
of the parlor. To this end, I envisage an individual who enters the parlor with a scientistic or
theologically-determined orientation, and contrast this by hypothesizing how Soren Kierkegaard
would adapt to the parlor. A danger to the Burkean parlor, I suggest, is the temptation for its
inhabitants to preoccupy themselves with justifying the parlor and creating a totalizing frame of
identification with one another. The danger of identification is then explored by comparing the
critical works of Burke and Sartre regarding anti-Semitism; each attempts to caution against the
attraction for publics to degenerate into bad faith, which I consider a corollary to Burkean
identification. Rhetoric will always feature a consubstantial drive to link people together for a
common purpose, but it must not proceed as a totalizing frame of pure identification which
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would abolish any sense of agency or choice for an individual consciousness. The last section
suggests existentialist literature functions rhetorically as acts of meta-communication and serves
as representative anecdotes which situate characters who struggle between isolating themselves
from the world and joining a group or cause in pure identification. Specifically, I examine
Samuel Beckett’s play, Waiting For Godot, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground,
and Herman Hesse’s Siddhartha as rhetorical acts that encourage readers to realize the primacy
of communication and reflect on how to authentically act.
While I am sensitive to Burkean interpretations which would otherwise prohibit an
association with existentialism, my adaptation of Burke allows for a clearer articulation of what
existentialism offers—namely, an orientation to the world grounded in symbolic action. In
general, my project aims at rendering existentialism more palatable to rhetorical scholarship, and
though such figures as Calvin O. Schrag, Craig Smith, Michael Hyde and Karlyn Kohrs
Campbell have alluded to such a connection, it has never entirely been fleshed out. In fact, I
admit that such a project linking Burke with existentialism is not worthy of a chapter, but might,
as I move forward, be grounds for a book-length study that incorporates literary and rhetorical
criticism, the ontology of communication, and the rhetoric of religion. This chapter serves as a
stepping-stone that can inspire future scholarship with Burke’s legion of academic followers, of
which I include myself. My hope is that this essay, like the entire project, will challenge the
common understanding of rhetoric and be critically challenged to defend itself, as I am prepared
to do. As the anecdotal opening to the chapter hints at, it is difficult to pigeon-hole Burke. My
aim, then, has not been to label Burke an existentialist, but to demonstrate the shared
perspectives between the two.
Chapter 3 articulates a Sartrean account of rhetorical agency, which has been a
controversial topic in contemporary rhetorical scholarship. I first implicate Heidegger’s
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misguided reading of existentialism as intimidating rhetorical scholars to consider it as a worthy
intellectual enterprise and grounding for conceiving a concept of agency. A great deal of
published work relies on Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” which sullies the work of JeanPaul Sartre. This chapter refutes such a view and demonstrates how existentialism contributes to
an understanding of agency that might satisfy both traditional and postmodernist rhetorical
scholars. In particular, I demonstrate how existentialism maintains the possibilities of responseability within the rhetorical act of expression but acknowledges that this by no means guarantees
meaning, which must be corroborated by others. At the behest of an audience of interlocutors,
the rhetor cannot dominate the meaning of one’s expression. As Sartre indicates, communication
is but a flight outside the self, and this can never be considered an autonomous property for it is
others who share in the ownership of the meaning. An existentialist account of rhetorical agency
thus manifests itself as the free exercise of individual expression within the facticity of a
rhetorical situation and dependent upon an audience to breathe life into the meaning of such a
communicative act. Since the existentialist account of freedom details both the radical
contingency and the limiting circumstances of a situation, we can begin to see rhetorical agency
as always that which is possible rather than the causal explanations of historical action found in
traditional rhetoric and the negation of agency evident in postmodern scholarship.
I seek not only to correct misunderstandings about existentialism but to identify the
misguided conflation between modernism and humanism as well, which is reflected in the title of
Heidegger’s essay. Humanism is, as Ernesto Grassi writes, a rhetorical endeavor that
concentrates on how being is tied up with the problematic uses of language. Modernism, by
contrast, begins with Cartestian thought and posits an unfettered, fluid sense of consciousness
and agency. Rhetorical inquiry and existentialism belong to the former camp—not the latter—yet
this is continually taken for granted. In refuting Heidegger’s analysis of humanism and
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existentialism, I do not mean to discount his corpus of works, but I think it is fruitful for
rhetorical scholars to begin more closely considering existentialism, with its focus on language
and meaning, as opposed to concentrating on Heidegger, who investigated language as it
discloses our abstract understanding of being. While it is perhaps fashionable in the wake of
Derrida, Foucault, and the death of the subject to call oneself a post-humanist, I question the
implications for rhetorical scholarship since the humanistic subject, as understood from Vico to
Grassi and by existentialism, is already de-centered. Existentialism serves as a profitable way to
begin recognizing and analyzing how agency functions because it features the idea of a rhetorical
agent who, grounded in the contingency of a situation, addresses a public with a communicative
act that is offered as the risk of a meaning and becoming which is always corroborated or
enacted later with the help of others. The efficacy of a rhetorical act should not be interpreted on
the causal criteria of its historical success, but the possibilities of response-ability which a
rhetorical agent attempts to activate for the individuals of her audience. At the risk of sounding
naïve and overly optimistic, I think an existentialist account of rhetorical agency serves as
middle ground in which both camps of the divide might find agreement. For traditional rhetorical
scholars, there still exists the freedom of agential invention within the rhetorical situation; for
postmodernists, the rhetorical agent is not viewed as in complete control of the situation insofar
as one’s facticity and expression is complicated by structural limitations and the feedback of
others.
While Grassi insists over and again what humanism explores and what it does not, his
call fails to gain much traction with the post-humanist camp. One way in which this chapter may
be extended is by moving beyond rhetorical agency and trying to conceive a new conception of
humanism within rhetorical studies. I might begin by calling it ex-humanism, which would refer
to exhuming the richer qualities of humanism without the baggage of the modernist subject. Its
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name offers a new direction away from the abundance of “post”-theories, and it would seek to
inclusion rather than exclusion: ex-humanism would mix the canon of existentialism—in
particular, the works which focus explicitly on communication—with the writings of Vico,
Burke, and, more recently, that of Michel Meyer, Richard Rorty (maybe), Henry W. Johnstone,
Martin Beck Matustik, Schrag, and Campbell. Ex-humanistic thought might be characterized as
the sincere effort to recover a sense of agency while simultaneously acknowledging the antifoundational, de-centering process of the rhetorical turn in the humanities. It is, of course, a
project in its nascent conceptual stages, but these thinkers merit an active, critical categorization
from which they are often denied by postmodernism and posthumanism. Existentialism has
suffered from being limited to only existentialists, the identity of which is problematic, so it
might benefit from expanding rather than limiting its scope. I have not been so bold to discard
the term entirely because this project has argued that the main consistency within existentialism
is a rhetorical orientation that emphasizes communication, but it might be profitable in the future
to divorce the existentialists from their heading if a rhetorical understanding of existentialism is
found unconvincing or wanting.
The last two chapters formulate a particular genre of speech which I call edification. The
first is a conceptual theorization of edifying discourse, the second an application of identifying
rhetorical acts which communicate with an edifying frame. To conceive edification as a species
of rhetoric, I examine how existentialism rhetorically communicates. Unlike the Aristotelian
models of deliberative, forensic, and epideictic, which are geared toward actualizing a telos,
edification advances as an ontological rhetorical address which re-positions attitudes of the
individuals of an audience. It does not seek categorical agreement from a public but looks to
interrogate the individual members of an audience. Edifying speech attempts to create a change
in viewpoint without guaranteeing the actualization of a specific endpoint. I use the term
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ontological shock as a way to understand edification as those rhetorical acts which explicitly try
to bring about a change in consciousness. It is public address geared toward the individuals of an
audience as opposed to the group en masse. As such, edification contrasts Perelman’s
articulation of the universal audience, which is based on calling forth a universalized public
through rational deliberation, and Plato’s drive for truth, which is grounded in the Socratic
method. Edification takes it cues from Kierkegaard’s understanding of indirect communication: a
rhetor can only speak to individuals and incite them to independent thought and activities; one
cannot communicate the truth through didactic propositions. Edifying rhetoric proceeds in risk
such that this type of discourse is offered to the freedom of others, who might reject it, and relies
on the individuals of a public to furnish the communicative act with meaning. As a rhetorical
method, edification does not pursue persuasion, but lets it ensue based on the will of others. A
quote I have repeated throughout this project is Michael Hyde’s contention that existentialists
want people to speak a rhetoric rather than be spoken by a rhetoric. Edification captures this
quality in that it does not seek pure identification, which can be presented as either an idea such
as that which is true or good, or a public to which an individual can float with the mass. By
contrast, edifying rhetoric sparks a movement of consciousness where the interlocutor of the
audience may dig themselves authentically by becoming more aware of the situation at hand, reconsidering the common understandings of the topic presented, and finding a way to negotiate
one’s social environment.
After theoretically sketching a rhetoric of edification, the last chapter examines three
rhetorical actors who adopt an edifying frame with which to communicate. The works of
Erasmus of Rotterdam, Angelina Grimké and John Ruskin are explored as illustrations of this
particular species of rhetoric. Analyzed through the prism of edification, each rhetor can be seen
as attempting to provoke an ontological spark in their contemporaries. None of the three specify
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an endpoint to their communicative acts; each is invested in activating a change in consciousness
for the individuals of their readership and/or audience so as to lead to an alteration of the means
which can lead to social change. In surveying these figures, it is admitted that each initially fail
to cultivate immediate historical success, but their work remains heuristically solvent insofar as
they are honored by posterity owing to the edifying texture of each address. Erasmus, Grimké
and Ruskin proceeded with a risk, aware that their rhetoric might fall on deaf ears. However,
they enable the possibility of agency in those who listen or read their works. This is most evident
in Ruskin’s residual impact on Gandhi, who recounts the ontological shock of reading Unto This
Last and resolves to change his life. One of the characteristics of edifying address is that the
interlocutor does not merely follow the discourse offered, but adapts and applies it, after
conscious reflection, to one’s own life so as to activate social change. Gandhi adopts the
orientation Ruskin considers, not the specific policies uttered. Edifying rhetoric seeks to alter the
consciousness of individuals within a public since even the passing of laws cannot guarantee the
freedom of others. Its ultimate goal is to re-position attitudes, not draft legislation. In doing so,
edification, as evident in the work of Erasmus, Grimké, and Ruskin, rupture the consubstantial
agreements of a public. Such a rhetoric challenges individual members of a rhetorical audience
insofar as the auditor or reader is asked to confront oneself and question the accepted truths of an
epoch. A reworking of the public address from these three rhetors is examined such that others
may begin to identify other acts of edification, and that it be seen as unique strategy of discourse
apart from the Aristotelian models of deliberative, forsensic, and epidictic rhetoric.
Developing and applying edification is offered to gain acceptance as a new rhetorical
construct of discourse. Unlike other models, it does not pursue agreement or that which is
efficacious. My goal is that rhetoricians might consider the method of edification when
examining other discourses of confrontational rhetoric and extend it beyond what I have traced
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out here. Erasmus, Grimké and Ruskin are three selections of rhetorical actors who adopt an
edifying frame, but I want to encourage others to identify more and begin interpreting the
performance of rhetorical acts apart the historical efficacy of particular addresses. I think my
work on edification helps recognize what a rhetoric of authenticity might look like because it
avoids the pitfalls of consubstantiation and pure identification. It acknowledges the drive to
identify with one another, but does not yield to the temptation of purchasing success at the price
of bad faith. As such, an existentialist account of authenticity has taken this understanding of
rhetoric to the shores of ethics. A rhetorical act is ethical not by the causal effect of its pragmatic
good(-ness), which can only be evaluated through an a fortiori historical reconstruction of the
rhetorical situation, but by the authenticity of its performance. That is to say, a rhetor is ethical or
authentic insofar as she exposes the risk of her expression to the individuals of a public, who
then furnish the communicative act with meaning. An unethical act of rhetoric finds a rhetor
attempting to dominate the meaning of one’s own expression and failing to pay deference to the
fact that meaning is a joint effort. Edification represents a form of rhetorical communication that
renders its own discursive offering explicit in the hope that individuals may experience a call to
responsibly consider the address and then interact with meaning. The auditor or reader is
disciplined to participate individually since the address encourages a reaction of any kind;
existentialism and the edifying frame of rhetoric suggest that not choosing is itself a choice. An
edifying rhetoric does not permit the auditor or reader to purely identify with the rhetor or the
public to whom the discourse is addressed. Yet having articulated what an ethical rhetoric of
authenticity may look like theoretically and how it has been deployed in the past in Chapters 4
and 5, it is fair to ask whether such a rhetoric is possible in a globalized world.
The short of it is I don’t know. I have my hopes, but am as of yet uncertain. I would
argue the rational-based methodology of public communicative interaction advanced by
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Perelman, Habermas, and, more recently, Al Gore, attempts to create a fair and equitable
rhetorical network of society, but it does so by ignoring both the creative and the fallible aspects
of human communicative practices. Their intentions are sound, yet they underestimate the
inventiveness of language, with its gifts of irony and its pervasive misunderstandings when
communicated, and the radical contingency of human affairs. Ultimately, they think rhetoric can
be controlled, its dynamic qualities arrested so as to ensure the integrity of communicative
interaction—hence their reliance on reason. On the other hand, postmodern or posthumanist
rhetorics challenge any totalizing social frames of communication and question the freedom of
the rhetorical agent in the contemporary world. Existentialism anticipates some of these
postmodern criticisms yet also provides a profitable middle ground wherein persons can
recognize their inextricable ties to one another yet admit difference in a matter that lets them
move forward. It offers a way to look at the world and negotiate oneself within the world.
Despite the multiplicity of languages that abound, communication itself it the one certainty we
can be aware of. The problem, of course, is that communication necessary leads to uncertainty.
Anything is possible when God, would that He exists, does not play puppet-master, but
these possibilities require the risks of committed rhetorical acts from persons who are aware of
their potential failure. What the phrase, existential struggle, refers to is not the pain of an
isolated, lonely consciousness, but the realization of just how hard it is to be-with-others in a
world without pre-set values or determined outcomes. There is an implicit failure to the human
condition, and this struggle signals both a need for and the deficiency of rhetoric in a world
without assurances. Rhetoric is that faculty which we possess to negotiate the existential struggle
of a species continually suspicious of itself, ever prone to war, and fearful of uncertainty. To
deny the preponderance of rhetorical communication is to exercise bad faith, and to focus solely
on the Good or the True is a way to avoid our rhetorical being as existents. We have no
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guarantees other than nothing itself is guaranteed, but, with that, existentialism and rhetoric
ultimately turn our attention to the hopes of a future that may never be actualized but always
remains possible. As such, we can begin to conceive a rhetoric of virtue through our existential
commitments—something evident in the work of Grimké and Ruskin, in particular.
It may not be popular to admit, but the existentialists are correct in their assessment of a
world where God is dead and his absence, indeed, permits everything. Should the outpost of
humanity outlined here be met with suspicions of pure relativism, know that its result is not that
nothing matters—rather, everything can be seen to matter. A bountiful texture of meaning must
continually be constructed, decoded, and processed with the help of others. Indeed, the relativism
to which rhetoric has been charged with for over 2,000 years and whose mantle was resuscitated
by the existentialists should be confronted with openness. The existentialists have been critiqued
for saying life is meaningless. On the contrary, existentialism presents life as meaning-full—in
fact, absurdly so. Not because of any a priori justification, but by the sheer proliferation of
rhetorical interactions that abound. Our existence is thus rhetorically inscribed and suffused with
meaning. This project has attempted to acknowledge the insecurity of our being and how
existentialism arouses a rhetorical view of life that allows us to negotiate the anxieties of such a
world with an authentic humility. While the faculties of communication prohibit actualizing the
Good or reaching the Truth, we may, in the last, exercise rhetorical practices that risk
encouraging one another to consider what might be better in the future given the radical
contingency of the ever-unfolding present and the failures of the past. Perfection, clearly, is not
of this realm; hence the need to equip ourselves with a rhetorical worldview that harnesses our
ability to communicate with humility, openness, and an awareness of our own symbolic
deficiencies.
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